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Summary 
The thesis explores whether and how analytical activities during the policy formulation 
process - typically referred to as Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) - contribute to a 
reorientation of policy-making towards the goals of sustainable development. During the 
1990s and the 2000s, many OECD countries introduced, extended or formalised proce-
dures for RIA. Many of these reforms also stated to aim at giving more regard to sus-
tainability issues. In the political science literature on environmental policy integration, 
such appraisal procedures have been considered as an important instrument to ensure 
that environmental effects of new measures play a more prominent role in decision-
making processes. 
Based on extensive empirical analysis involving a review of all RIA procedures in the EU 
as well as 59 case studies of individual assessments, the research aims to establish to 
what extent and under what conditions these procedures contribute to sustainable de-
velopment in practice.  
The research finds that RIA offers opportunities to give more prominence to ecological 
concerns in sectoral policy-making practice, but also contains a considerable risk that 
narrow assessment practices contribute to sidelining sustainable development. The re-
search observes not only a large implementation gap, but reveals that even in cases 
where a substantial RIA is undertaken, the process functions very differently from what 
has been envisioned both in guidance documents and in the environmental policy inte-
gration literature. After analysing the actual roles of assessment knowledge in policy 
processes, the study concludes that the positivist perspective underlying both theory and 
practice of policy appraisal is inadequate to account for its political and practical uses. 
The thesis then moves on to adopt the more post-positivist perspective of reflexive gov-
ernance which implies a fundamentally different set of expectations about the uses and 
effects of policy appraisal. By reinterpreting the empirical material from this theoretical 
lens, the study finds considerable potential for RIA to serve as a reflexive governance 
arrangement, but also identifies a number of structural limitations. Five approaches for 
making RIA more reflexive are identified: focusing on the function of opening up rather 
than closing down decision-making; increasing participation; defining process rather than 
material standards; extending the appraisal towards frame reflexivity; and understanding 
RIA as boundary work. The thesis concludes with the argument that the reflexive gov-
ernance literature should not only develop and study new government arrangements 
outside the core institutions of representative democracies, but undertake more efforts to 
identify opportunities to reshape the working of the classical-modernist institutions in 
more reflexive ways to foster more integrative and sustainable policy-making/to improve 
environmental governance. 
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“If geologists themselves, rather stolid and serious types, see humanity as a force of the 
same amplitude as volcanoes or even of plate tectonics, one thing is now certain: we 
have no hope whatsoever – no more hope in the future than we had in the past – of 
seeing a definitive distinction between Science and Politics. 
Bruno Latour, An Inquiry into Modes of Existence, 2013 
 
“Governance matters, but so does government.” 
Albert Weale, Governance, Government and the Pursuit of Sustainability, 2009 
 
1. Introduction 
1.1 Background, objectives and research context 
The multiple global and local ecological crises humanity is facing today have 
raised the stakes of the academic and political discussion on environmental gov-
ernance. Numerous national and international studies – most prominently the 
IPCC reports (e.g. IPCC 2014) and the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 
(Millennium Ecosystem Assessment 2005) – have highlighted the extent to which 
human activities are damaging natural resources, thereby undermining vital eco-
system services. Since around the middle of the last century, global socio-
economic development – as described by indicators such as population, economic 
activity, transportation, food production and energy use – has sharply accelerated 
(Steffen et al. 2015). The risk of crossing ecosystem boundaries with the conse-
quence of abrupt and irreversible environmental changes is increasing. The impact 
of human activity on planetary ecological systems is now such that geologists are 
discussing whether we have entered a new geological epoch - the Anthropocene 
(ibid.). Given the fundamental changes required to steer away from the dynamics 
of an ever-faster over-exploitation of natural resources and sinks, the environmen-
tal crisis is, above all and at its core, a governance challenge (Adger and Jordan 
2009). The question how our governance institutions can be re-shaped to be able 
to break with current crisis dynamics and steer towards pathways which respect 
environmental limits has become urgent and existential. 
The multi-faceted body of academic knowledge which attempts to respond to this 
challenge from a political science perspective has – depending on context and 
emphasis – been referred to as environmental or sustainability governance litera-
ture (cf. for example Weale et al. 2002, Lafferty 2004, Jänicke and Jörgens 2006, 
Voß, Bauknecht, et al. 2006, Jordan and Lenschow 2008, Adger and Jordan 2009 
to cite just a few major monographs in this area). The majority of contributors to 
this literature are political scientists from across Europe, especially the UK, Ger-
many and the Netherlands, as well as from North America. Key questions ad-
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dressed in this literature are, for example: How can environmental concerns be 
given more weight in political decision-making across all areas of policy? What 
institutional frameworks can strengthen long-term and diffuse environmental inter-
ests vis-à-vis short-term economic considerations? How can policy and society 
consciously steer the development of complex socio-technical systems towards 
less energy and resource intensive pathways? What knowledge is required in poli-
cy-making to avoid negative environmental effects and to invent new, sustainable, 
social and technological solutions? How can robust and legitimate decisions be 
made in the face of uncertainty about environmental effects? What degree of pre-
caution is reasonable in these circumstances? What is the role of both hierarchical 
(government) and non-hierarchical (governance) methods and arrangements of 
decision-making in environmental policy? How can accountability and legitimacy 
be secured in new modes of governance? This thesis aims to contribute to this 
literature. It addresses one particular aspect of sustainability governance: the ana-
lytical activities during the policy formulation process, typically referred to as 
‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ (RIA). It aims to understand whether and how 
Regulatory Impact Assessment promotes the consideration of environmental and 
sustainability concerns in policy-making. 
Being written over the course of about twelve years, this thesis describes an aca-
demic journey during which both the questions asked and the answers given have 
evolved. When the first journal article (chapter 2 of the thesis) was published in 
2003, there was a general optimism about the ability to reconcile economic, social 
and environmental requirements by fundamentally transforming approaches to 
collective decision-making. During the years following the UN Conference on Envi-
ronment and Development in 1992, numerous policy processes were initiated at 
global, national and local levels to advance sustainable development and to im-
plement the manifold outputs of the conference, especially the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development and the Agenda 21. 
One of the policy principles which played a prominent role in this process – espe-
cially in industrialised countries – was environmental policy integration. It was de-
veloped to systematically and strategically address the basic challenge formulated 
almost three decades ago in the seminal report by the World Commission on Envi-
ronment and Development “Our Common Future”: “The mandates of ministries of 
industry include production targets, while the accompanying pollution is left to min-
istries of the environment. Electricity boards produce power, while the acid pollu-
tion they also produce is left to other bodies to clean up. The present challenge is 
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to give the central economic and sectoral ministries the responsibilities for the 
quality of those parts of the human environment affected by their decisions […]” 
(World Commission on Environment and Development 1987, p. 11). 
The 1990s and 2000s saw a surge in academic publications on environmental pol-
icy integration in political science (e.g. Lenschow 1997, Weale 1998, Buller 2002, 
Jordan 2002, Lafferty and Hovden 2002, Lewanski 2002, Müller 2002, Jacob and 
Volkery 2004, Jacob, Volkery, et al. 2008) and legal studies (e.g. Calliess 1998, De 
Sadeleer and Leubusher 2002, Nollkaemper 2002). The main aims of these contri-
butions were to clarify the implications of the principle of environmental policy inte-
gration, to assess potentials for its realisation and to evaluate the different 
measures and strategies taken for its implementation. 
The academic literature has developed the concept of environmental policy inte-
gration as an essentially prescriptive programme with a supposedly straightforward 
rationale. The material substance of the principle of environmental policy integra-
tion was often taken for granted: Environmental policy integration is understood as 
the requirement that policy areas such as energy, planning and transport should 
minimise negative environmental impacts when designing and implementing policy 
measures. The focus of both theory and practice of environmental policy integra-
tion was on procedures to implement the principle in practice (Jordan and 
Lenschow 1999, p. 31). Environmental policy integration is therefore largely under-
stood as a “procedural principle” (Lenschow 2002, p. 7). The main barrier to im-
plementing environmental policy integration is found in the functionally differentiat-
ed bureaucracies with their strong organisational subcultures and their close links 
to powerful polluter interests (Hey 2002, Lenschow 2002). The environmental poli-
cy integration literature typically analyses and prescribes mechanisms that aim to 
motivate sectoral departments to seriously consider environmental issues. In addi-
tion to policy appraisal1 studied here, these mechanisms include a range of com-
municative, organisational and procedural instruments (Jacob, Volkery, et al. 
2008). 
Although environmental policy integration has been a common reference point in 
environmental thought since the 1970s and has been enshrined in European treaty 
law since 1987, serious institutional reforms to challenge the dominant pattern of 
                                               
1
  In the following, the terms ‘policy appraisal’ and ‘policy assessment’ are used inter-
changeably. ‘Regulatory Impact Assessment’ (also referred to as Regulatory Impact 
Analysis, especially in North America) is a specific form of policy appraisal which is inte-
grated into the process of law-making and often formalised through administrative regu-
lations (cf. chapter 3). 
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‘additive’ environmental policy making (Jänicke 1992) only spread during the 
1990s and early 2000s. During this time, a broad range of mechanisms to promote 
environmental policy integration were implemented at European Union (EU) and 
Member State level as well as in many other OECD countries. These have includ-
ed, for example, the adoption of environmental provisions in constitutions, sectoral2 
environmental strategies, interdepartmental working groups, green cabinets, green 
budgeting as well as the environmental or integrated RIA procedures studied in 
this thesis. The most important political initiatives to implement the principle of en-
vironmental policy integration at EU level were the inclusion of the principle in the 
EC Treaty (originally Art. 130r EEC Treaty, today Art. 11 TFEU), the introduction of 
an integrated procedure for RIA and the so-called Cardiff process (a sectoral re-
porting and monitoring mechanism which was initiated by the European Council at 
the Cardiff summit in 1998 and requested individual Council formations to integrate 
environmental considerations into their variuos activities). 
While a large number of mechanisms and institutions to implement the principle of 
environmental policy integration had been initiated, the effectiveness of these pro-
cesses had not been systematically analysed (cf. Jordan and Lenschow 2008, p. 
335). A key objective of this thesis is to contribute to an emerging literature evalu-
ating such mechanisms (other contributions are, for example, Lafferty and Hovden 
2002, EEA 2005, Jordan and Lenschow 2008) with a focus on RIA. In the envi-
ronmental policy integration literature, policy appraisal procedures are considered 
as an important instrument to ensure that environmental effects of new measures 
become more visible in the policy formulation process (e.g. Russel 2007, Jordan 
and Lenschow 2008). In the typology of instruments for environmental policy inte-
gration (Jacob, Volkery, et al. 2008), policy appraisal is subsumed under the group 
of procedural instruments, the other groups being communicative and organisa-
tional instruments. Jacob et al (2008) argue that procedural instruments such as 
policy appraisal “can be assumed to be the most immediately consequential for 
[environmental policy integration] as they affect the substance of policy decisions. 
They are meant to alter the core procedures for decision-making” (Jacob, Volkery, 
et al. 2008, p. 28). Significantly, environmental policy integration was not the only 
driver for the trend towards more structured ex ante policy appraisal. Simultane-
ously, the research and practice of ‘better regulation’ also (re-)discovered the in-
                                               
2
 Following the terminology used in EU policy making and in some parts of the literature 
on environmental policy integration, the terms ‘sector’ and ‘sectoral’ are used to desig-
nate policy areas other than environmental policy (i.e. energy policy, agricultural policy 
and so on). 
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strument of policy appraisal as a way to improve the quality, transparency and effi-
ciency of regulation and sometimes also as a way to reduce regulation (Wilkinson 
et al. 2005, CEC 2006). The combined impetus of these two distinct agendas cer-
tainly broadened the appeal of RIA across the OECD. 
This choice of research focus in this thesis was prompted by a surge of institutional 
activity in this area: During the 1990s and the 2000s, many OECD countries intro-
duced, extended, formalised or reformed procedures for the ex ante analysis of the 
potential effects of new policies. The most prominent case was the Impact As-
sessment procedure that was introduced by the European Commission in 2003. To 
accompany this process, the European Commission funded a range of research 
projects. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 of this thesis are outputs from three of these studies.3 
The key interest of the European Commission as a funder – and the initial focus of 
this research – was to support the design and implementation of European Impact 
Assessment in practice: How does RIA actually work? What are opportunities for 
and barriers to improving the evidence base of policy-making through ex ante poli-
cy appraisal? What tools and methods are available and can be developed to sup-
port RIA? What can the European Commission learn from practice at national level 
in Europe and beyond? However, the empirical research into RIA quickly raised 
more fundamental issues as it showed not only a large implementation gap but 
also a huge mismatch between the ways the assessment procedure was de-
scribed in formal documents and the ways in which it worked in practice. There-
fore, the focus of the research shifted towards attempts at gaining a deeper under-
standing of processes at the interface between science and policy in the context of 
RIA: On which conceptions of the relationship between science and policy were 
RIA procedures based and how did these conceptions affect the design of proce-
dures? Which function was RIA expected to have in the policy process and were 
there alternative ways of framing this role? How was knowledge produced and 
used in RIA?  
In addressing these questions about the role and use of expertise in policy-making, 
the study could build on a long tradition of research. It has long been recognised 
that public administrations have to address very complex problems with limited 
resources in terms of time, staff and analytical capacity with the effect that a ra-
                                               
3
 “Evaluating Integrated Impact Assessments” (EVIA), Project No. 028889, 6
th
 Framework 
Programme, “Methods and Tools for Integrated Sustainability Assessment” (MATISSE), 
Project No. 4059, 6
th
 Framework Programme and “Indicators and Quantitative Tools for 
Improving the Process of Sustainability Impact Assessment” (IQ TOOLS), Project No. 
502078, 6
th
 Framework Programme. 
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tional-comprehensive approach to decision-making is the exception rather than the 
norm (Lindblom 1959). Nonetheless, many scholars – especially in North America 
– have promoted the rational-comprehensive approach and have studied how ad-
vanced technical and scientific knowledge can be brought into political decision-
making despite these limitations (cf. Hoppe 1999). This line of research emphasis-
es the value of sophisticated quantitative analysis, for example modelling, forecast-
ing, cost-benefit analysis, opinion research and statistical analysis in guiding deci-
sion-making and avoiding policy failure. It focuses on how to increase the analyti-
cal capacity both inside government and in the non-governmental sector (e.g. 
Howlett 2009). 
Since the self-proclaimed ‘argumentative turn in policy analysis’ (Fischer and 
Forester 1993) the mainstream, positivist approach to policy analysis has been 
strongly criticised. The critique is based on several decades of work in sociology, 
especially the field of science and technology studies, which has emphasised the 
social embeddedness of all types of knowledge (Latour and Woolgar 1979, Bijker 
et al. 1987, Woolgar 1988, Barnes et al. 1996, Jasanoff 2004). 
The fundamental idea underlying positivism in policy analysis is that “policy inter-
ventions should be based on causal laws of society and verified by neutral empiri-
cal observation” (cf. Dryzek 1993, p. 218). This claim has been rejected by post-
positivist analysis on the basis that general causal laws of society do not exist and 
that goals and values in public policy are multidimensional as well as contested 
(ibid.). A perspective which takes the broader decision context into account casts 
doubt on the assumption that larger data sets and more sophisticated analytical 
methodologies inevitably lead to better decisions. Much of the more recent aca-
demic work on policy analysis is directed at deconstructing and providing alterna-
tives to this model of “speaking truth to power” (Wildavsky 1979). This type of re-
search emphasises, inter alia, the role of competing rationalities, the importance of 
framing decisions, biases inherent in methodological choices, the role of uncertain-
ty, as well as the need to link cognitive and participatory appraisal (Dryzek 1990, 
Dryzek 1993, Fischer 1998, Hoppe 1999, Cash et al. 2002, Hajer and Wagenaar 
2003, Stirling 2008). Consequently, instead of focusing exclusively on the scientific 
credibility of knowledge (e.g. the academic credentials as provided by rigorous 
peer review), researchers and others operating at the science-policy interface 
should pay attention to its salience (i.e. relevance to the decision situation) and 
legitimacy (i.e. whether it is based on appropriate perspectives, values and 
concerns Cash et al. 2002).  
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As Dryzek has observed, however, “the history of policy analysis as practiced 
since the 1940s does not reveal a clear and clean switch away from approaches 
beholden to objectivism and instrumental rationality and toward more argumenta-
tive orientations. Indeed, whether based in public sector organizations, corpora-
tions, universities, foundations, or think tanks, most analyses [...] still cling to these 
traditional methodologies” (Dryzek 1993). The relative continuity of practice in poli-
cy analysis was perceived by many observes as a divide between the instrumen-
tal-rational approach and its post-positivist critique. The common wisdom of such a 
polarisation was challenged by an influential paper by Owens et al (2004). They 
suggested that reflexive learning opportunities may well arise through more in-
strumental forms of policy assessment but admitted that more empirical work was 
needed to confirm their assertion. The empirical research of this thesis shows that 
the implicit ontological and epistemological perspectives are indeed a crucial factor 
for the design and implementation of RIA procedures. Therefore, exploring the 
assumptions behind different ways of setting up RIA and how these assumptions 
affect the practice of RIA is a key element of this research. 
After the publication of the four research papers that make up the core of this work 
(see chapter 2-5), the academic journey of this thesis came to a long halt. In 2009, 
I left University to take up a new position in the German Advisory Council on the 
Environment (Sachverständigenrat für Umweltfragen), a high-level government-
funded academic advisory body on environmental policy issues in Germany. Here, 
I could witness processes at the interface between science and environmental 
policy from close-up and on a continuous basis. In particular, I experienced on a 
day-to-day basis how expert knowledge on environmental policy is produced as 
well as how it is perceived and used by policy-makers, ministerial staff, stakehold-
ers outside government, media, and citizens. These four years of experience in an 
advisory council were followed by a stint at the Federal Ministry for the Environ-
ment where I was involved in some of the most controversial and high-profile poli-
cy issues in German environmental policy, namely the Government’s monitoring of 
the national energy transition, the reform of the renewable energy act and the fu-
ture design of the German energy market. Here, I found myself in the role of a 
‘desk officer’, i.e. in the type of position of which I had studied the behavioural pat-
terns, cultural context and incentive structures for several years. 
During my work at the interface between environmental policy and academic re-
search, a number of observations struck me and renewed my interest in pursuing 
my previous research agenda. First, my personal experience appeared to suggest 
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that organisational and procedural initiatives to promote the integration of environ-
mental issues into policy-making have left few traces in the day-to-day work of 
administration. In Germany, environmental policy integration was largely ad-
dressed through the wider overall frame of the National Sustainable Development 
Strategy. Key instruments adopted in this context were the extension of RIA to 
explicitly cover sustainability, indicator-based sustainability reporting, as well as a 
high-level ministerial committee for sustainable development (SRU 2011, 
Bundesregierung 2012). Although Germany has widely been seen as a leader in 
sustainability policy (e.g. Stigson et al. 2009, SRU 2012), in my experience these 
mechanisms have not developed any broad appeal or significant influence on poli-
cy-making outside the environmental niche in Germany. 
This personal experience is in line with the findings of the literature on environmen-
tal policy integration looking at a wider set of countries and jurisdictions. Overall, 
the evaluations of different mechanisms for environmental policy integration in 
practice – to which this thesis contributes – have produced disappointing results 
(cf. for example Hey 2002, Jordan 2002, Jacob and Volkery 2006, contributions in 
Jordan and Lenschow 2008). Although many countries have implemented a wide 
array of instruments to explicitly promote environmental policy integration, Jordan 
and Lenschow (2008) conclude in their state-of-the-art review of environmental 
policy integration that the adoption of the principle of environmental policy integra-
tion is “weak and soft” (ibid., p. 338), that there is an “almost complete absence of 
a coordinated and comprehensive design for implementing it in practice” (ibid., p. 
338), and that we know “precious little” about the actual policy outcomes, i.e. the 
influence on the state of the environment (ibid., p. 337). Albert Weale adds in his 
foreword to the book: “Sustainable development was never going to be easy. The 
merit – the depressing merit – of this book is that it shows the many different ways 
in which it is difficult” (Weale 2008, p. xvi). 
One the other hand, I was surprised to see that somewhat paradoxically there is a 
remarkable degree of environmental policy integration going on in German policy 
making independently from specifically designated initiatives. This can be seen 
most prominently in the field of energy policy where Germany is undertaking a 
massive effort in moving its national energy supply from a fossil fuel-based system 
to one which relies predominantly on renewable sources (BMWi and BMU 2010, 
BMWi 2014). Although the German energy transition benefits from popular sup-
port, it is clearly an overall state-led project rather than a grassroots initiative. In 
the context of the energy transition, integration processes are occurring on a range 
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of different levels and in a host of different arenas of policy-making. They concern 
the federal as well as regional and local levels, generic energy policy as well as 
more specialised areas such as grid and electricity market regulation. One notable 
example is the change of policy style and direction which occurred in the federal 
ministry of economic affairs, partly resulting from the integration of a large adminis-
trative division dealing with renewable energy (the so-called ‘division for energy 
transition’) which was moved there from the federal environment ministry at the 
end of 2013. Similar (although much slower) processes of change are visible in 
other administrations, for example agriculture, research, and housing. 
Moreover, there are an increasing number of reflexive, participatory, transparent 
and evidence-based processes of policy formulation in Germany. Although the 
formal process of RIA continues to play a marginal role, policy appraisals outside 
this procedure appear to become more transparent and more widespread. One 
example is the monitoring system put in place to assess the progress of the energy 
transition towards a renewables-based energy system (BMWi 2014). Under this 
system, monitoring reports are published annually by the government and evaluat-
ed by a group of independent energy experts. The indicators used in the monitor-
ing process were selected with inputs from public consultation. The aim of the 
monitoring system is to promote learning in the context of a sustainability transi-
tion: “The Energiewende [..] breaks new ground in many areas. This is why it is 
important to monitor this development continuously and closely” (BMWi 2012, p. 
2). Similar initiatives also exist in other policy areas, such as resource policy (e.g. 
the German Resource Efficiency Programme and the Citizens’ Dialogue 
“GesprächStoff”). Other examples from the field of energy policy are the amend-
ment of the renewable energy act, the electricity market design, and the planning 
of the German electricity grid. In all three cases, the Government carried out large 
public consultation processes instead of following the traditional neo-corporatist 
model of hearings with only selected interest groups and at a late stage in the de-
cision-making process. 
In personal communication, desk officers developing such processes have stated, 
however, that these approaches to more transparent, participatory and knowledge-
based policy formulation at German federal level are neither part of a well thought-
out strategy nor the response to an explicit directive from the top of the hierarchy. 
Rather, officers appear to respond to a societal demand for more transparency and 
involvement, see benefits from promoting a policy intervention by providing evi-
dence, and in some cases perceive a practical need to involve a wide range of 
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perspectives in order to develop robust policies. The concrete set-up of these pro-
cesses is typically shaped by ad-hoc decisions by bureaucrats in charge, an ob-
servation that would well explain the wide range of different formats used for con-
sultation. Being a relatively recent trend, these developments have not been sys-
tematically researched. 
Overall, these observations motivated me to re-consider and continue my previous 
research with a more optimistic outlook. Previously, the conclusion of chapters 3, 4 
and 5 had been sobering: Desk officers often see RIA as a required formality with-
out value because it does not help them mediate the relationship between science 
and policy making. RIA rarely works in the way it is described in guidance docu-
ments and has typically limited impact on the policy-process. It is typically con-
ceived as a narrow analysis with an inherent bias against long-term and complex 
impacts (such as environmental effects). Although chapter 5 contained reflections 
on how to develop RIA towards a discursively rational process, such a new model 
of ex ante policy analysis seemed far from the reality at the time. It also remained 
unclear whether key actors would have an interest in pursuing such an agenda. 
Given my perception that administrations are beginning to develop a strategic in-
terest in more transparent, participatory and knowledge-based policy formulation 
processes, I began to ask myself whether there may be a more promising future 
for RIA. At the same time, the analysis made clear that this would require a fun-
damentally revised vision of the role RIA-type activities could and should play in 
policy-making. Throughout this study, the instrumental expectations of both the 
environmental policy integration literature and the policy appraisal guidance docu-
ments provided the backdrop against which assessment practice was described, 
evaluated and analysed. During the research, it emerged that the ecological mod-
ernisation perspective – while pointing at highly relevant factors – had an overly 
instrumental view of the required processes of change. The ecological modernisa-
tion literature (as well as the framework developed from it in chapter 2) recognises 
in principle the importance of learning, not only in the narrow instrumental sense 
but also in the sense of a change of values and belief systems (Sabatier and 
Jenkins-Smith 1988). It does not, however, realise the full implications of the in-
sights from sociology, especially the field of science and technology studies, which 
has emphasised the social embeddedness of all types of knowledge, including that 
of scientific experts (Latour and Woolgar 1979, Bijker et al. 1987, Woolgar 1988, 
Barnes et al. 1996, Jasanoff 2004). While much of the work in this thesis was di-
rected at showing why and in what ways these instrumental expectations are mis-
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guided, they have not explicitly been supplemented by a set of theoretically more 
convincing expectations. 
The aim of the additional research chapter 6 is to reflect on such a ptoential and 
emerging new role for RIA. The theoretical perspective chosen for this task is the 
concept of reflexive governance. The relatively recent strand of literature on reflex-
ive governance has been developed over the last decade (De Schutter and Deakin 
2005, Grin 2006, Rip 2006, Voß and Kemp 2006, Hendriks and Grin 2007, Newig 
et al. 2008, Feindt 2012, Stirling 2014) but draws on much older academic dis-
courses on both governance (Rhodes 1997, Pierre and Peters 2000, Kooiman 
2003, Rhodes 2007) and reflexive modernisation (Beck 1986, Beck 1993, Beck et 
al. 1994). The concept of reflexive governance has a decidedly more post-positivist 
and sometimes constructivist perspective than the concept of environmental policy 
integration. Acknowledging the limits to societal capacity for steering as well as the 
uncertain and contested nature of scientific knowledge, it is a suitable basis for 
reflections on the potential role for RIA in policy-making, in particular for enhancing 
environmental considerations.  
Setting this study into the context of reflexive governance brings up another issue: 
With the empirical focus of this research being on RIA, this study concerns itself 
with the process of law-making. This is well in line with the literature on environ-
mental policy integration which is largely focused on traditional public policy and 
state institutions. The sustainability governance literature, in contrast, addresses a 
much wider set of institutions for collective decision-making. Running through this 
literature is a widespread disillusionment about the ability of ‘the state’ to address 
urgent contemporary problems. This scepticism about the state is partly fuelled by 
the realisation that many of the procedures, tools and instruments for ‘greening 
government’ had little tangible effect on the substance of decision-making while at 
the same time evidence is growing about the rising threat which currently dominant 
socio-economic development pathways pose for vital ecosystems and the global 
climate (e.g. IPCC 2014, EEA 2015, Steffen et al. 2015). Most authors therefore 
tend to downplay the impact of state-led policies and instead emphasise bottom-up 
change, both in national (Ohlhorst et al. 2014) and international discourses 
(Hielscher et al. 2011, Leach et al. 2012, WBGU 2014, Hajer et al. 2015).4 Against 
this backdrop, an additional aim of the concluding chapter is to reflect more broad-
                                               
4
  This corresponds to a trend in the wider academic literature on governance which typi-
cally disregards institutions of representative democracy, cf. Prosser (2014) who ob-
serves that the institution of parliament is curiously absent from prominent handbooks on 
governance. 
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ly on the role of the state in collective decision-making for sustainability and to crit-
ically discuss the analytical and empirical focus of the reflexive governance litera-
ture. 
 
1.2 Research questions, methodology and overview of the argument 
Having described the basic aims of this thesis in a chronological context, the aim 
of the following section is to present the research questions in a logical order. The 
overall question addressed by the research is whether and how Regulatory Impact 
Assessment promotes the consideration of environmental and sustainability con-
cerns in policy-making. This question is approached through a number of more 
specific research questions which will now be discussed in turn. 
 
1. What kinds of processes are conceptually required to improve the consid-
eration of environmental concerns in collective decision-making and to reor-
ient such decision-making towards sustainable development? 
The first question that needs to be addressed in an effort to improve the considera-
tion of environmental and sustainability concerns in policy-making through RIA is 
that of our conception or mental model of this process. The literature on environ-
mental policy integration, however, has remained unspecific about what is being 
integrated, how and to what effect. It has rarely been critically discussed what ‘the 
consideration of environmental concerns in decision-making’ implies in detail. The 
role of power, knowledge and institutions in environmental policy integration has 
remained unclear. The only major academic debate in this literature in the 2000s 
was about the normative basis of environmental policy integration: Should the 
principle of environmental policy integration involve a 'principled priority' for envi-
ronmental objectives (known as ‘strong environmental policy integration’, see 
Lafferty and Hovden 2002, Jordan and Lenschow 2008, p. 148) or should it merely 
involve the requirement to take environmental issues ‘into account’ (known as 
‘weak environmental policy integration’, cf. Hill and Jordan 1993, Jordan and 
Lenschow 2008, p. 11). Beyond this discussion, environmental policy integration 
was seen to be “conventional wisdom” (Jordan 1998, Lenschow 2002, p. 4). 
The method adopted to answer this question is an analysis of the relevant aca-
demic literature with regard to the qualitative description of theoretically assumed 
or empirically established causal links between processes and institutions on the 
one hand and policy outputs on the other. More specifically, chapter 2 carries out a 
comprehensive review of the policy-oriented literature on ecological modernisation 
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theory (cf. Weale 1992, Jänicke 1993, Wallace 1995, Andersen and Massa 2000, 
Buttel 2000, Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000, Murphy 2000) which has done most to 
develop the conceptual foundations of environmental policy integration. As the link 
between the two bodies of knowledge has not been widely acknowledged in the 
literature, drawing out the underlying rationale for environmental policy integration 
stemming from the theory of ecological modernisation is conceptually innovative. 
On this basis, chapter 2 then develops a framework for the analysis and evaluation 
of institutional strategies for environmental policy integration. 
In the latter part of the thesis, chapter 6 revisits this research question, but draws 
on the more recently developed theoretical perspective of reflexive governance 
(De Schutter and Deakin 2005, Grin 2006, Rip 2006, Voß and Kemp 2006, 
Hendriks and Grin 2007, Newig et al. 2008, Feindt 2012, Stirling 2014). It first 
analyses the differences between ecological modernisation and environmental 
policy integration on the one hand and reflexive modernisation and reflexive gov-
ernance on the other. It then explores what kinds of processes are conceptually 
required to improve the consideration of environmental concerns in collective deci-
sion-making from the perspective of the reflexive governance literature. It finally 
derives a set of evaluation criteria for governance arrangements such as RIA. 
 
2. How is Regulatory Impact Assessment framed and institutionalised across 
the EU? 
Having established conceptually-based expectations towards processes of envi-
ronmental policy integration and reflexive governance, the next step is to turn to 
the empirical analysis in the specific field of RIA. The first aim is to understand how 
procedures for RIA are designed in different countries across Europe. This in-
cludes the question about the conceptualisation of the role of assessment and the 
stated purpose of the procedures as well as a comparison of institutional designs 
(for example the foreseen appraisal process, the scope of analysis, prescribed 
methodologies, and requirements for stakeholder involvement).  
Two research methods are adopted to answer research question 2. First, chapter 3 
traces the historical development of policy assessment in Europe through a review 
of the relevant academic literature as well as policy documents. Here, the aim is to 
establish the general thinking about the objectives and potential benefits of formal-
ised ex ante policy appraisal as well as the actors and driving forces promoting 
these kinds of procedures in Europe. Second, chapters 4 and 5 review individual 
RIA procedures. The main method adopted in all analyses relating to the overall 
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procedure is qualitative document analysis, validated with telephone or face-to-
face interviews (for example with officials working in administrative units coordinat-
ing the procedure) where this was needed to complement or validate written infor-
mation. The sources are legal frameworks, guidance documents, evaluation re-
ports, academic analyses and policy documents. Chapter 3 is a scoping analysis 
which reviews the experiences at EU level, in the Netherlands, Canada and the 
UK. The four jurisdictions have been chosen because they were recognised as 
pioneers in promoting RIA but also represent a variety of institutional arrange-
ments and functions of policy appraisal. Chapter 4 is based on country studies of 
four jurisdictions (EU, Germany, Sweden and the UK) which provide the framework 
of subsequent in-depth analysis of individual policy cases (see research questions 
3, 4 and 5 below). These four jurisdictions have been selected because the sys-
tems vary in relation to formalisation, institutional set-up and overall orientation of 
RIA. 
While chapters 3 and 4 study appraisal only in a small selection of jurisdictions, 
chapter 5 systematically reviews appraisal procedures across the whole of the EU. 
It provides the most comprehensive analysis of RIA in Europe to date. It draws on 
28 individual country studies (EU level and 27 Member States5) using a standard-
ised template containing 21 individual evaluation criteria (e.g. the aims stated in 
key policy documents, the legal bindingness of the procedure, or the presence and 
role of an administrative unit coordinating the procedure). The results are compiled 
in a spreadsheet. 
 
3. What kind of knowledge is generated in Regulatory Impact Assessment? 
In the environmental policy integration literature, RIA is seen as a potentially pow-
erful instrument to promote the consideration of ecological issues in sectoral policy 
decisions (Jacob, Volkery, et al. 2008, p. 28). The rationale behind this assumption 
is that generally knowledge about environmental threats and dangerous trends 
(such as climate change and biodiversity loss) is increasing, but recognition of this 
knowledge in political decision-making has remained limited. Policy appraisal, 
therefore, is expected to bring this relatively marginalised knowledge on environ-
mental effects into real world policy decisions. Under research question 3, we ex-
plore precisely what kind of knowledge is generated in RIA in practice. This in-
                                               
5
  Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta do not have a RIA system in place 
and are therefore not studied in detail. 
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cludes for example the questions whether knowledge is qualitative or quantitative, 
gathered from which methodologies, and whether it is narrowly focused on a par-
ticular angle or broadly covering the policy issue in question. 
The kind of knowledge generated in RIA is partly determined by the overall objec-
tive and design of the procedure. For example, in some jurisdictions, guidance 
documents favour the use of certain assessment methodologies and are thus guid-
ing the process of knowledge creation in predictable ways. Therefore, the ap-
proach and methods described under research question 2 are also used to gain 
insights in relation to research question 3. This broad procedural-level evaluation is 
complemented with and validated against in-depth studies of individual policy cas-
es. Here, chapter 4 reports on a study of 37 individual cases of policy assessments 
carried out at EU level as well as in Germany, Sweden and the UK. Chapter 5 con-
tinues this line of inquiry but draws on a different empirical basis: in addition, an-
other 22 individual case studies carried out at EU level as well as in Denmark, the 
Netherlands, Poland and the UK are included. All case studies are based on a 
combination of desk research (relating to the assessment report and other relevant 
policy documents) and face-to-face interviews with desk officers in charge of the 
RIA as well as with external stakeholders (e.g. business, NGOs, government offi-
cials from other departments). 
 
4. How is knowledge from Regulatory Impact Assessment used in decision-
making? 
Having established what kind of knowledge is produced in RIA, the logical next 
step is to ask who uses this knowledge in what way in the policy formulation pro-
cess: Has information generated in RIA helped to shape the policy design? If so, 
has it done this in fundamental ways (e.g. highlighting radically different policy 
choices) or in an incremental style (e.g. informing decisions about specific design 
implementation options)? Has knowledge from RIA also been used in ways other 
than informing policy formulation, for example to justify predetermined decisions? 
How does the actual use of knowledge compare to the anticipated role of RIA as 
set out in guidance documents?  
Research question 4 is approached with the same methodology as the previous 
research question. Again, the broad, desk-based analysis of RIA procedures and 
guidelines gives first insights: The set-up of the appraisal system provides a cer-
tain frame for the use of knowledge, for example because it determines who can 
access the assessment knowledge at what point in time. A more thorough under-
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standing of how knowledge from RIA may have been used to learn, persuade or 
demonstrate, can only be accessed through detailed empirical research. There-
fore, research question 4 is mainly addressed in the individual policy case studies 
contained in chapters 4 and 5. The aim of chapter 4 is to develop a typology of 
different types of knowledge use and to gather evidence on how these can be 
identified empirically. Chapter 5 addresses the same issue, but refers to positivist 
and post-positivist conceptualisations of the role of knowledge in policy-making as 
the theoretical lens.  
 
5. Can Regulatory Impact Assessment promote the consideration of sustaina-
ble development in policy-making and how are the conception and design 
of assessment procedures influencing this potential? 
Research questions 2, 3 and 4 have to some extent stepped back from the over-
arching question whether and how assessment promotes the consideration of en-
vironmental and sustainability concerns in policy-making: Instead of narrowly fo-
cusing on environmental policy integration from the start, the aim is to understand 
the wider dynamics of RIA at the interface between science and policy. Research 
question 5 aims to analyse the insights into the framing and institutionalisation of 
RIA as well as the production and use of knowledge from the perspective of sus-
tainable development. It explores the extent to which the implementation of RIA 
procedures can support (or indeed hinder) the integration of environmental con-
cerns into policy-making and the role played in this context by the specific design 
of RIA procedures. 
A key aim of this final research question, therefore, is to confront the empirical ma-
terial with the conceptual discussion of sustainability governance. Chapter 3 pro-
vides an evaluation of opportunities for and barriers to enhancing environmental 
policy integration. Chapter 6 develops this line of analysis further using reflexive 
governance as an alternative theoretical perspective. Chapter 6 first explores the 
commonalities and differences between environmental policy integration (with eco-
logical modernisation theory as its basis) and reflexive governance (grounded in 
reflexive modernisation theory). It draws out the opportunities which the concept of 
reflexive governance offers to more adequately understand the issues raised by 
the empirical research and to explore potentials for the further development of RIA. 
In order to use these opportunities, chapter 6 introduces a new analytical frame-
work derived from the reflexive governance literature and applies this to the empir-
ical material underlying this thesis. The chapter thereby bridges consolidated in-
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sights into the limitations of traditional regulatory impact assessment with current 
thinking about the potential of more reflexive governance arrangements for sub-
stantial integration of environmental concerns into policy-making.  
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2. Analysing institutional strategies for environmental policy 
integration: The case of EU enterprise policy 
Hertin, J. and F. Berkhout (2003). Analysing institutional strategies for environmen-
tal policy integration: The case of EU enterprise policy. Journal of Environmental 
Policy and Planning 5(1): 39-56. 
2.1 Introduction 
At first sight, the basic idea of environmental policy integration seems unconten-
tious. The state of the environment is affected not only by environmental policy, but 
also by the decisions of energy, planning, industry and other domains. It follows 
that an environmental strategy can be effective only if it also influences policies in 
other domains. However, different government departments tend to pursue contra-
dictory policies with regard to the environment. Governments have long been re-
garded as being composed of heterogeneous and diverging interests (Rhodes 
1997), but this phenomenon is particularly prevalent in the environmental domain 
(Weale 1992). The problem of cross-cutting environmental issues was recognized 
shortly after ‘the environment’ first appeared as a serious policy issue on national 
and international agendas in the early 1970s. Integration between economic and 
environmental policies was one of the main demands of the classic texts on the 
environment such as A Blueprint for Survival (Goldsmith et al. 1972), the World 
Conservation Strategy (IUCN 1980) and Our Common Future (WCED 1987): 
The mandates of ministries of industry include production targets, while the accompany-
ing pollution is left to ministries of the environment. Electricity boards produce power, 
while the acid pollution they also produce is left to other bodies to clean up. The present 
challenge is to give the central economic and sectoral ministries the responsibilities for 
the quality of those parts of the human environment affected by their decisions… 
(WCED 1987, p. 11). 
Although the question how an integrated approach to the environment can be posi-
tively implemented has been continuously debated since the 1970s, the practice of 
environmental policy making remains largely unchanged (cf. Lenschow 2002). It 
still is generally characterized by specialized environmental administrations, power 
struggles between environmental and sectoral departments and by environmental 
regulations imposed on conventional development activities (for example, road 
building, intensive farming, and fossil-fuel based electricity generation). 
This dominant pattern of environmental policy making has only recently been tack-
led through serious institutional reforms. 6 Major initiatives aiming at a ‘greening of 
                                               
6
  An exception to this rule was, for example, the US National Environmental Policy Act of 
1969 (Pub. L.91–190, 42 U.S.C. 4321–4347, 1 January 1970), which required federal 
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government’ have, for example, been launched in the Netherlands, Sweden, Fin-
land and the UK. At an EU level, the principle of environmental policy integration 
has not only gained political significance through its inclusion in Article 6 of the EU 
Treaty but it has also been the subject of significant, new policy initiatives, most 
notably the so-called Cardiff process. These policy initiatives have been accompa-
nied by a wave of academic research on environmental policy integration, which 
includes sectoral case studies (Hey 1996), national case studies (Jordan 2002, 
Lewanski 2002, Müller 2002) best-practice orientated accounts (Jordan and 
Lenschow 2000) , evaluations of specific policy initiatives (Schepelmann 2000, 
Fergusson et al. 2001, Kraemer 2001), analyses of policy institutions and process-
es involved in environmental policy integration (Liberatore 1997, Wilkinson 1997) 
and larger multi-sectoral studies with a theoretical perspective (Kraack et al. 2001). 
With their different approaches these studies have generated a range of important 
insights, especially into opportunities for and barriers to integration, and into the 
varying contextual conditions of integration in different policy sectors and national 
settings. Despite the wealth of recent studies, the notion of environmental policy 
integration still suffers from the absence of a clear and practicable conceptualiza-
tion (Kraack et al. 2001, p. 13). Although it can generally be taken to describe the 
'inclusion of environmental concerns in processes and decisions of public policy 
making that are predominantly charged with issues other than the environment, 
both academic publications and policy documents often remain ambiguous on the 
question of what exactly environmental policy integration entails: does environ-
mental policy integration describe a procedural requirement or is it an “autono-
mous normative principle” (Nollkaemper 2002)? What precisely should be integrat-
ed: policy objectives, decision-making structures, knowledge and capabilities, or 
policy instruments? Does it involve a changed balance of power between sectoral 
and environmental administrations, or is integration a question of expertise and 
organizational routines? Unless the specific objectives and mechanisms of envi-
ronmental policy integration are clearly defined, it is difficult to fruitfully analyse the 
potential of this approach, to compare the strengths and weaknesses of different 
institutional strategies and to assess the success of individual initiatives. 
This paper aims to address these questions, suggesting a theoretically informed 
framework for the analysis and evaluation of different institutional approaches to 
environmental policy integration in theory and practice. Operationalising environ-
                                                                                                                                   
agencies to carry out environmental impact assessments for major project developments 
(Taylor, 1984). 
 20 
 
mental policy integration for empirical research, the framework allows both the 
systematic evaluation of single institutional integration strategies (assessing the 
extent to which they have achieved their aims) and a comparison between different 
strategies (identifying similarities and differences, appropriateness for a specific 
institutional context, etc.). 
In developing the evaluation framework, the paper will draw on the ecological 
modernization literature, especially contributions from the discipline of policy stud-
ies. This literature appears to be particularly suitable as a basis for the develop-
ment of an environmental policy integration framework for at least two reasons. 
First, as we will show below, there is strong resonance between the core ideas 
underlying the two concepts. In particular, both challenge the assumption that the 
environmental policy process needs to be dominated by a conflict between pro- 
and anti-environment coalitions and stress the importance of pollution prevention 
at source. Second, several of the protagonists of the policy-orientated ecological 
modernization literature have analysed the specific problems associated with de-
partmentalized environmental policy, thereby laying the conceptual foundations for 
environmental policy integration (for example Jänicke 1990, Jänicke 1992, Weale 
1992, Gouldson and Murphy 1996, Weale 1998, Murphy and Gouldson 2000). 
The paper will start by analysing the shortcomings of departmentalized environ-
mental policy from an ecological modernization perspective. Drawing on this anal-
ysis to define the aims of environmental policy integration, the second section will 
propose a framework for the analysis of institutional integration strategies. The 
following parts of the paper apply the framework to a specific initiative for environ-
mental policy integration on the level of the European Union. The final section will 
draw conclusions about the opportunities for and limits of sectoral strategies for 
integration. 
 
2.2 Modernizing Policy: The Critique of ‘Additive’ Environmental 
Administration 
Over the last 20 years, thinking about environmental policy has undergone a fun-
damental process of transformation, in which the new emphasis on environmental 
policy integration is only one element. As Weale (1992) has shown, this transfor-
mation was associated with a fundamental reconceptualisation of the environment 
– economy relationship during the 1980s and 1990s, which can be described as 
‘ecological modernization’. 
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As many have observed, the growing literature analysing processes of ecological 
modernization is heterogeneous, not easy to delineate, and comprises a range of 
disciplinary perspectives (for recent reviews, see Andersen and Massa 2000, 
Buttel 2000, Mol and Sonnenfeld 2000, Murphy 2000). The different contributions 
have in common that they explore the idea that while modernization and industrial-
ization have in the past been the cause of many major environmental problems, 
economic development does not necessarily lead to increasing environmental 
damage. The central hypothesis is that the same forces that drive technical 
change and economic development can - under certain circumstances - improve 
the quality of the environment. The remedy for environmental problems, then, lies 
in a process of modernization steered towards environmental improvements, ra-
ther than a fundamentally different development pathway. 
This hypothesis is explored by a diverse range of contributions, not all of which 
refer explicitly to the ecological modernization concept. Empirical studies from a 
variety of disciplines have attempted empirically to test the core hypothesis of eco-
logical modernization. These include macro-level studies about the relationship 
between GDP and environmental pressures (Shafik and Bandyopadhyay 1992, 
Jänicke et al. 1993, De Bruyn 1998, Esty and Porter 2001, Jänicke 2001), firm-
level assessments of the link between financial and environmental performance 
(cf. Edwards 1998) and engineering studies that assess technical potentials to 
minimize the detrimental environmental effects of products and production pro-
cesses (Weizsäcker et al. 1996). At the same time, a growing sociological litera-
ture uses ecological modernization as a theoretical lens for the study of social 
change (cf. Buttel 2000). It analyses how modern industrial societies respond to 
the challenge of environmental degradation, examining, for example, institutional 
changes in the core institutions of industrial production (Spaargaren and Mol 1992, 
Mol 1995), roles and strategies of advocates of environmental reform (Mol 2000), 
as well as the role of consumption in these transformation processes (Spaargaren 
1997, Spaargaren and van Vliet 2000). 
This paper focuses on a third strand of literature, which examines the role of public 
policy aimed at bringing about ecologically orientated modernization processes - 
the second body of work on ecological modernization according to Mol’s classifica-
tion (Mol 1995, p. 27). Ecological modernization is not seen as an autonomous 
process purely driven by the inherent dynamics of technological and economic 
development (Mol and Spaargaren 2000, p. 23). Rather, it is thought to unfold 
through a process of reflexive institutional transformation, in which public policy is 
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a central element (Buttel 2000). The ability of society to exploit the potentially syn-
ergistic relationship between modernization and environmental protection through 
a steering of technological change has been conceptualized as the ‘ecological 
modernisation capacity of society’ (Jänicke 1992). Based on a comparative study 
of conditions for environmental policy success, this concept emphasizes the im-
portance of the political system for ecological modernization. 
Maintaining that existing policy-making structures in Europe, by and large, do not 
correspond to the principles of ecological modernization, this more applied and 
policy-orientated literature formulates a “prescriptive programme of policy reform” 
(Weale 1992, Jänicke 1993, Wallace 1995, Gouldson and Murphy 1996, 
Blazejczak et al. 1999, see also Andersen and Massa 2000, Murphy and Gouldson 
2000). At the heart of this conception is a prescriptive typology of strategies to con-
trol pollution, ranging from clean-up/dilution and end-of-pipe technology (remedial 
strategies) to cleaner technologies and structural change (preventative strategies) 
(Andersen 1994, p. 18, Jänicke 2001, p. 2). The key objective of an ecological 
modernization of policy is to promote a shift of responses along this axis, especial-
ly through the innovation and diffusion of new technologies. This line of analysis 
brings to the centre of attention the policy processes, strategies and instruments 
that encourage environmentally orientated technical change. While most of this 
work is focused on the design and mix of policy instruments and the relationship 
between government and industry (for example Wallace 1995), some attention has 
also been given to intra-governmental processes of public policy making. 
The ecological modernization literature is deeply critical of the way in which envi-
ronmental policy has traditionally been embedded in administrative structures. 
When the environment was beginning to be established as an independent policy 
field in the early 1970s, most industrialized countries set up institutions specifically 
dedicated to the protection of the natural environment – for example, ministries, 
agencies, reporting mechanisms, framework laws and expert advisory committees 
(Jörgens 1996). The institutionalization pattern followed the Weberian model of 
rational and effective administration. It is based on functional differentiated organi-
zation, a principle that is a deeply rooted and virtually universal characteristic of 
public administration. It involves the definition of manageable areas of policy that 
are allocated to specialized units. These can develop the necessary expertise and 
build up policy networks with stakeholders inside and outside government, thereby 
enabling the organization to handle the complexity associated with the policy areas 
typically covered by government departments. 
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Applied to the area of the environment, this model manifested itself in a specific 
approach to pollution control. Environmental departments were given responsibility 
for the manifestations of pollution. They approached environmental problems tech-
nocratically: treating different aspects of pollution separately, applying standard 
routines of pollution abatement, combating symptoms rather than tackling sources, 
etc. (Jänicke 1990). This segregated institutionalization of the environment ne-
glects the origins of pollution problems that occur as the result of a wide range of 
sectoral activities such as production, transport and agriculture. Sectoral policy 
initiatives, however, are commonly formulated with little or no regard to the envi-
ronment. This might be partly due to a lack of capacity, but also reflects more 
deeply-rooted institutional factors. Administrations act in policy communities with 
different belief systems (Weale 1992), which are related to disciplinary and profes-
sional cultures, sources of information, and institutional arrangements. These de-
fine what the administration perceives as its role and mission, which has, in the 
case of sectoral departments, traditionally not included environmental concerns 
(for example, the overriding concern has conventionally been the supply of cheap 
and secure energy, rather than preventing climate change or minimizing local air 
pollution). 
In principle, this problem of a ‘misfit’ between problem structure and administrative 
structure could be overcome through conscious co-ordination efforts. However, 
locating environmental and sectoral responsibilities in separate parts of govern-
ment is seen to draw them into an antagonistic rather than a co-operative relation-
ship (cf. Weale 1992). This partly reflects tensions between the respective political 
constituencies but is also due to the fact that environmental policy initiatives often 
‘infringe’ on the responsibilities of sectoral administrations. As a consequence, 
status, power and resources are often at stake in environmental disputes, placing 
an additional strain on inter-departmental relationships (Weale 1992). 
The combination of an administrative ‘misfit’ and antagonistic relationships leads to 
patterns of communication and decision-making that, from an ecological moderni-
zation perspective, have several shortcomings: 
- Lack of incentives for innovation. The opportunities for environmental depart-
ments to prevail in inter-departmental bargaining processes are few and far 
between. Historically, they have a lower status than sectoral departments 
such as transport, energy and agriculture, mainly because their interests are 
asymmetric (Wilson 1980). While polluter interests tend to be driven by strong 
economic motives and represented by well-resourced advocacy groups, envi-
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ronmental interests are more dispersed and possess less direct political lev-
erage. As a result, it is a common experience that the ambitions of environ-
mental proposals are considerably reduced during intra-governmental nego-
tiations. A policy that does not sufficiently depart from the status quo is unable 
to provide both the economic incentives and the political signal needed to 
stimulate the innovation and diffusion of new technologies (Wallace 1995, 
Blazejczak et al. 1999). 
- Bias against integrated technological responses. In order to minimize ‘inter-
ference’, sector departments have an interest in reducing the involvement of 
environmental administration in the process of policy formulation. When the 
environmental ministry voices its concerns in the later stages of sectoral policy 
design, the opportunities to embed environmental safeguards are limited. In-
ter-departmental conflicts are resolved at this stage through compromises that 
satisfy the interests of both agencies but may be highly inefficient. Either con-
tradictory policies are implemented in parallel, or costly end-of-pipe technolo-
gies are added to a controversial project to make it acceptable for environ-
mental departments (Jänicke 1990). The relationship between intra-
governmental relationships and policy outcomes can be self-reinforcing. 
Where environmental policy tends to take the form of restrictions and costs 
imposed on sectoral projects, assuming a defensive role becomes the most 
promising strategy. It has also been observed that, paradoxically, environmen-
tal departments aiming to extend their budgets could lose interest in preventa-
tive action: “For government, the self preservation instincts of those institu-
tions that have been established to administer this form of policy [additive pol-
lution control] ensure that this approach continues” (Gouldson and Murphy 
1996, p. 12). 
- Unstable innovation context. The processes of bargaining associated with 
conflictual intra-governmental policy making lead to mixed political signals and 
uncertainty in policy direction. This is diametrically opposed to the political 
conditions seen to encourage environmental innovation – that is, a reliable, 
stable, knowledge-based and long-term policy based on consensual decision-
making (Blazejczak et al. 1999). The resulting absence of a stable, long-term 
perspective for the emergence of markets acts as a barrier to investment in 
research and development, and slows the pace of innovation (Wallace 1995). 
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Figure 1: Relationship between administrative structures and policy outcomes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
In short, the critique argues that departmentalized administrative structures create 
a bias towards policies that are unable to exploit the eco-efficiency potentials of 
modern technology: “The corollary of an additive environmental bureaucracy is an 
additive, end-of-pipe abatement technology” (Jänicke 1992, p. 84). While a tradi-
tional trade-off view of environmental policy would suggest that these patterns of 
decision-making are the consequence of the specific characteristics of ecological 
problems (costs associated with environmental protection, common-good charac-
ter of the environment, and so on) ecological modernization sees it as the outcome 
of particular institutional settings, ‘which can be transformed’. If relationships be-
tween environmental and sectoral ministries were co-operative and focused on 
joint problem solving, environmental policy could successfully promote cost-
efficient or even profitable technological or structural responses. The option of win-
win solutions is likely to allow sectoral departments to take a constructive position 
in negotiations, thus improving the co-operation between the departments. From 
this perspective, the main objective of environmental policy integration is to enable 
environmental policy making to shift from a traditional antagonistic model to a new 
co-operative model (see Figure 1). 
 
2.3 Analysing environmental policy integration as a Process of 
Administrative Change 
Although environmental policy integration is clearly a substantive and normative 
concept, policy initiatives to implement environmental policy integration are by na-
ture largely procedural. Given the aim of this paper to provide a framework for the 
analysis and evaluation of environmental policy integration initiatives, the concep-
tualization of environmental policy integration in this section will therefore focus on 
policy processes and outputs. It could be argued that policy outcomes should also 
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be examined because environmental policy integration makes no sense unless it 
leads to better (that is, more effective and more cost-efficient) environmental poli-
cy. However, it is a well-recognized problem of policy evaluation that, more often 
than not, the link between policy measures or processes and policy outcomes is 
extremely difficult to establish (Carter et al. 1992, p. 14ff.). Although the critique 
presented above does not prescribe a specific model of integration, it points to-
wards a number of generic elements of environmental policy integration that may 
be expected to promote a shift between a segregated and an integrated mode of 
environmental policy. 
 
Table 1: Core functions of environmental policy integration 
Function of environmental 
policy integration 
Examples of evidence of integration 
sectoral agenda setting - environmental protection part of mission statement 
- assessment of environment impacts of sector 
policies 
- environment regular agenda item at high-level 
meetings 
horizontal communication - interdepartmental working groups / committees 
- routine early consultation on sectoral policies and 
projects 
sectoral capacity building - environment unit 
- environmental information services 
- system of officials charged with environment 
- high-level environmental official ('green minister') 
policy learning - 'positive' framing of environmental issues 
- constructive inter-departmental cooperation 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
2.3.1 Sectoral Agenda Setting 
Environmental policy integration requires first and foremost, that environmental 
concerns are on the political agenda of sectoral administrations. A shift from reme-
dial to anticipatory policies called for by the advocates of ecological modernization 
can only occur if the administration (i) is aware of unintended environmental effects 
of sectoral projects, (ii) recognizes them as relevant for its own strategy and (iii) 
takes steps to improve environmental outcomes. The construction of political 
agendas is a complex process, which is affected by many factors other than ‘ob-
jective’ problem pressure (Cobb and Elder 1972) - for example, beliefs, political will 
and institutional arrangements. More specific characteristics of agenda-setting in 
the context of environmental policy integration could be, for example: inclusion of 
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environmental objectives into the overall mission statement of a department (e.g. 
promoting an economically successful and eco-efficient industry); presence of en-
vironmental mechanisms in standard operating procedures (requirement of strate-
gic environmental assessments, inclusion of internal environmental expertise in 
decision-making processes, etc.); and inclusion of environmental provisions in sec-
toral policy initiatives and outputs (see Table 1). 
 
2.3.2 Horizontal Communication 
Successful environmental policy integration does not make environmental admin-
istration redundant. Relying exclusively on the environmental expertise in the de-
partments of transport, agriculture, energy and so on, would involve building up 
duplicate and inefficient structures and neglecting the generic elements of envi-
ronmental policy. It can, therefore, be assumed that integrated environmental poli-
cy would also have to be based on well-functioning horizontal communication be-
tween administrative units with different responsibilities. The exchange of 
knowledge between environmental and non-environmental sectors can have dif-
ferent specific functions depending on the policy sector, the policy and the stage of 
development. Two main aims can be distinguished. First, horizontal communica-
tion should ensure that the environmental agendas of different sectors form a con-
sistent overall strategy, thus working towards the stable framework conditions that 
promote technological innovation. Second, it will provide the scientific and tech-
nical expertise of the environmental department needed for the development of 
environmental measures at the source. The interaction between sectoral and envi-
ronmental administrations can take different forms: formalized interdepartmental 
consultation processes, issue-specific joint working groups, frequent ad hoc meet-
ings and informal discussions, etc. 
 
2.3.3 Sectoral Capacity Building 
Horizontal communication will only lead to integrated policies if the sector admin-
istration possesses the capacity to appropriate, process and implement environ-
mental knowledge. Assessing the potential ecological effects of policies is a diffi-
cult and contentious task, especially where complex changes to a system of rules 
(for example, changes to the land-use planning system) are concerned rather than 
a decision on a well-circumscribed project (for example, a new road). Specific ex-
pertise is also needed to recognize win-win opportunities and to exploit them 
through the formulation of innovation-orientated policies. The question of how envi-
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ronmental innovation capacity is best institutionalized will depend on the specific 
context of the sector, but creating a specialized environment unit within the de-
partment is unlikely to be sufficient. An integrated environmental capability requires 
relevant financial, technical and human resources and incentives in different parts 
of the organization. These can take many different institutional forms – for exam-
ple, a system of officials charged with environmental responsibilities, internal in-
formation services, training, specific budgets for external consultancy. 
 
2.3.4 Policy Learning 
Finally, environmental policy integration is aimed at a more fundamental process of 
policy learning. Here, policy learning is not understood in the sense of instrumental 
learning often referred to in the management and organizational learning literature 
(cf. Dierkes et al. 1999). Rather, it means social learning in the wider sense of a 
change of values and belief systems over time (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1988). 
Public policies are based on a certain framing of a problem, assumptions about 
causal relationships and so on (Pressman and Wildavsky 1979). From an ecologi-
cal modernization perspective, the shortcomings of departmentalized policy stem 
partly from the fact that environmental measures are often perceived as a threat to 
established sectoral interests. If, in contrast, sectoral (and environmental) depart-
ments ‘learned’ that environmental concerns can be reconciled with other policy 
objectives, paralysing turf disputes would be avoided and strategies to prevent 
pollution at the source facilitated. While it might not always be possible to distin-
guish a change in political rhetoric from ‘genuine’ changes of attitude, there are 
developments that can be taken as indications of policy learning (for example, 
changed framing of environmental issues in policy documents, attitude in inter-
departmental negotiations). 
 
2.4 Integrating the Environment into EU Industry Policy 
By applying the framework to a specific initiative for environmental policy integra-
tion on the level of the European Union, this section will assess whether the Cardiff 
process has led to environmental policy integration (in the sense of an administra-
tive process of change) in EU industry and enterprise policy. The analysis will 
comprise the first phase of the process from the Luxembourg to the Gothenburg 
European Council (December 1997 to June 2001). This case study draws on a 
desk-based review of policy documents and on a series of interviews in the Euro-
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pean Commission and EU member states carried out between April 2000 and May 
2001.7 
 
2.4.1 Background and Development of the Cardiff Process 
With the exception of a few front-runner states such as Sweden and the Nether-
lands, little real effort was made until recently to overcome the departmentalized 
character of environmental policy. Since the early 1990s, environmental policy 
integration has moved gradually up political agendas and a number of countries 
have experimented with different types of institutional reform (Joas 1999, Jordan 
and Lenschow 2000, Lewanski 2002). Most common reform approaches involved 
the integration of departments (merging the environmental department with a key 
sectoral ministry), mechanisms to promote horizontal co-operation (inter-ministerial 
working groups, ‘green’ ministers, consultation procedures, etc.), and a high-level 
integration strategy based on political leadership (for example, environmental poli-
cy plans or sustainable development strategies). 
The EU committed itself to the environmental policy integration principle early on. 
Integration constituted one of the key objectives in the Third Environmental Action 
Programme (1983). The Single European Act (1987) formally incorporated the 
integration principle into the EEC Treaty, demanding that “environmental protection 
requirements shall be a component of the Community’s other policies” (Article 
130r). But it was the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) that gave environmental policy in-
tegration its current political significance, by introducing it into the Part One of the 
EC Treaty, which established the principles of the Community: 
Environmental protection requirements must be integrated into the definition and im-
plementation of the Community policies and activities referred to in Article 3 [listing of all 
Community activities], in particular with a view to promoting sustainable development 
(Art. 6). 
The reality of EU policy making has not matched these ambitions. It is widely un-
derstood that policies have often lacked coherence and that most EU institutions 
have traditionally been organized in a hierarchical and segmented fashion. The 
formations of the Council, in particular, have been criticized for their lack of co-
ordinating mechanisms. As a response to these deficits, new institutional co-
                                               
7
  Twelve in-depth interviews were carried out in DG Enterprise, with individuals charged 
with environmental issues in ministries of economic affairs in member states, in DG En-
vironment and with external observers. Interviewees were granted anonymity. Additional 
information was gathered through short interviews, informal contacts, participation in 
meetings, etc. 
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operation mechanisms were introduced or reinforced – for example, extended in-
ter-service consultation, task forces and corresponding units. In the environmental 
area, a system of new mechanisms was introduced after 1993 (Wilkinson 1997). It 
included a system of environmental correspondents within each Directorate-
General (DG), incentives for staff rotation, environmental appraisal procedures and 
check lists, and the Green Star appraisal system for environmentally sensitive pro-
posals. The European Commission itself admitted, however, that the effect of 
these reforms was limited (Wilkinson 1997, p. 164). The Forward Studies Unit of 
the European Commission found evidence “to suggest that there is frequently a 
tendency towards minimising the possible influence of these tools” (Lebessis and 
Paterson 2000). 
Disappointing results of co-ordination mechanisms, a reinforced mandate through 
the Amsterdam Treaty and growing environmental tensions in some policy areas 
created pressure for further action on environmental policy integration. At the end 
of 1997, the European Council launched work on a new environmental policy inte-
gration initiative based on the development of sectoral integration strategies. The 
overall mandate for the process was provided by the Cardiff European Council 
(June 1998), which gave its name to the process. Most importantly, the Cardiff 
European Council: 
- “invited the Commission to report to future European Councils on the progress in 
meeting the requirements of the Amsterdam Treaty”; 
- “invited all relevant formations of the Council to establish their own integration strate-
gies within their respective policy areas”; and 
- “requested identification of indicators for monitoring progress with the environmental 
integration strategies in different sectors” (European Council 1998). 
Successive European Councils specified nine key sectors that led the work on 
environmental policy integration and asked them to present their integration strate-
gies at the Gothenburg Council in June 2001. 
In response to this mandate, sectoral Councils and their respective DGs launched 
a series of internal and external meetings, documents, studies that are commonly 
referred to as the ‘Cardiff process’. The overall aim of these activities was to de-
velop sectoral integration strategies: a process through which non-environmental 
policy sectors assess the environmental implications of their decision-making, set 
out action plans to reduce negative and enhance positive environmental effects 
and evaluate the success of the process. Although the approach taken in the Car-
diff process is not unique – a similar sector-based strategy has been adopted in 
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Denmark (Jordan and Lenschow 2000) – it is distinct from conventional approach-
es to environmental policy integration. In particular, it is characterized by a high 
degree of decentralization and sectoral autonomy. Based on a fairly general man-
date by the European Council individual Council formations and their administra-
tions are given the task to define environmental priorities and to set out action 
plans. 
 
2.4.2 The Case of EU Industry and Enterprise Policy 
Did the Cardiff process lead to environmental policy integration in the policy sec-
tors it was designed to change? Industry policy is for two reasons an interesting 
case for the study of environmental policy integration. The main aim of EU industry 
policy is to encourage a competitive, innovative, adaptive and collaborative Euro-
pean industry and to improve the commercial exploitation of innovation, research 
and technological development (cf. EC Treaty, Title XVI). Industry policy is there-
fore directly charged with those drivers – innovation and technology – at the heart 
of ecological modernization. On the other hand, industry and economic affairs de-
partments have traditionally been the strongest internal opponents of environment 
departments. Unlike other sectors, such as energy and transport, the industry sec-
tor was until very recently still largely unaffected by the environmental agenda. The 
sector, therefore, provides potentially large opportunities as well as large challeng-
es for environmental policy integration. After a brief chronological description, we 
will assess the industry/enterprise policy integration strategy according to the four 
attributes of integration developed above: agenda setting, capacity building, policy 
learning and communication. 
The industry sector was invited to develop an environmental integration strategy by 
the Vienna Council in December 1998. In response, the Industry Council ex-
pressed a general commitment to the Cardiff process. Unlike most other sectors, 
the Industry Council emphasized the need to integrate all three pillars of sustaina-
ble development. This interpretation of Article 6 of the EC Treaty was internally 
criticized by DG Environment, where some perceived it as an attempt to water 
down the Cardiff mandate (interview DG Environment). However, interviewees in 
DG Enterprise maintained that the decision was an expression of concern for so-
cial issues. The Industry Council conclusion was generally optimistic in tone (“well 
defined and environmentally sound policies may have a great potential to contrib-
ute to increased competitiveness of industry and create employment opportuni-
ties”), but its wording suggests that the Council intended to emphasize that envi-
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ronmental protection is only one aim amongst others (Industry Council 1999). One 
year after Vienna, the Industry Council published a report on integration, which 
invited the Commission to “submit, as soon as possible, to the Council, as a con-
tribution to the strategy, an action plan for promoting integration” (Industry Council 
1999, p. 9). The report included strong elements of a positive environmental dis-
course (“environment does not merely present threats and limitations to industry 
but will offer huge business opportunities”) and put strong emphasis on those in-
struments and policy areas that were seen to be more compatible with competi-
tiveness – for example, voluntary actions, market-based instruments, eco-
efficiency, environmental management (Industry Council 1999). 
In the first phase of strategy development, the Commission played an active role. 
Existing institutional structures, especially the Environment Unit within DG III and 
the informal network of ‘environmental focal points’ in member states’ ministries of 
industry and economic affairs allowed the Commission to respond quickly to the 
Cardiff process. Its first contribution to the strategy was a Commission staff work-
ing paper (CEC 1999). This set out, in very general terms, the interactions be-
tween sustainable development and industrial policies. The paper emphasized the 
need to integrate all three pillars of sustainable development, and stressed the 
importance of economic instruments and assessment tools. This document was 
initially conceived as a Commission Communication but this was opposed by DG 
Environment on the grounds that it was not sufficiently ambitious (interview DG 
Environment).  
At the end of 1999, the reorganization of the European Commission took place. 
The old Industry Directorate-General (DG III) was merged with the DG for Small 
and Medium-sized Enterprises and the Innovation Directorate from the Information 
Society DG. The new DG Enterprise had a broader remit and included new non-
industrial sectors. This reorganization led to a more generic view of competitive-
ness, innovation and technological change. As a result, initial plans to base the 
integration strategy on a sector-based assessment of environmental impacts were 
revised (interview DG Enterprise). While the new DG Enterprise had to define the 
new area of ‘enterprise policy’, work on an integration strategy lacked a clear fo-
cus. Furthermore, Fabio Colasanti took up the position of Director General in early 
2000. Interviewees stated that while the integration process had previously been 
encouraged and co-ordinated from the top under former Director Generals, the 
importance of the Cardiff process on the internal agenda declined significantly after 
this change. For example, the DG decided not to respond to the call from the 
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Council for an “action plan” on integration, because “… the hierarchy didn’t see 
any point in an action plan. They couldn’t see an action plan that would be opera-
tional” (interview DG Enterprise). 
The Industry Council Conclusion on the integration strategy submitted to the 
Gothenburg European Council (Industry Council 2001) re-iterates earlier positions. 
It maintains the commitment to a strategy for the integration of sustainable devel-
opment into enterprise policy, including objectives, a timetable and indicators. This 
contrasts with the fact that very little substantial progress has been made. DG En-
terprise and the Industry Council were unable or unwilling to present a compre-
hensive assessment of environmental issues in the sector, an action plan, or a 
reporting mechanism. The development of an operational industry/enterprise inte-
gration strategy has been postponed until the end of 2004.  
 
2.4.2.1 Sectoral Agenda Setting 
The Cardiff process has clearly contributed to the foregrounding of environmental 
issues on the institutional agenda of the Industry Council and within DG Enterprise. 
Before Cardiff, the Industry Council had not had a substantial discussion of envi-
ronmental issues since 1992. Although DG Enterprise launched a number of envi-
ronmental initiatives, these lacked a strong political mandate by the Industry Coun-
cil. Because of the Cardiff process, both institutions were forced to engage more 
than before in discussions about ways of addressing environmental issues. In par-
ticular, the Industry Council asked DG Enterprise to report biannually on the pro-
gress made on the contribution of enterprise policy to sustainable development. 
Consultations, meetings and discussions carried out during the Cardiff process 
involved a substantial number of officials who do not conventionally deal with sus-
tainability issues. This need to engage contributed to raising the awareness of offi-
cials. It also seems likely that the process generated environmental initiatives in 
the sector (policies on issues such as eco-efficiency and responsible entrepre-
neurship) with a salience and continuity.  
On the other hand, none of the internal and official strategy documents reviewed 
above systematically mapped the interrelations between the sector and the envi-
ronment. The focus of the strategy was never clearly defined. Although the strate-
gy is nominally focused on all three pillars of sustainable development, most con-
crete examples and initiatives refer to the environmental dimension. It is indeed 
remarkable how little the process contributed to providing a coherent framework 
that clarifies problems, opportunities and responsibilities at the interface between 
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sustainable development and enterprise policy. As a result, the agenda-setting 
process that took place remained diffuse. Other sectoral strategies – for example 
in the energy and transport sector – have shown that it is possible to make consid-
erably more progress in this respect (Kraemer et al. 2002). 
 
2.4.2.2 Horizontal Communication 
Although the Cardiff process does not explicitly aim to improve horizontal commu-
nication, it has led in some sectors to new co-operation. For example, the Envi-
ronment and Transport Councils decided to hold a joint meeting in the context of 
the process, and a broader set of sectors collaborated with the European Envi-
ronment Agency in the development of integration indicators. In the enterprise sec-
tor, however, there is little evidence to suggest similar effects. On the contrary, DG 
Enterprise made it clear that it did not want a heavy involvement of DG Environ-
ment or the European Environment Agency in the development of a strategy doc-
ument and a monitoring mechanism (interview DG Enterprise). This was officially 
justified through the decision to develop an integration strategy that gives equal 
weight to all three pillars of sustainable development, rather than just focusing on 
the environment. An observation by a DG Enterprise official, however, suggests 
that behind this lay the attempt by the sector not to give DG Environment an op-
portunity to ‘interfere’ in sectoral issues: “they [DG Environment] don’t want to inte-
grate the environment, they want to integrate DG Environment policies” (interview 
DG Enterprise). Overall, it appears that neither DG Enterprise nor the Industry 
Council chose to use the Cardiff process as a vehicle for horizontal communica-
tion. Although there have been instances of communication, they were sporadic 
and no attempts were made to institutionalize them. 
 
2.4.2.3 Sectoral Capacity Building 
The impact of the Cardiff process on capacity building is considerably more difficult 
to assess. It can be observed that the Industry/Enterprise DG possesses some 
institutional capacity and that this has been built up gradually during the 1990s. A 
number of sectoral units work on environmental issues on a regular basis – for 
example, in relation to the car industry, chemicals and eco-labels. Recently, an 
email network was introduced to provide all DG Enterprise units with regular infor-
mation about environmental issues. In particular, there is a unit specifically 
charged with environmental aspects of enterprise policy, which is small but grow-
ing. Although this unit pre-dates the Cardiff process, it has been at the centre of 
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efforts to engage with the process, partly also as a way of securing and expanding 
its position within the DG. From one perspective, these environmental units repli-
cate administrative specialization (a perceived obstacle to integration) at a micro-
scale. ‘Sectoral’ environmental units may also suffer from marginalization from the 
more powerful policy divisions within the sector. The Cardiff process, therefore, 
appears to have afforded an existing, not very powerful policy interest group with a 
new means of promoting its interests, rather than creating the conditions for the 
development of integrated capabilities. Overall, it seems that the integration strate-
gy has not fundamentally affected internal structures. 
 
2.4.2.4 Policy Learning 
Most Cardiff documents from the industry sector adopt a positive environmental 
discourse. The 1999 Industry Council conclusions on the Cardiff process express 
the view that “well defined and environmentally sound policies may have a great 
potential to contribute to increased competitiveness of industry and create em-
ployment opportunities” (Industry Council 1999). The potentials for a positive-sum 
game between environmental and economic aspects are most explicitly spelled out 
in the Commission staff working paper: 
Environment and industrial policies are both important pillars for the achievement of 
sustainable development…The efforts to achieve a high level of environmental protec-
tion may encourage industrial innovation and increase competitiveness. And it is clear 
that a highly competitive economy is better placed for pursuing a high level of environ-
mental protection and promoting employment (CEC 1999). 
Traditional defensive arguments (for example, the need to avoid excessive cost 
and administrative burden for industry, environmental regulation as a threat to in-
ternational competitiveness, the principle of proportionality of measures) are rarely 
employed in these statements. On the other hand, the request that environmental 
policy integration should be ‘mirrored’ by the integration of competitiveness con-
cerns into environmental policy (Kraack et al. 2001, p. 220) suggests that DG En-
terprise retained a defensive position. 
There also seems to be a disjuncture between a largely eco-modernist discourse 
in high-level policy documents and far more sceptical positions taken on a working 
level. Interviews as well as internal documents confirm that parts of the DG contin-
ue to hold more traditional views. For example, in internal meetings in relation to 
the Cardiff process, DG Enterprise officials frequently emphasized the need to 
strike a balance between environmental concerns and the need to preserve the 
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competitiveness of European industry. It remains to be seen whether the Cardiff 
process will, over time, affect views held on all levels of the institution.  
This range of attitudes also applies to the relationship between DG Environment 
and DG Enterprise, which seems to vary depending on the nature of the policy 
issues (interview DG Enterprise). While policies in relation to the regulation of 
chemicals tend to be dominated by antagonistic fights over competencies, a more 
constructive relationship exists on issues such as integrated product policy 
(Berkhout and Smith 1999). Overall, the relationships between DG Enterprise and 
DG Environment are not seen to have improved through the Cardiff process (inter-
view DG Enterprise). 
 
2.5 Conclusions 
This paper argued that environmental policy integration strategies can be fruitfully 
evaluated on the basis of four specific functions of environmental policy integra-
tion: agenda setting, horizontal communication, capacity building and policy learn-
ing. The application of the framework to the current status of the Cardiff process in 
EU industry policy showed that its impact has varied in relation to different func-
tions of integration. It appears that considerable agenda setting has taken place. 
The Cardiff process has obliged policy makers and officials to consider the link 
with industry/enterprise policy and generated a stronger political mandate for fur-
ther environmental activities. Although Cardiff seems to have contributed to the 
development of some new environmental capacity in DG Enterprise, it was clearly 
insufficient to respond adequately to the mandate of the European Council. There 
is also no evidence that the sectoral environmental policy integration strategy has 
led to a substantial increase in horizontal communication. While a shift towards a 
more positive attitude towards the environment is noticeable in high-level policy 
documents, the Cardiff process has not challenged the sectoral belief systems and 
institutional power structures in a more fundamental way. The relationships be-
tween the industry and the environment sector remain antagonistic in most areas. 
Overall, the impact of the initial three years of the Cardiff process on EU industry 
and enterprise policy has been modest.  
Our case study has confirmed the somewhat disappointing results of other anal-
yses (Schepelmann 2000, Kraemer 2001, Kraemer et al. 2002): not only is pro-
gress towards the formal requirements of the Cardiff process patchy, but there is 
also little evidence to suggest that it has brought the EU closer to resolving its key 
programmatic contradictions. This contrasts with the enthusiasm with which the 
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Cardiff process has been welcomed, and leads to the question as to what contribu-
tion sectoral integration strategies can make to environmental policy integration. 
Past environmental policy integration strategies and mechanisms have often been 
unsuccessful because other policy sectors have found ways to reduce the influ-
ence of environmental rules and procedures that they saw as threats to their insti-
tutional interests. The potential benefit of sectoral integration strategies lies in their 
attempt to overcome this problem of sectoral resistance through a decentralized, 
bottom-up process. Although the Council mandate includes elements of a top-
down approach (namely the request for target-setting, timetables and monitoring) 
sectoral integration processes essentially represent a bottom-up environmental 
policy integration strategy (for a distinction, see Wilkinson 1997). They are based 
on persuasion rather than power and give policy sectors an active role in framing 
the integration agenda. Sectoral integration strategies aim to challenge the tradi-
tional understanding of a trade-off relationship between sectoral and environmental 
aims. Rather than just adding environmental procedures, they undertake to inte-
grate environmental concerns into the core objectives of all parts of government.  
The bottom-up nature of sectoral integration strategies has, on the other hand, two 
main drawbacks. First, sectoral processes can result in diverging, or even incom-
patible strategies, because they do not provide a coherent framework for environ-
mental strategy. Their inability to enhance horizontal communication represents a 
barrier to inter-departmental learning. Second, the case of EU industry/enterprise 
policy shows that unwilling sectors can use the autonomy granted by a sectoral 
approach to delay action. Without strong political leadership commitment to envi-
ronmental policy integration, integration can lead to a ‘dilution’ (Liberatore 1997) 
rather than a strengthening of environmental policy. The long history of rhetoric 
and symbolic action in the EU and in many member states has shown that integra-
tion requires substantial political pressure. It is unlikely that the Cardiff process will 
lead to substantial changes in EU policy making unless the top-down elements of 
the process are strengthened or new pressures are added. 
The specific weaknesses of sectoral integration strategies suggest that they will 
not be successful by themselves. Environmental policy integration requires a het-
erogeneous set of conditions, such as political will or pressure, suitable proce-
dures, resources and knowledge. The different aspects of environmental policy 
integration can only be addressed usefully through a mix of strategies because the 
ability of different approaches to provide each of these conditions varies. In par-
ticular, any successful environmental policy integration strategy has to involve a 
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balanced combination of top-down elements of political leadership by the core ex-
ecutive with bottom-up approaches suitable to engage sectors in constructive 
ways. It also needs to be based on the recognition that institutional routines and 
belief systems tend to be deeply embedded and fixed. Rather than conceiving an 
environmental policy integration strategy as a formal and linear administrative pro-
cess, it needs to be understood as an ongoing, long-term process consciously de-
signed to promote internal capacity and policy learning. 
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3. Policy appraisal 
Hertin, J., K. Jacob and A. Volkery (2008). Policy Appraisal. In: Innovation in Envi-
ronmental Policy? Integrating environment for sustainability. A. Jordan and A. 
Lenschow. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar: 114-133. 
3.1 Introduction 
The ex ante appraisal of policies has been a standard procedure in government for 
a long time. It has been used in many countries to improve the quality of regula-
tion, to reduce implementation costs and to achieve cross cutting objectives such 
sustainable development, economic competitiveness or human health. While not 
an entirely new policy instrument, ex ante policy appraisal has recently attracted a 
remarkable level of attention. A considerable number of policy-making institutions 
at all levels of governance have started to revise their appraisal procedures with a 
view to strengthening, broadening and integrating ex ante policy assessment. 
This new impetus for broader and more integrated forms of appraisal has often 
been supported by those promoting environmental policy because it appears to 
offer new opportunities for strengthening environmental policy integration and facil-
itating sustainable development. However, concerns have been voiced that this 
trend could lead to a sidelining of environmental issues if the appraisal process is 
dominated by concerns such as over-regulation and economic competitiveness 
(Wilkinson et al. 2005). 
In this chapter, we analyse a number of policy appraisal systems in order to under-
stand the contribution they make or could make to environmental policy integra-
tion. We will analyse four cases of comparatively advanced appraisal procedures 
(in Canada, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands and the European Commission), 
highlighting the variety of institutional arrangements and functions of policy ap-
praisal. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: The following section (3.1) 
gives a brief overview of the history of ex ante policy appraisal. Section 3.2 anal-
yses its conceptual foundations. Section 3.3 presents the four case studies, look-
ing at both the institutional set-up of the four appraisal systems and their perfor-
mance in practice. It compares and contrasts the different systems and analyses 
their strengths and weaknesses from the perspective of overall effectiveness and 
the consideration of environmental concerns. The final section (3.4) proposes a 
number of conclusions about the potential contribution of ex ante policy appraisal 
to environmental policy integration. 
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3.2 History  
3.2.1 The origins of policy appraisal  
The integrated ex ante assessment of impacts of regulatory proposals, pro-
grammes or policies can be traced back to three different origins: environmental 
project assessments, regulatory impact assessments and sectoral assessments 
procedures.  
From the very beginning of modern environmental policy in the late 1960s, the 
environmental assessment of large projects (for example construction and infra-
structure schemes) was introduced as an obligatory tool in a many OECD coun-
tries, starting with the USA (see Chapter 13). Focusing on potential negative im-
pacts, Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) aims to provide decision-makers 
with the information needed to minimize damage to the environment. Often, how-
ever, decisions taken already at an earlier stage of planning limit the scope for 
reducing the environmental impacts of a project. The project level assessment thus 
may be of only marginal benefit for the environmental. Hence, there have been 
calls to introduce mandatory assessment procedures at an earlier stage of the pro-
cess i.e. covering policies, plans and programmes (see Chapter 7). This form of 
Strategic Environmental Assessment (SEA) was developed in the 1980s and dif-
fused more widely during the 1990s. From an environmental perspective, the pro-
cedures for integrated policy appraisal analysed in this chapter represent a further 
'upstreaming' of assessment in the decision-making process. 
A second root of integrated policy appraisals is RIA which first developed in the 
early 1970s, mainly in Anglo-Saxon countries. RIA assesses the economic costs 
and benefits of new regulation, aiming to both avoid unnecessary or overly costly 
regulation and improve the design of policy. This is supposed to decrease the 
costs of regulation for both business (and other target groups) and public authori-
ties, thereby enhancing economic competitiveness and contributing to a stabiliza-
tion of public spending. Although it is difficult to obtain a complete overview of 
these activities because they are frequently informal or confidential, it is clear that 
RIA has fairly rapidly diffused throughout the OECD during the 1980s and 1990s 
(OECD 1997, Radaelli 2004, Radaelli 2005). There is now also a strong trend to-
wards devoting more efforts in appraisal processes to assessing and reducing ad-
ministrative burdens. Many countries follow the Dutch example and adopt a stand-
ardised methodology (the so-called Standard Cost Model) to calculate and then 
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reduce the costs for business complying with information obligations stemming 
from government regulation. 
Alongside EIA and RIA, a number of other specific appraisal procedures have 
been developed to promote more joined up thinking and working in government. 
They cover cross-cutting issues such as human health, the concerns of small and 
medium enterprises, the environment and different aspects of social welfare. Often 
consisting of simple forms or checklists, these 'single issue assessments' have the 
aim of making the policy department aware of unintended - and usually negative - 
consequences and of finding ways of minimising these through better cross-
sectoral policy coordination. 
 
3.2.2 The shift to integrated policy appraisal 
A number of administrations, most prominently the European Commission, have 
recently begun to develop more integrated appraisal procedures. Such move from 
a sectoral to an integrated approach implies multiple and sometimes conflicting 
objectives. In this chapter we ask whether this integration benefits sustainability in 
general and environmental policy integration in particular. It seems plausible that 
integrated policy appraisal should promote the integration of environmental con-
cerns: Sectoral departments would be obliged to consider the unintended envi-
ronmental impacts of their policy proposals at a stage where decisions are not yet 
reached and there may be potential for win-win solutions (Hertin and Berkhout 
2003). Environmental ministries (and perhaps agencies and NGOs) would be con-
sulted early in the process, promoting cross-sectoral networking and, possibly, 
policy learning. There are, however, also critics who think that integrated assess-
ment may sideline environmental concerns if the procedure is dominated by the 
de-regulation agenda (Wilkinson et al. 2005). Some of the arguments in favour and 
against integrated assessment re-iterate the debate about the effects of merging 
environmental and sectoral ministries (Weale 1992), where integration without a 
change in power relations within government is considered by some as ineffective 
or even counter-productive (see Chapter 3). One of the concerns is that integrated 
appraisal could make it easier for powerful sectoral ministries to challenge envi-
ronmental policy on competitiveness grounds while doing little to help environmen-
tal ministries successfully voice their concerns. NGOs also see the risk that they 
could lose their capacity to advance their position through a conflict-oriented mode 
of action if they subscribe to an integrated appraisal procedure which is structurally 
biased against the environment (see for example the critique of the EU’s latest 
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chemicals policy produced by the European Environmental Bureau and the World 
Wide Fund)8, or the critical statement by the European Environment and Sustaina-
ble Development Advisory Councils on EU Impact Assessment.9 
 
3.2.3 Conceptual background: Ex ante appraisal and the policy process 
Policy appraisal is based on the assumption that policy-making can – at least to a 
certain extent – be designed according to principles of rational discourse and linear 
problem-solving (Radaelli 2005). Typically, the procedures set out a sequence of 
analytical steps that mirror the phases of a linear and rational model of the policy 
process. The process normally begins with the identification of a policy problem or 
objective, runs through an analysis of options and respective impacts and leads to 
a weighing up of alternatives with a final selection of the 'best' policy choice (see 
for example OECD 1997, and CEC 2005). In this conception, policy assessment is 
- at least implicitly - based on a number of assumptions. It suggests that policies 
are: designed to address identified problems or objectives; that the impacts of 
planned policies can be anticipated with a certain degree of accuracy; that there is 
a central decision-maker who selects a policy option on the basis of expected net 
benefits; and that, implicitly, the provision of more and better information leads to 
more rational policies. A careful analysis of the problem and the appraisal of avail-
able options should, it is claimed, identify mutually acceptable solutions in an effi-
cient manner. Where competing objectives exist (as in relation to a policy goal like 
sustainability), trade-offs can be made explicit, compromises reached and com-
pensatory measures implemented.  
Many scholars of political science argue, however, that while the policy cycle may 
under certain circumstances be a useful heuristic device, this rational, linear con-
ception of the policy process is not empirically valid (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 
1993). Influential authors emphasise that political decision-making is characterised 
by discontinuities, dynamic change and a loose coupling between problems and 
policies (Kingdon 1984, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). It has also long been 
accepted that there is no unitary decision-maker or central steering mechanism. 
Instead, policy decisions are the outcome of complex actor and interest constella-
tions. Third, knowledge is seen to have a far more complex and varied role in the 
                                               
8
  See http://www.eeb.org/activities/chemicals/20050113-EEB-WWF-KPMG-brief-final.pdf 
[accessed on 2 November 2006]. 
9
  See http://www.eeac-net.org/download/EEAC%20WG%20Gov_IA% 
20statement_final_18-5-06.pdf [accessed on 2 November 2006]. 
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policy process than the positivist model would suggest (DeLeon 1997, see also 
Owens et al. 2004). A range of influential authors with a more post-positivist orien-
tation emphasise the important role of ideas, argumentation and discourse in shap-
ing policy debates and ultimately decision-making (Majone 1989, Fischer and 
Forester 1993). In this view, knowledge is not merely constituted by factual infor-
mation that is generated to help solve problems. Instead, knowledge is more 
broadly defined as including ideas and argument. It is seen to be used by different 
actors - typically in a competitive fashion - to structure policy problems and solu-
tions (see also Radaelli 1995). Policy appraisal, then, gives interest groups another 
opportunity to intervene early in the process of decision-making and provides an 
additional forum for lobbying activities and political conflict. In short, it may be an 
additional arena for inter and intra-sectoral politics rather than a way to overcome 
them through rational argument. 
Against this background institutional design becomes important for determining the 
robustness of the different appraisal procedure. This concerns especially the clarity 
of rules for selecting proposals and coordinating the appraisal process, i.e. the 
actors in charge, but also the definition of framework conditions, i.e. regarding the 
transparency of the process. 
 
3.3 Deployment: practical experiences 
3.3.1 United Kingdom  
The UK is well-recognized for traditionally having both efficient inter-ministerial 
coordination procedures (Bulmer and Burch 1998) and extensive systems for ad-
ministrative target-setting and performance evaluation (Carter et al. 1992). Weale 
et al. (2000) have also observed that the UK has a tendency to deal with environ-
mental policy problems by making changes to the policy process or the machinery 
of government (see also Chapter 12). It is therefore not surprising that the UK be-
gan to experiment with environmental and sustainability appraisal earlier and more 
extensively than most other countries.  
Over the last decade or so, a range of policy appraisal methodologies were devel-
oped within different departments, several of which are at least partly concerned 
with environmental issues10. A specific Environmental Policy Assessment proce-
                                               
10
  Examples include the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions' ‚Policy 
appraisal and the environment’ guide, the Department for Transport’s ‘New Approach to 
Appraisal’, Regulatory Impact Assessment, Strategic Environmental Assessment, the 
Green Ministers’ screening requirements, the Treasury policy guidance ‘Tax and the en-
vironment’ and the Cabinet Office's ‘Policy makers checklist’. 
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dure was first introduced in the 1990s by the environmental ministry as a tool for 
promoting the 'greening of government' (DETR 1998), but it was not very widely 
used (Russel 2007). The profile of environmental policy appraisal increased after 
Labour came into government in 1997, but it remained essentially a voluntary pro-
cedure with very limited uptake.  
In parallel to this, the scope of mainstream regulatory appraisal (i.e. RIA) has been 
broadened. RIA was first introduced in the mid-1980s when it focused on the anal-
ysis of business compliance costs. The commitment to RIA was reinforced in 1998, 
when Prime Minister Blair announced that assessments would be carried out for all 
major policy proposals. It has also been extended to include unintended conse-
quences, distributional effects and indirect costs. In principle, environmental im-
pacts were covered by RIA, but in practice they did not usually play a major role in 
the assessments and little guidance was given on how to identify and evaluate 
environmental effects (Cabinet Office 2003). 
To promote environmental policy integration while at the same time addressing the 
problem of there being too many issue-specific appraisals, the environmental and 
transport department developed Integrated Policy Appraisal. This was a checklist 
tool that aimed to bring together the three departmental procedures to cover issues 
that were judged to be insufficiently addressed by RIA. In 2004, Integrated Policy 
Appraisal was abandoned and key elements of the checklist were integrated into 
the system of RIA overseen by the Cabinet Office. 
The resulting system of integrated RIA is characterized by the following features: 
- It is mandatory for all significant legislative initiatives (implementation was 
brought up to 90 per cent in recent years);  
- coordination and quality assurance is provided by the Cabinet Office and 
backed by personal commitment of the Prime Minister;  
- assessment is made of costs and benefits of unintended impacts as well as 
intended effects;  
- monetization is strongly encouraged and guidance on cost-benefit analysis is 
provided;  
- environmental impacts are integrated in the form of a generic question to as-
sess direct and indirect costs (‘which may be economic, social and environ-
mental’) and a list of questions on specific environmental issues.  
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Although sustainability concerns still play a limited role in the British system of RIA 
(National Audit Office 2006), the formal strengthening of the environmental per-
spective has been considered as at least a partial success by the environmental 
department because it has moved into the mainstream appraisal procedure. It re-
mains to be seen, however, whether this formal change has a significant effect on 
assessment practice because it is left to the responsible policy unit to decide which 
impacts to consider and most RIAs only look at a small set of selected impacts in 
detail. 
 
3.3.2 The European Commission 
Similar to the UK, the policy appraisal system within the European Commission 
has also recently undergone a re-organization that aims to bring together different 
strands of appraisal previously developed in a rather disconnected manner. These 
include ex ante evaluations that are legally required under certain circumstances 
(e.g. budgetary evaluation, business impact assessment and EIA) as well as those 
that are not (e.g. gender assessment, trade impact assessment, and small and 
medium sized enterprises (SME) assessment). This re-organization of policy ap-
praisal in the EU was partly a result of the 'better regulation' agenda which has 
received increasing emphasis. This reflects a number of factors, not least Europe’s 
disappointing economic performance in comparison with the US, China and India 
and its inability to meet the economic and employment targets set out in the EU’s 
Lisbon strategy. The ultimate aim of implementing a new and more integrated form 
of appraisal was to improve the quality of regulation, promote greater stakeholder 
interaction and ensure the costs of regulation are proportionate to benefits (CEC 
2002).  
In parallel, the idea of sustainability impact assessment was referred to in the 
Gothenburg Presidency Conclusions as an instrument to implement the EU Sus-
tainable Development Strategy (see Chapter 8). Environmental policy appraisal in 
the European Commission had had a rather difficult heritage. A 'Green Star' sys-
tem was introduced in the mid-1990s. Under this procedure, proposed new legisla-
tion with particular relevance to the environment (marked with a Green Star) was 
planned to go through a process of environmental appraisal. As explained in Chap-
ter 8, this system was never systematically implemented (Kraack et al. 2001) due 
to lack of methodologies and resources as well as opposition from sectoral direc-
torates general who felt ‘controlled’ by DG Environment (Hertin and Berkhout 
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2003). In fact, Wilkinson (1997, p. 163) found ‘no evidence that any such environ-
mental appraisals ha[d ever] been undertaken’.  
In 2002, plans for Sustainability Impact Assessment were integrated into the new 
Impact Assessment (IA) procedure (CEC 2002). This dual objective of IA is clearly 
expressed in the Commission Communication: ‘The Commission intends to launch 
impact assessment as a tool to improve the quality and coherence of the policy 
development process. It will contribute to an effective and efficient regulatory envi-
ronment and further, to a more coherent implementation of the European strategy 
for Sustainable Development’ (CEC 2002). The procedure was introduced gradual-
ly throughout 2003 and 2004. Currently, its main characteristics are as follows:  
- IA should be carried out for ‘key legislative proposals as well as the most im-
portant cross-cutting policy-defining non-legislative proposals’ and replaces 
previously separate RIAs.  
- The assessment is carried out by the directorate-general responsible for the 
policy proposal during the process of decision-making in consultation with 
other directorate-general and external stakeholders; external consultants may 
also be involved.  
- The overall process is coordinated by the Secretariat-General in the European 
Commission; quality assurance shall be reached through inter-administrative 
consultation.  
- The results of the appraisal are documented in an IA report which is published 
on a central web-site to ensure high transparency and better forward planning.  
- Analysts are encouraged to quantify or monetize impacts where possible and 
to explore impacts qualitatively where quantification would be inappropriate.  
- European Commission is working to provide better training as well as qualita-
tive and quantitative tools for IA.  
 
Several recent analyses of the IA system reveal that many assessments were of 
modest quality (Hertin et al. 2004, Wilkinson et al. 2004, IMV 2006). For example, 
many only consider one policy option, are narrowly focused on direct economic 
impacts and explore social and environmental impacts only briefly. Moreover, the 
coverage is uneven (some policy areas undertake very few or no IAs), the evi-
dence basis is sometimes weak, and few are transparent about how and by whom 
the assessment was carried out. The procedure was also rolled out at a slower 
pace than initially planned. For 2003, the first year of operation, 43 proposals had 
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been identified as requiring an Impact Assessment, but only 21 of those were 
completed (IMV 2006). Current IA practice also highlights the potential tension – 
although not outright contradiction - between the better regulation and competi-
tiveness agenda pursued by the Lisbon process on the one hand and the sustain-
able development agenda on the other (see also Chapter 8). This has become 
particularly apparent during the process of assessing some of the more controver-
sial policy proposals that have emerged from the Commission in recent years, 
such as the reform of the EU’s sugar and chemical policies. 
Nonetheless, our analysis of IA reports (Hertin et al. 2004) shows that most poli-
cies with a substantial environmental dimension are assessed against environmen-
tal criteria. Although the treatment of - particularly unintended - environmental ef-
fects could rarely be considered as appropriate in terms of scope and rigour, it is 
clear that the introduction of IA has opened-up the policy-making process in the 
European Commission and - unlike the Green Star procedure - served to improve 
transparency and forward planning (Jordan and Schout 2006). Anecdotal evidence 
from our stakeholder interviews suggests that the IA procedure may have triggered 
learning processes and opened the decision process to new knowledge (Hertin et 
al. 2004). Whether this has lead to 'substantive' environmental policy integration in 
the sense of a changing policy output remains, however, open to question. 
 
3.3.3 The Netherlands  
The Netherlands has a strong tradition of policy planning and coordination. For 
instance, it pioneered the development of SEA in the mid-1980s. Ex ante policy 
appraisal was introduced, however, only as early as of 1994, with two central pro-
cedures: the Business Effect-Test (B-Test) and the Environmental Test (E-Test). 
The preparations for the introduction of such assessments were initiated in the 
context of the revised National Environmental Policy Plan after 1992. Additional 
momentum for the introduction came in 1994 from the Quality of Legislation initia-
tive which aimed at a more stringent evaluation of proposed legislation. Here, the 
underlying goal was (as in the UK and the EU) to increase economic productivity 
and promote more effective administration.  
The E-Test and B-Test procedures aimed at improving the quality of regulation, 
reducing negative effects on business and implementing environmental policy. A 
Joint Support Centre for Draft Regulation (the so called ‘help desk’) was set up by 
the ministries of economic affairs and environment to coordinate appraisals and 
provide technical back up (cf. Marsden 1999). A joint ministerial working group was 
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responsible for selecting proposals. A Proposed Legislation Desk, a joint unit of the 
ministries of economic affairs, environment and justice, decides jointly with the 
lead ministry which aspects merit an extended policy appraisal. However, an inter-
nal evaluation found the system was too cumbersome, was located too low down 
in the bureaucratic hierarchy and lacked transparency (cf. Volkery and Ehrhardt 
2004). The system was restructured in 2001/2002, when it was simplified and 
tasks and responsibilities were decentralized. 
The current system is characterized by the following features: 
- The tests are mandatory for all legislative proposals that might significantly 
impact on business, environment or administrative burdens;  
- Four central tools are run separately in the early phase of the regulative for-
mation process: Business Impact Assessment, Environmental Assessment, 
Practice and Enforceability Assessment and Cost-Benefit-Analysis;  
- The procedure is predominantly qualitative: the assessments mainly require a 
simple, criteria-based qualitative assessment; cost-benefit analysis is rarely 
used.  
- The process is staged: after the first Quick Scan (preliminary assessment) by 
the lead ministry an extended policy appraisal has to be performed for select-
ed proposals.  
- There is no high-level coordination by a central institution (e.g. the Prime Min-
ister's office). The Proposed Legislation Desk is in charge of the quality con-
trol, but its powers are limited to giving advice. Quality control is also provided 
by the ministry of justice that is responsible for legal approval. In case of dis-
approval the legislative report has to be included in the submission of the pro-
posal to the cabinet. 
- There is a high degree of secrecy and little transparency. Assessment reports 
are not available to the public, but restricted to internal use.  
 
Although the Dutch system explicitly aims to promote the integration of environ-
mental and social issues into other policy domains, it does not really provide a truly 
integrated perspective. The tools for business (B) and environment (E) test-
ing/appraisal are mostly run independently and the results are rarely analysed from 
an integrated perspective. This might be explained by the low degree of central 
steering. The Dutch system places strong emphasis on technical support, but there 
is no central unit that could put pressure on ministries to comply with central re-
 49 
 
quirements. The Proposed Legislation Desk cannot fill this gap because it largely 
functions as a technical advice body. 
To conclude, although policy appraisal has been in place for a number of years, 
the rate of implementation appears to be quite low. In contrast to other procedures, 
policy appraisal in the Netherlands relies strongly on simple checklists and makes 
little use of quantitative analysis. Furthermore, the transparency of the system is 
low and stakeholders do not contribute directly. 
 
3.3.4 Canada  
Canada has been a pioneer and consistent leader in the area of regulatory reform 
for over 25 years. The agenda for regulatory reform emerged at the end of the 
1970s; the government adopted a comprehensive Regulatory Reform Strategy in 
1986. Its main principles are the restriction of growth of regulation, the principle 
that benefits of regulation should exceed its costs, early public consultation and the 
reduction of administrative burden. In 1992, the Government adopted the over-
arching goal of ‘maximizing net benefit to Canadians’. A central focus was on in-
creasing international competitiveness and removing barriers to internal trade (cf. 
Volkery 2004).  
Since that time, Canada has worked continuously to improve what is now a mature 
and well-functioning system of regulatory governance. Each ministry is responsible 
for conducting RIAs on its policies, but the Treasury Board and the Regulatory 
Affairs and Orders in Council Secretariat of the Privy Council Office play a strong 
coordination role. RIA is required by Cabinet directives that regulate the process 
for making federal acts and regulations. The key document with regard to RIA is 
the Cabinet Directive on Canada Regulatory Policy from 1999. Over the years, it 
has permeated the overall departmental policy-making culture. Quantitative cost-
benefit analysis has been strengthened and it is now mandatory for all proposals 
with costs exceeding Canadian $10 million.  
The system is characterized by the following features:  
- RIA is mandatory for all legislation and aims to cover the early stages of the 
policy process.  
- There is a strong political commitment to RIA through approval and signature 
by responsible ministers. It is supported by a wide array of guidelines and 
manuals, which are constantly up-dated. Training has been improved through 
interactive, web-based instruments.  
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- Strong central coordination is provided by the Treasury Board which oversees 
the overall process. It is supported by the Regulatory Affairs and Orders in 
Council, which provides central quality control. Both institutions have the pow-
er to refuse the submission of the proposal to Cabinet if documents are miss-
ing or if the statement is seriously flawed.  
- Consultation plays an important role: after approval, the proposal is ‘pre-
published’ to collect public comments over a period of 30 days. For final sub-
mission to the Treasury Board, the department must amend the statement re-
flecting the received information, the action taken and the rationale behind it. 
After the final proposal has been approved by the minister, the Regulatory Af-
fairs and Orders in Council will again verify all documents.  
- External auditing and quality control are mainly provided by the General Audi-
tor and the Parliament. All departments fulfil watchdog functions with regard to 
their policy areas and intervene if they consider the proposal or the assess-
ment as seriously flawed (Wilburn 2004).  
- Environmental impacts are treated separately under the Cabinet Directive on 
the Environmental Assessment of Policy, Plan and Program Proposals (a form 
of SEA). Environmental assessment has to be performed by the responsible 
departments or agencies, all of which have appointed a coordination officer for 
SEA. These officers keep contact with the Canadian Environmental Assess-
ment Agency that oversees and coordinates the SEA process.  
 
Although Canada is often regarded as a pioneer in terms of the institutionalization 
of policy appraisal and the quality of its outcomes, its RIA process is nonetheless 
strongly biased towards an assessment of economic costs and benefits. It mostly 
focuses on business compliance cost, competitiveness concerns and overall ad-
ministrative burdens. Environmental concerns have only been integrated to a lim-
ited degree. Like the Dutch approach, the Canadian RIA system does not provide 
a genuinely integrated assessment of possible impacts. Against this background, 
the Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development (located at 
the General Auditors Office) has strongly criticized departments and agencies for 
insufficient action regarding the integration of sustainability concerns into RIAs 
(Commissioner on the Environment and Sustainable Development 2004). NGOs 
have reiterated these criticisms, complaining that all major areas of governmental 
action, especially the budget, remain out of bounds to sustainability appraisal 
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(Hazell 2004). The Environmental Assessment Agency, however, notes that pro-
gress has been made (Wilburn 2004). 
 
3.3.5 Summary discussion  
Our comparison of the IA systems in the four jurisdictions shows that there are 
similarities in their basic orientation. All four procedures aim to:  
- improve the evidence base of policy decisions;  
- improve regulatory quality and streamline regulation;  
- increase stakeholder involvement, accountability and transparency in poli-
cy-making; and  
- promote policy integration and the consideration of cross-cutting objectives. 
 
There are differences, however, with regard to the emphasis on particular func-
tions and the underlying rationale for the entire system. In Canada and the UK, 
policy appraisal was introduced to reduce administrative costs, avoid unnecessary 
rules and increase accountability. Only later has the system been broadened to 
address other objectives such as sustainability and environmental policy integra-
tion. Regulatory and environmental policy appraisals were originally carried out 
separately in both the UK and Canada, with rather poor implementation of the lat-
ter (Jordan and Lenschow 2000). Whereas the degree of coupling remains low in 
Canada, environmental appraisal has now been formally integrated into RIA in the 
UK. RIA has traditionally been less developed in the European Commission and in 
the Netherlands and consequently the twin objectives of regulatory efficiency and 
sustainability have been on a more equal footing from the beginning. Interestingly, 
this does not mean that integration is necessarily a more prominent feature in the 
latter two systems. While the European Commission's IA procedure does indeed 
seek to combine sustainability and regulatory assessment, the Netherlands have 
introduced a Business Effect-Test and Environmental Test as completely separate 
procedures.  
The way in which the requirement for IA is formally defined appears to have little 
impact on the effectiveness of the procedure in practice. Although all four systems 
make ex ante appraisal mandatory for policies with large potential impacts, imple-
mentation rates vary from almost full implementation (the UK) to a very limited lev-
el of uptake (the Netherlands). The question of how much effort to put into apprais-
ing policies is answered in different - and sometimes complementary – ways in the 
four jurisdictions. Thus, formal monetary thresholds exist in Canada; the principle 
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of proportionality is used in the EU and the UK; a staged assessment process oc-
curs in the Netherlands, the EU and the UK; and differentiated methodologies are 
used in the Netherlands (Business Impact Assessment, Environmental Assess-
ment, Practice and Enforceability Assessment and Cost-Benefit-Analysis). Alt-
hough the conditions under which policy appraisal is mandatory are relatively 
clearly defined, there is less stringency regarding the required scope of the as-
sessment.  
From the perspective of environmental policy integration, the question of how poli-
cy proposals are selected for appraisal is crucially important. In all four jurisdic-
tions, the responsible ministry is ultimately in charge of framing the assessment, 
although in some cases (e.g. the European Commission) inter-departmental steer-
ing groups have an influence on this decision. This also used to be the case in the 
Netherlands, but the process was seen as overly burdensome and the scoping 
decision has been given back to the respective sectoral ministry. In all four sys-
tems, lists of potential impact areas are supposed to broaden the perspective of 
the officials in charge of policy development. Practice shows, however, that this is 
not sufficient if policy appraisal is to function as a tool for environmental policy in-
tegration: in the two cases with integrated procedures (namely, the UK and the 
EU), assessment reports tend to cover only direct, short term and economic costs 
and benefits, often considering unintended effects only in a cursory way.  
Another important difference concerns the mechanism and extent of central coor-
dination. Probably as a result of the strong tradition in regulatory reform in the UK 
and Canada, both systems have a powerful coordinating body (the Cabinet Office 
and the Treasury Board, respectively). By contrast, there is hardly any central con-
trol in the Netherlands and the EU, where coordinating units play a rather technical 
role and evaluation is mainly left to departments themselves (see also Jordan and 
Schout 2006). In Canada and the UK, the central coordinating body also provides 
a certain level of quality assurance and is entitled to block the adoption of a pro-
posal if the appraisal is considered to be flawed or otherwise insufficient. Although 
this has rarely happened in practice, the presence of an external evaluator is an 
important driver for implementation - although not necessarily quality - in both 
countries. A similar role is played by the General Auditor and its Commissioner for 
Sustainable Development in relation to environmental appraisals in Canada.  
A range of approaches also exist with regards to the methodologies used to ap-
praise potential impacts of new policies. In the UK and in Canada, the assessment 
guidelines strongly encourage the quantification of impacts, particularly the use of 
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cost-benefit analysis. The guidelines issued by the European Commission also 
promote quantitative analysis but at the same time recommend a flexible strategy 
where the analytical technique is chosen depending on the issue under considera-
tion. In the Netherlands, more qualitative methods are favoured. In practice, how-
ever, the differences are less pronounced because methodological difficulties and 
limited resources for IA mean that extensive and detailed quantitative assessment 
is the exception rather than the rule in all four jurisdictions. Perhaps due to the 
scale of interests at stake, the European Commission tends to use formal assess-
ment methods and tools more often than the other three jurisdictions. From an 
environmental perspective, using quantitative methodologies can have the benefit 
of facilitating the integration of previously neglected ecological impacts into deci-
sion-making. On the other hand, policy appraisal in the UK (and to some extent in 
the European Commission) shows that a heavy reliance on cost-benefit analysis 
tends to bias against the consideration of environmental factors, which are notori-
ously difficult to quantify particularly over the long run.  
Finally, the four appraisal systems differ with respect to their openness and trans-
parency. The systems in Canada, the UK and the European Commission explicitly 
aim to increase the transparency of rulemaking through the publication of assess-
ment results, disclosure of the methodologies used and stakeholder consultation. 
In these three jurisdictions, public scrutiny functions as an important driver for bet-
ter compliance with the assessment guidelines. IA reports also provide NGOs and 
other actors with an opportunity to analyse and question the criteria which underlie 
policy decisions which affect the environment. By contrast, in the Dutch system, 
appraisal is seen as an administrative procedure, and there are no provisions for 
participation and disclosure. It is not surprising that the Netherlands also has the 
lowest implementation rate amongst the four jurisdictions analysed. 
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Table 2: Comparison of Impact Assessment systems in four jurisdictions 
 European 
Commission 
Netherlands 
 
Canada UK 
Orientation     
Function of the IA 
procedure (derived 
from guidance  
documents) 
better regulation 
policy integration 
use of evidence 
involvement 
better regulation 
policy integra-
tion 
use of evidence 
better regulation 
use of evidence 
involvement 
better regulation 
use of evidence 
involvement 
Institutionalisation     
Central coordination 
mechanisms 
weak weak strong strong 
Integration of env'l 
assessment 
integrated separate separate integrated 
Focus on quantifica-
tion 
medium weak strong strong 
Transparency provi-
sions 
strong weak medium medium 
Performance     
Implementation of 
the procedure 
fairly good moderate moderate good 
Scope, detail, quality 
of analysis 
variable, but fairly 
good 
modest modest modest 
Timing in practice variable variable variable, but 
often late 
variable, but 
often late 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
3.4 Conclusions  
Overall, we would like to argue that the ex ante appraisal of generic national-level 
policies represents a number of opportunities to pursue environmental policy inte-
gration. Our analysis of the appraisal procedures in four jurisdictions reveals a 
number of new entry points that could allow environmental issues to become more 
embedded in sectoral policy-making. In particular, they: 
- promote the involvement of environmental administrations in cross-sectoral 
policy making: the provisions for interdepartmental consultation which are 
usually part of policy appraisal procedures create new opportunities for the 
environmental departments to influence decisions in other ministries. Although 
this does not change the power structure within government, the requirements 
for early consultation give them an opportunity to identify potential environ-
mental impacts before any decisions have been taken. However, in order to 
exploit these opportunities, environmental departments must be sufficiently 
motivated and resourced. At present, this is far from being the case: many en-
vironmental departments seem to believe that the sectors should ‘own’ envi-
 55 
 
ronmental problems for themselves, with little involvement from them (Jordan 
and Schout 2006).  
- provide the centre of government with a new steering instrument: much of the 
literature on environmental policy integration concludes that successful inte-
gration is ultimately a question of political will and that environmental respon-
sibilities need to be institutionalized at the centre of government (for example 
the prime minister's office). In the UK and Canada, policy appraisal has the 
potential of being used by the Prime Ministers to oversee and potentially con-
trol other parts of government. If environmental concerns are high on the polit-
ical agenda, policy appraisal is potentially a powerful tool for environmental 
policy integration.  
- increase the role of environmental NGOs: increased involvement of stake-
holders and the disclosure of decision criteria and anticipated impacts open 
up new opportunities for environmental NGOs to scrutinize the decision-
making process. Under conditions of transparency, pursuing private objectives 
at the expense of public interests becomes more difficult.  
- create opportunities for ex post evaluation: the ex ante formulation of objec-
tives, intended benefits and other anticipated effects provides opportunities for 
a systematic and critical ex post evaluation of policies. This could further pro-
mote a balanced consideration of generic objectives in the decision making 
process.  
 
There is no simple answer to the question whether an integrated appraisal system 
is more suitable to promoting environmental policy integration than a purely envi-
ronmentally focused one. On the one hand, separate environmental appraisal pro-
cedures have often been ignored by sectoral departments (e.g. previous appraisal 
procedures in the UK and the European Commission, and the current E-Test in the 
Netherlands), particularly when it was coupled with a low degree of central coordi-
nation and monitoring. This is not just because sectoral ministries lack the exper-
tise or interest for addressing those issues, but also because they want to avoid 
drawing attention to environmental costs that could undermine support for the poli-
cy. Therefore, integrating 'weak' environmental issues into a mandatory procedure 
which also deals with the 'hard' issues of competitiveness and public finances may 
involve a potential upgrading on the political agenda.  
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On the other hand, integrated IA procedures have in practice not usually been 
genuinely 'integrated' in the sense of a coherent, balanced consideration of im-
pacts. Even in the European Commission, which explicitly emphasizes the objec-
tive of sustainability, most appraisals focus on short-term (mostly economic) costs 
and benefits. Unless there are mechanisms in place that ensure that unintended 
social and environmental effects are carefully considered (Canada and the Euro-
pean Commission come closest to this ideal), there is a risk that integrated policy 
appraisal becomes a new label for what is in practice little more than conventional 
RIA. Moreover, merging regulatory and environmental appraisal procedures also 
involves potential for conflict: regulatory reform aims to reduce the burden of regu-
lation on business and society. This involves setting higher standards for the justi-
fication of policy intervention, which will often contradict the regulatory needs of 
addressing challenges such as climate change and biodiversity loss. Which of 
these objectives prevails is to some extent a question of political priorities, which 
vary between and within jurisdictions. But there is also common ground which 
carefully designed appraisal procedures can help to explore. To achieve this, poli-
cy appraisal has to be used to open up the political process by including a wide 
range of interests and values, making them explicit and considering marginal views 
and neglected issues. If it is conceived as a purely internal tool for analysis or cap-
tured by political interests, however, there is a risk that it will close down the politi-
cal process in order to identify the 'best' solution, or legitimatize pre-existing deci-
sions or justify a course of action advocated by the strongest set of interests. A 
carefully designed appraisal system can help to address these risks. 
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4. Rationalising the policy mess? Ex ante policy assessment and the 
utilisation of knowledge in the policy process 
Hertin, J., J. Turnpenny, A. Jordan, M. Nilsson, D. Russel and B. Nykvist (2009). 
Rationalising the policy mess? Ex ante policy assessment and the utilisation of 
knowledge in the policy process. Environment and Planning / A 41(5): 1185-1200. 
4.1 Introduction 
“We are”, to quote a paper published recently in the pages of this journal, living in 
“interesting times for anyone concerned with the theory and practice of appraisal” 
(Owens et al. 2004, p. 1944). Formal procedures for policy level ex ante assess-
ment are currently experiencing a remarkable level of interest in the EU (Radaelli 
2005, Jacob et al. 2007), but also well beyond (OECD 1997, OECD 2004). These 
procedures come in different guises, such as RIA, Sustainability Impact Assess-
ment and Impact Assessment (IA), and seek to achieve different things (Radaelli 
2005). Broadly speaking they all aim to identify the major impacts of a proposed 
new policy, are carried out before the final decision on the policy is taken, follow a 
formal administrative procedure and result in a formal report or statement. While 
the set-up and diffusion of these procedures has been the focus of a number of 
comparative studies (e.g. OECD 1997, and OECD 2004, Radaelli 2005), the exist-
ing literature has little to say about what, if any, impact they have on the actual 
processes and outputs of policy making. This is somewhat curious given that their 
underlying aim is precisely ‘to inform decision makers by predicting and evaluating 
the consequences of various activities according to certain conventions’ (Owens et 
al. 2004, p. 1944). 
Our purpose in this paper is to go beyond simply describing the different assess-
ment procedures in various jurisdictions and/or reviewing their quality based on 
documentary analyses of the resulting statements (e.g. Lee and Kirkpatrick 2004, 
Wilkinson et al. 2004). Crucially, we explore the role played by formal ex ante as-
sessments in the wider policy-making process. In the past the consensus has gen-
erally been that policy assessment and evaluation have only very limited effect on 
policy decisions (Weiss 1999, Owens et al. 2004). We might expect the recent 
uptake of policy-level procedures to have altered this somewhat pessimistic pic-
ture. First, prevailing assessment processes tend to be ‘end of pipe' that is, they 
are conducted when there is less in policy terms to play for. Recent efforts to ‘up-
stream' assessment to the earlier stages of decision making should - we might 
think - have opened up opportunities for assessment knowledge to induce deeper 
policy changes. Second, the problem was traditionally cast in terms of how to get 
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policy makers to listen to knowledge developed externally (Nutley et al. 2007). Ex 
ante policy assessment, in contrast, requires policy makers themselves to collate 
and evaluate evidence before making policy. 
However, the design of many assessment procedures primarily draws on a ration-
al-instrumental view of public policy making. This view corresponds with a linear 
model of problem solving. It is found in the handbooks and guidance handed out to 
policy makers, which typically set out a sequence of steps to be followed. This pro-
cess normally begins with the identification of a policy problem or objective, runs 
through an analysis of the main options and their respective impacts, and culmi-
nates with an identification of the ‘best’ one (see for example OECD 1997, CEC 
2005). This view of policy making contains a number of (implicit) assumptions 
about the policy process and the role of knowledge within it. For example, it sug-
gests that: policies are designed to address specific problems or objectives; the 
impacts of planned policies can be anticipated with a degree of accuracy; there is 
a central decision maker who selects a policy option on the basis of expected net 
benefits; and ‘better’ information necessarily leads to more ‘rational' policies. It is 
notable, however, that many studies have shown that, in practice, many assess-
ments depart from these ideals (e.g. Wilkinson et al. 2004, NAO 2006), which sug-
gests that alternative approaches to policy assessment are worthy of further explo-
ration.  
It is curious that this basic rationale for, and design of, policy assessment has been 
so little affected by at least three decades of research in political science, sociolo-
gy, administrative studies, and other disciplines. Without attempting to summarise 
a varied and complex literature, three main aspects can be highlighted. First, most 
scholars of political science argue that, while the rational-instrumental conception 
of the policy process may under certain circumstances be a useful heuristic device, 
it is not an empirically robust model (see Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993, for a 
critique and an overview of alternative approaches). Political decision-making is, 
they argue, characterised by sudden discontinuities, and a far looser coupling be-
tween problems and policies (Kingdon 1984, Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1999). 
Second, it has long been accepted that rarely is there a single, unitary, decision 
maker; most policy decisions are the outcome of complex actor and interest con-
stellations, bounded by institutional path dependencies (e.g. Sabatier 1999). Third, 
knowledge is seen to perform many more roles in the policy process than the line-
ar, rational-instrumental, model would suggest (DeLeon 1997, see also Owens et 
al. 2004). Importantly, a range of authors with a more post-positivist orientation 
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have emphasised the important role played by ideas, arguments, and discourse in 
shaping policy debates and ultimately decision making (Majone 1989, Fischer and 
Forester 1993). According to this view, knowledge is not merely constituted by 
factual information generated to help solve problems; it is also used strategically 
by different actors - typically in a highly competitive fashion - to structure policy 
problems and solutions to advance their positions (see also Radaelli 1995). A 
whole branch of the public policy literature - which is sometimes labelled the ‘study 
of knowledge utilisation’ - grappled with the worrying finding that knowledge is 
rarely used as a basis for decision making (e.g. Caplan et al. 1975, Knorr 1977, 
Francis et al. 1980 , Deshpande 1981, Corwin and Louis 1982). A raft of studies 
concluded that decision makers rarely ‘learn' from knowledge in a straightforwardly 
rational way. First, a wide range of barriers impede the flow of information from 
researchers to decision makers. For example: shortcomings in the research itself; 
problems in spelling out findings in an accessible and relevant way; a lack of ac-
cess to policy makers; shortages in resources, skills, and incentives; and the trans-
formation of messages during the communication process (Romsdahl 2005). Sec-
ond, decision makers often use knowledge to pursue their own self-interests 
(Owens 2005). 
In summary, while existing studies emphasise different dimensions, there is broad 
agreement on the importance of three main types of knowledge use (cf. Weiss 
1999, p. 141, Romsdahl 2005, p. 470):  
- Conceptual learning: when knowledge ‘enlightens' policy makers by slowly 
feeding new information, ideas, and perspectives into the policy system, chal-
lenging existing beliefs and opening up new opportunities for policy change.  
- Instrumental learning: when knowledge directly informs concrete decisions by 
providing specific information on the design of policies.  
- Political use: when knowledge is put forward to attain political objectives. For 
example, it may justify decisions already taken, disarm opponents, or post-
pone a decision.  
 
More recent research has therefore sought to understand how knowledge is used 
in different ways by different actors (e.g. Anderson and Biddle 1991, Weiss 1999, 
Nilsson 2006), including attempts to trace more subtle long-term learning effects 
(for example Bulmer 1987, Anderson and Biddle 1991). These studies have tend-
ed to find that assessments have an important longer-term role in policy formation. 
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It has, however, been recognised that these slow effects can be extremely difficult 
to trace, even to the point of being completely “invisible to the naked eye” (Weiss 
1999, p. 472). 
In a recent paper in this journal, Owens et al (2004) rightly rejected the polarisation 
between the linear, rational-instrumental model set out above and its post-positivist 
critique on both empirical and theoretical grounds. They challenge the view that 
policy analysis must be fundamentally reinvented, suggesting that learning oppor-
tunities may well arise through more traditional forms of policy assessment. They 
claim: “experience suggests that even quite technical procedures have, as an unin-
tended effect, provided important apertures for deliberation and learning” (page 
1950). However, they admit that much more empirical work is needed to confirm 
their assertion. Do such opportunities currently exist and under what conditions 
might they be possible in the future? These are the issue that we address in this 
paper. 
In this paper we attempt to rise to this challenge by exploring the scope for initiat-
ing deliberation and learning through some of the assessment procedures that are 
now proliferating across the OECD. We focus on routinised forms of ex ante as-
sessment activities undertaken or initiated by policy-making units in the administra-
tive parts of government. We consider the role of what are essentially internal as-
sessment procedures, directly undertaken, or at least commissioned, by the unit in 
charge of policy to inform its activities. Our focus on internal assessments there-
fore allows us to focus on exploring the different uses of assessment knowledge 
and their determinants within policy making. Although research has moved on from 
the rational-instrumentalist underpinnings of the very early knowledge utilisation 
literature, their empirically based typologies of knowledge use remain valid. There-
fore, we shall use them to structure our empirical findings. Note that we use the 
term ‘political use’ not as a negative divergence from the rational-instrumental 
model (i.e. the strategic misuse of knowledge), but as a more nuanced concept 
that relates to the extent to which it has become an object of political negotiation, 
or been used to support a political position. This perspective draws on a post-
positivist epistemology which recognises that knowledge is never value free and 
that the boundaries between knowledge and policy are fluid (cf. Barnes et al. 
1996). For example, when a ministry compiles a dataset to justify a proposed poli-
cy, it is using knowledge politically. Whether or not this use of knowledge is valid 
and legitimate depends on the context in question: for example, whether potential 
negative effects were also represented, whether the data were unbiased (or se-
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lected to reflect the upper or lower range of estimates), or whether critical assump-
tions were disclosed. 
In our analysis we focus on three countries (Germany, Sweden, and the United 
Kingdom) and the EU. We have chosen these four jurisdictions because, although 
all four have adopted some form of policy assessment, they vary in terms of their 
institutional setup and orientation. For convenience, we refer to them all as exam-
ples of ‘policy assessment’. We opted to focus on a selection of thirty-seven policy 
cases which cover a broad range of policy sectors and types of policy intervention 
(e.g. regulations, strategies, and economic instruments, see Table 3). The larger 
number of cases studied in the EU is due to the accessibility of the European 
Commission's documentation and policy officials, which allowed us to cover more 
cases with the same resources. 
Our analysis is organised around four research questions:  
1. How is the role of assessment conceptualised and what is the stated pur-
pose of the procedure? Here, our main reference points are the legal 
frameworks and guidance documents published by different parts of gov-
ernment. Our aim is to test our assumption that the dominant model of poli-
cy-level assessment is still rational-instrumental.  
2. To what extent does assessment follow formal rules and guidelines? When 
and where do assessment practices depart from the guidance set out in the 
handbooks and, if so, why? Specific attention is given to whether a gap ex-
ists between the rationality of the procedures and whether the ‘messiness' 
of everyday policy processes is manifest in practice.  
3. Which function(s) does ex ante assessment fulfil in practice? Does it serve 
different functions for different actors? Here, we aim to explore whether it is 
possible to detect the opportunities for policy learning referred to by Owens 
et al (2004), or if other functions are more dominant.  
4. Which factors determine the function of assessment practice in the policy 
making process? Is there systematic variation between policy areas, in-
struments, and actors? With this question we aim to draw out generic ex-
planations for our results. 
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Table 3: Policy cases analysed in the four jurisdictions.   
 Cases analysed 
EU  
(17 cases, 22 
interviews) 
- Groundwater Daughter Directive  
- Framework Decision on the Principle of Availability  
- Capital Adequacy Directive  
- Communication on winning the battle against global climate change  
- Framework Programme on Solidarity and management of Migration Flows 
- Environment and Health Action Plan 
- Directive on the retention of data 
- Directive on legal protection of designs  
- Euro-Mediterranean Partnership Work Programme  
- Regulation concerning the Visa Information System 
- Recast of the Gender Equality Directives  
- Regulation on Timber Imports  
- Regulation on Sugar Reform  
- Rural Development Strategy  
- Thematic Strategy on Air Pollution  
- Decision on FP7 for research  
- Directive on car taxation 
Germany 
(7 cases, 18 in-
terviews)  
- Farm Premium Law  
- Genetic Technology Law  
- Flood Protection Law  
- SEA laws  
- Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan  
- 2005 Climate Change Programme  
- Federal Airport Concept 
Sweden 
(7 cases, 14 in-
terviews) 
- EC CO2 trading directive  
- Climate Change follow up study  
- Climate strategy  
- Public transport  
- Sustainable production and consumption patterns  
- Biofuels in transport sector  
- Transport taxation 
UK 
(7 cases, 16 in-
terviews)  
- Landfill Allowances Regulations  
- Kyoto project-based mechanisms and the EU ETS  
- Data capture and sharing powers for the border agencies  
- National Lottery Bill  
- NHS (Pharmaceutical Services) Regulations  
- Working Time in Road Transport  
- Offshore Petroleum Activities 
 
Source: Own compilation 
Note: in order to preserve the anonymity of our sources, the labelling of the interview 
quotes below does not correspond to the ordering in this table. 
 
For each jurisdiction we drew on two principal sources of data. Relevant docu-
ments (namely, on the assessment system, its origins, and objectives; the official 
guidance; the resulting assessment reports; and publications by relevant stake-
holders) provided a broad basis for our analysis. Tracing the creation and diffusion 
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of knowledge in everyday policy process could only be achieved through in-depth 
interviews with those that participated in them. Semi-structured interviews with 
officials responsible for the policy in question were therefore identified as a princi-
pal data source. Overall, more than sixty interviews were conducted: nineteen with 
actors involved in supporting and/or promoting assessment, or with an obvious 
stake in the process (e.g. nongovernmental organisations) and forty three with the 
officials that completed the assessments.  
 
4.2 The use of assessment knowledge in practice 
4.2.1 How is the role of assessment conceptualised? 
In the EU, the prevailing system of policy-level assessment is the European Com-
mission's IA. This system was introduced in 2002 and combines elements of Sus-
tainability Impact Assessment and RIA. It only applies to major new policy initia-
tives. The basic conception of the procedure is rational instrumental (CEC 2005). 
However, this is attenuated in several key respects. First, the main handbook 
states that the assessment should be “an aid to political decision-making, not a 
substitute for it” (page 4). The aim of the options analysis is put modestly: “this 
may then allow the conclusion to be drawn that one option stands out above the 
others'' (page 39, our emphasis). Second, this guidance draws attention to the 
limits of analysis, reminding policy officials to “flag up uncertainties and assump-
tions in the final ... report'' (page 39). Third, the importance of the analysis process 
is emphasised, and consultation with stakeholders is considered to be a vital part 
of the assessment. Crucially, stakeholders do not simply provide information on 
impacts; they should also be allowed to express views on the nature of the prob-
lem and the framing of policy objectives.  
Policy assessment in Germany is formally known as ‘assessment of the effects of 
law’ (or Gesetzesfolgenabschätzung), but most German officials refer to it as RIA. 
It is set up as a rather narrow, downstream, assessment of the legal, administra-
tive, and budgetary impacts of proposed new laws. Implementation is weak, and 
comprehensive guidance was only introduced very recently. The requirements are 
briefly set out in the Joint Rules of Procedure of the federal ministries which essen-
tially state that all significant effects of new laws have to be assessed by the lead 
ministry in cooperation with other concerned ministries and with input from relevant 
stakeholders. Although the objectives remain implicit, the focus is on ensuring that 
the costs of the law or regulation are justified by its benefits. The stated aim is to 
“identify the best regulation alternative'' (BMI 2006, p. 3) through nine successive 
 64 
 
assessment steps, with the core element being the “assessment and comparison 
of benefits and costs''. Another indication of the rationalist conception of assess-
ment in Germany is that guidance documents say almost nothing about the pro-
cess of analysis.  
In Sweden some provisions for assessment at the ministry level are under devel-
opment, but the more important opportunity for conducting policy assessments 
(and thus connecting knowledge to policy making) are the ‘committees of inquiry’. 
These committees are temporary bodies set up by ministries to comprehensively 
review knowledge of the policy issues at hand and make proposals to the govern-
ment. Each committee typically lasts for 1 to 3 years, creating more-or-less con-
crete proposals for strategies or policies. The official guidance sets out good prac-
tice, but does not give specific guidance - for example, on methods and tools. The 
guidance conceptualises assessment as an instrumental process, but with im-
portant caveats. For example, the scope and focus of individual assessments is 
clarified by the specific instructions issued by the ministry ‘client’ vis-à-vis the op-
tions and impacts to be considered. Furthermore, political parties are represented 
in all major committees, and final recommendations are negotiated politically. In 
other words, it does not make a strict separation between knowledge generation 
and political decision making. 
In the UK, RIA is the main policy assessment system. This is coordinated centrally 
by the Cabinet Office. The system predominantly aims to promote ‘better regula-
tion’ through producing an “assessment of the impact [on business, charity or the 
voluntary sector] of policy options in terms of the costs, benefits and risks of a pro-
posal'' (Cabinet Office 2003, , paragraph 1.1).The official guidance conceptualises 
assessment as a rational and linear process (Cabinet Office 2007), although it em-
phasises that it should be a continuous process starting at the earliest stage of the 
policy-making process. However, the guidance acknowledges that policy assess-
ment should not be a purely expert-based activity. The aim of consultation is not 
just to provide relevant information, but also increase transparency and public par-
ticipation (Cabinet Office 2003). 
 
4.2.2 To what extent does policy level assessment follow formal rules 
and guidelines? 
In the EU, although policy assessment has improved the transparency of Europe-
an rule-making, it does not achieve the ambitious objective of basing policy deci-
sions on robust, integrated assessment knowledge. Actual policy assessment 
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practice is biased towards economic impacts and administrative costs. Unintended 
consequences and those in other policy areas tend to be neglected and the quality 
of analysis varies widely. Tool use is rather limited, with a focus on very simple 
tools such as checklists. The extent and quality of consultation varies from case to 
case, but often the perspectives included are from the established stakeholders 
who have been involved in the policy area before. Many - although not all - as-
sessments justify policy proposals that are to a large extent already determined. 
Policy assessment is often therefore perceived as having a narrow purpose, name-
ly that of informing the detailed policy design and achieving greater societal buy-in. 
Fundamentally different options (including the ‘no action’ alternative) are rarely 
considered, let alone explored fully.  
In practice, the German procedure is only partially and often formalistically imple-
mented. The framing tends to be extremely narrow; typically, it only addresses 
administrative costs, direct economic costs and price effects. In many cases, it is 
considered as an 'annoying duty' (interview 2, Germany, Environment Ministry) 
that has to be met with minimal effort. Actual analysis is in some cases replaced by 
pre-set sentences, for example 'the costs cannot be quantified' or 'alternatives: 
none'. This minimalist attitude is, however, not universal. In a considerable number 
of cases, efforts are made - sometimes due to pressure from the Economic Affairs 
and Finance Ministries - to assess economic and administrative costs. Where this 
is done, the assessment tends to rely on figures provided by stakeholders, often 
remaining incomplete. There also appears to be a strong reluctance to include 
conditional or uncertain information. Although the exact timing varies, policy as-
sessment is typically a one-off activity towards the end of the policy formulation 
process. The policy assessment documentation rarely contains any information 
about the way in which analysis was carried out, options rejected, parties consult-
ed, underlying assumptions etc. Stakeholders are not usually involved except - in 
some cases - as a passive source of data. While policy assessment does not func-
tion as an ex ante policy assessment system, it should be mentioned that there are 
other, often extensive assessment activities which surround the policy-formulation 
process at federal level. They remain, however, outside the context of the formal 
policy assessment procedure, but are typically carried out in an ad hoc, informal, 
fragmented manner which is not transparent to outsiders. 
In practice, the generic guidance in Sweden plays a very minor role compared to 
the specific instructions given to each committee by the ministry. In most cases, 
the guidance is followed in the sense that each impact category is briefly assessed 
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or at least mentioned, but they receive only minimal attention. The actual use of 
the ‘Committee Handbook’ is also low (Regeringskansliet 2005). In practice, the 
specific instructions to the committees frame the assessment. This has a formal 
component; that is the publicly available written instructions issued by the govern-
ment, and an informal one, that is the continuous contacts between the Committee 
secretariat and the ministry. There are few formal requirements regarding partici-
pation and consultations, methods or tools, or ways in which the committee results 
should be used. Weaknesses in these regards therefore cannot be attributed to an 
implementation failure. On the contrary, most committees appear to be very good 
on delivering what the ministry requests of them.  
Our research confirms some of the other criticisms levelled at the UK's policy as-
sessment system (e.g. NAO 2006) that is, while compliance with the requirement 
to produce policy assessments is high, they remain narrowly focused on direct 
economic costs. Narrowing the scope of assessment to what are perceived to be a 
smaller number of critical categories is one way in which officials pursue their min-
istry's core policy objectives. The policy assessment process is weak at exploring 
different ways of meeting a policy goal. In our sample, policy assessments did not 
radically change the overall direction of policy: “it is often squeezed in at the very 
end” (Interview, UK case B). Consequently, policy assessments tend to contain a 
limited range of options, sometimes artificial constructions created to comply with 
the requirements: “often [this] is disguised by analysing different options which 
deliver similar results” (Interview, UK, case E). We found that informal consultation 
with key groups tends to occur before and in parallel with the public consultation 
process. 
 
4.2.3 Which function(s) does ex ante assessment fulfill in practice? 
In many of the cases analysed, policy assessment in the EU engendered a certain 
degree of instrumental learning, but this was limited by the way in which ‘the prob-
lem’ was defined and by previous policy commitments. The impact of assessment 
knowledge on policy design was very small compared with the impact of external 
lobbying. One factor that limits the potential for conceptual learning is the narrow 
focus of the assessments, which often simply confirm preconceived views. In near-
ly all the cases examined, policy assessment had little effect on stakeholder posi-
tions. The use of incomplete datasets and inevitable reliance on speculative as-
sumptions can in some cases lead to contradictory results and more room for a 
political use of knowledge: “We rely on data [from industry] but [they] are not al-
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ways keen to give it'' (interview, EU, case G). While the relative transparency of 
the assessment system appears to have supported learning, it has also given in-
terest groups the opportunity to engage in more political uses of knowledge. In 
several cases, lobby groups have consciously tried to influence decisions by criti-
cising the assessment and/or providing alternative analyses of their own. Whether 
the policy assessment process has promoted consensus amongst stakeholders 
remains doubtful. In the most politicised cases, consultation may actually have led 
to more entrenched positions.  
Very few resources are devoted to RIA in Germany and knowledge use is highly 
politicised. Both the late timing of many policy assessments and the way in which 
assessment knowledge is presented suggest that they tend to be used to provide 
an ex post justification of preconceived ideas. This was confirmed by several of our 
interviewees: “The RIA is just a little hoop we have to jump through. ...We try to 
assess the costs because we are required to do it by the Joint Rules of Procedure. 
Also the other impacts considered in the Explanatory Memorandum serve the de-
fence of the proposal, something we put forward when the law is criticised” (inter-
view 2, Germany, Environment Ministry). More interesting and varied was the use 
of the knowledge from informal assessment activities. In most cases, significant 
resources were devoted to external studies, workshops, expert groups, or internal 
analysis. These activities tended to result in instrumental learning, mostly about 
the detailed design of the policy. Conceptual learning (in the sense of a fundamen-
tal rethinking of the prevailing problem) only occurred in one of the seven cases. 
Political use of assessment knowledge by the lead ministry as well as by other 
ministries and external stakeholders could be observed in the majority of cases: 
“Scientific input plays an important role, but not in a straightforward way. Every- 
body has their own researchers. There is a certain competition [about claims and 
research input], we use our own budgets to commission studies that substantiate 
the interests of the different ministries. ... It is only partly true that ministerial ad-
ministration works rationally. With technical arguments alone you don't get 
through'' (interview 3, Germany, Environment Ministry). The interplay between sci-
ence and policy is commonly neither purely rational-instrumental nor purely politi-
cal: “Sometimes a study can also be a pure lobby instrument, but generally people 
- both those who commission the studies and the research institutes - are weary of 
making themselves look ridiculous. Everybody just tries to use the existing lee-
way... in their favour” (interview 3, Germany, Environment Ministry).  
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In Sweden most committees engage in instrumental fact-finding. There is a fair 
amount of both instrumental and conceptual learning among their members. In 
relation to actual decision-making processes, however, the knowledge is primarily 
used politically. There are several reasons. First, the instructions to committees 
are developed by the ministry in charge which means that problem framings, policy 
directions, and key priorities are set out in advance.”The assessments are deter-
mined by the task you are given. It also depends on what you want to achieve, 
what is more or less relevant, how deep you want to go. The political sphere is not 
a research domain, you do not search for those truths, and it is in the end a ques-
tion of achieving political goals'' (interview, Sweden, case F2). Second, the key 
function of the committee is not learning but building a political consensus by navi-
gating between established political positions. In parliamentary committees, politi-
cal negotiations between the political parties are the basis for the recommenda-
tions to the government, implying that they are already backed by a parliamentary 
majority. Agency officials and experts tend to be excluded from the final negotia-
tions and proposals. In expert committees where politicians are not directly in-
volved, the political negotiation might take place after the ministry has received the 
proposals. Expert committees are also normally highly perceptive to the political 
context and anchor the proposals at the political level through continuous contacts 
with the political parties and the government. Hence, in both parliamentary and 
expert committees the political aspects of assessment knowledge use are even 
more accentuated than the formal guidance implies. Our interviewees have report-
ed very intricate political processes within and around the committees, including 
the deliberate withholding of information, the scheduling of committee inquiries 
after key decisions have already been made, and selecting expert members to 
deliver certain types of knowledge. These appear particularly in the latter stages of 
the committee process, and the political bargaining between the political parties 
about what to recommend is, however, often unconnected from the main assess-
ment process. 
In practice, the focus of the analysis on direct economic and administrative costs 
means that there is usually little or no scope for conceptual learning in the UK. 
Undertaking a comprehensive policy assessment is seen as too complex and time- 
consuming. Policy assessment is not used as an instrument to highlight and ex-
plore trade-offs; on the contrary, troublesome matters like this tend to be down-
played. Major decisions are made before the policy assessment process has even 
started. Instrumental learning occurs in some cases, but typically only in relation to 
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the minor details of a policy. The political use of assessment knowledge is more 
dominant, since the assessment of direct costs (and, to a lesser extent, benefits) 
often functions as a way of justifying the impacts of the predecided policy. Moreo-
ver, officials “are very risk averse and often choose the solution that is safest and 
least controversial” (interview, UK, case B). 
Both conceptual and instrumental learning are also limited by what some policy 
officials perceive as a rather artificial nature of policy assessments - that is, that 
they require a formal assessment of (sometimes unrealistic) policy options even 
though in most cases the issues were already known about. There is little evidence 
that stakeholders alter their preconceived positions based on policy assessments. 
 
4.2.4 What factors determine the function of assessment practice? 
In the EU we found that the Commission's policy assessment procedure broadly 
follows the rational-instrumental model, but that guidance documents promote a 
relatively process-conscious assessment approach which recognises the limits of 
rational analysis. However, policy assessment practice does not usually conform to 
the ambitious goals in terms of scope of analysis and variety of methods. The in-
volvement of stakeholders is somewhat limited, although it still goes much beyond 
practice in the other jurisdictions. We found plenty of small-scale instrumental 
learning, some instances of political use of assessment knowledge, and several 
cases where assessment knowledge did not play any significant role. 
There are several potential explanations for the apparent failure to widen the 
scope of assessment using more diverse methodologies. First, there are inherent 
difficulties in analysing broader impacts. Even when policy units are willing to go 
beyond an analysis of direct costs, they are confronted with complexities, uncer-
tainties, shortages of data, and a lack of well-established assessment methods. 
This is reinforced by a risk-averse attitude amongst policy officials and the pres-
sure to quickly quantify impacts. Second, the organisational culture of the direc-
torate-general (i.e. ministry) leading the assessment strongly shapes its overall 
focus. Given the difficulties making clear causal links between policies and im-
pacts, assessments focus on effects in key areas of departmental interests. Third, 
the availability of financial resources, time, and technical knowledge appears to be 
a significant constraint in many cases. Fourth, some policy officials see policy as-
sessment as an inappropriate or unwarranted requirement, particularly in relation 
to specific issues whose solutions seem obvious. Fifth, many decisions are based 
on pre-existing legal or political commitments: “You don't sit down with a blank 
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sheet” (interview, EU, case E). Finally, dominant political priorities - namely, the 
concern about Europe's competitiveness – shape the focus of assessment. In most 
cases these factors have restricted the role of policy assessment knowledge to 
instrumental learning about narrow issues such as implementation pathways.  
In Germany our analysis revealed that the prevailing policy assessment procedure 
corresponds closely to the rational-instrumental model, but also that the implemen-
tation gap is particularly large. Formal policy assessment produces little knowledge 
and/or produces it for political purposes. This appears to have strengthened infor-
mal assessment activities that have taken over some of the instrumental learning 
functions that policy assessment is supposed to have. A key reason for this state 
of affairs is that key actors do not have an interest in, or experience of, transparent 
assessment practices which do not resonate with the legalistic administrative cul-
ture. Politicians tend to see policy assessment as restricting their discretion and so 
concentrate on defending their preferred solution(s). Policy makers in ministries 
tend to see it as counterproductive to their effort to push a legislative proposal 
through the legislative process. It seems plausible that this effect is particularly 
strong in the German political system where the presence of a large number of 
veto players (coalition parties, Länder, constitutional court) tends to slow or impede 
the political decision process. Major stakeholder groups with access to ministries 
also tend to benefit from traditional corporatist styles of consultation and tend not 
to press for transparency.  
Given these fundamental barriers, any formal policy assessment system would 
face resistance, but our research suggests that, while policy assessment under-
stands policy as a rational problem-solving activity, the daily reality in Germany is 
one of constant political bargaining. The expectation that impacts can be anticipat-
ed and should be precise ironically leads to the effect that much relevant infor-
mation is not included because it does not live up to this ideal. The lack of 
knowledge input and validation by stakeholders also contributes to the low quality 
of policy assessment. The vertical separation of competencies in the German fed-
eral system (where Länder are typically responsible for implementing federal laws) 
compounds the lack of detailed technical knowledge available. 
In Sweden we find that the formal guidance emphasises an instrumental role for 
assessment knowledge but also that the setup explicitly recognises the political 
dimensions. This distinguishes Sweden from the other three jurisdictions. The in-
strumental and political uses of assessments that dominate the Swedish cases are 
strongly linked to the particular institutional arrangements surrounding the ‘commit-
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tee of inquiry’ system. First of all, the institutional separation between the commit-
tee and the ministry creates a gap between the knowledge and the policy making, 
and the committees reside closer to policy making than knowledge-making institu-
tions: “The committee members don't frame it as a scientific report ... a committee 
inquiry is not written that way” (interview, Sweden, case F1).  
Second, resource and time limitations restrict broader explorations in most cases: 
“[E]ven if we had the resources, in the end there is always someone that has to do 
the job ... .You concentrate on what you judge as most essential” (interview, Swe-
den, case E). Another factor is the strong steer imposed by the respective ministry, 
narrowing the selection of participants. The written instructions and informal steer-
ing of the process precludes conceptual learning because it is so strongly geared 
towards political decision making, not learning.  
However, it must be noted that the rules surrounding committees in Sweden usual-
ly provide various stakeholders the opportunity to bring ‘their’ knowledge to the 
table, which opens up opportunities for more political uses as well as learning be-
tween different interest groups. Indeed, as in Germany, the political bargaining 
logic dominates committee processes more than the instrumental rationality that 
permeates the official guidance: even when committees are of ‘expert’ rather than 
‘parliamentary’ types, they still need to anchor their proposals politically to ensure 
that it can sail through the ministry and parliamentary processes. The Swedish 
experience therefore suggests that political uses cannot be clearly separated from 
conceptual ones: a fair amount of ‘enlightenment’ sometimes occurs among the 
members of the committees as they are confronted with (and are forced to assimi-
late) alternative knowledge. 
Finally, policy assessment in the UK follows an economic rationality, but the guid-
ance emphasises the importance of making assessment iterative and transparent. 
Actual policy assessment reports, however, focus on impacts that can be easily 
quantified, giving a limited view of costs and benefits and mostly fulfilling a role of 
narrow instrumental learning. Political use of policy assessment knowledge largely 
occurs in the sense of legitimising decisions that have already been taken. Stake-
holders do not tend to engage with the assessment because of a (perceived or 
actual) lack of expertise and because policy assessment is not seen as having a 
major impact on decisions.  
The focus on economic impacts and administrative costs is a clear consequence of 
the dominance of the competitiveness paradigm in the UK. The Better Regulation 
Executive, which is located in the very heart of government and has the high-level 
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political support of the prime minister, promotes policy assessment primarily as a 
means to reduce regulatory burdens. Consequently, issues that by their very na-
ture require regulatory intervention (e.g. the environment) risk being marginalised 
in the assessment process. In addition, in many cases the objectives are already 
defined by EU law or existing policies which are only slightly amended. In the case 
of significant new policies, the goals often derive from senior policy officials or from 
ministers, who “try to make their names by proposing big regulations” (generic in-
terview 1, UK). The result is that “ministers won't thank you if you don't come up 
with what they want” (interview, UK, case E). The mismatch between the ambitions 
of policy assessment and the practice of policy making is therefore obvious. 
 
4.3 Conclusions 
In this paper we set out to analyse whether the proliferation of ex ante assessment 
procedures has created new knowledge-generation opportunities, which in turn 
have informed processes of policy deliberation and, eventually, learning and policy 
change. We also investigated how far the conceptualisation and use of policy as-
sessment systems reflect the three models of knowledge use in policy making. Our 
empirical answers to these questions are summarised in Table 4. Despite consid-
erable differences in administrative culture, institutional context, and procedural 
design, we discovered that the intended role of ex ante policy assessment in the 
four jurisdictions is actually broadly similar. All four systems aim to provide tech-
nical information to help policy makers select the ‘best’ policy option – that is, an 
instrument intended to make policy more ‘rational’. Only in the case of the Europe-
an Commission's system have post-positivist ideas left a noticeable impression on 
the assessment guidance, particularly in relation to processes and recommended 
methods. But the practice of policy assessment is mostly contingent upon the pre-
vailing political context in the four jurisdictions. Overall, we have seen that as-
sessment knowledge serves a range of functions which frequently vary between 
actors and jurisdictions, and over time. With the exception of cases where there 
was no significant production of knowledge (because assessment was not done at 
all or was done formalistically), ex ante policy assessment led to some degree of 
instrumental learning. This normally concerned the detail of policy design and 
tended to be selective in its focus on achieving political objectives at the lowest 
economic and administrative costs. This does not, however, imply that policy as-
sessment has achieved its aim of ‘rationalising the policy mess’. Generally, we 
found that, while assessments inform policy designs at the margins, the political 
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context shaped the outcome of decision processes. In the large majority of cases a 
range of constraints meant that the assessment procedure could not steer the de-
cision-making process in the manner envisaged in the guidance documents. The 
strength and type of constraints varied but tended to include preexisting political 
commitments, legal requirements, and the views of powerful stakeholders, public 
opinion, and existing legal and institutional frameworks (Turnpenny et al. 2008). If 
the policy choice was perceived to be limited by these factors, officials had little 
motivation to commit resources to an open assessment of all the options and im-
pacts. While policy assessments have made contributions to broader policy 
change in some cases, we found few examples of conceptual learning – that is, 
where an assessment fundamentally challenged prevailing problem definitions or 
policy approaches. 
 
Table 4: Comparison of the four assessment systems 
 EU Germany Sweden UK 
Main assess-
ment procedure 
Impact Assess-
ment 
Regulatory Im-
pact Assessment 
(‘assessment of 
the effects of law’) 
Committees of 
inquiry 
Regulatory Im-
pact Assessment 
Main purpose of 
assessment 
Aid to political 
decision making; 
participatory 
To identify best 
policy option; 
rationalist and 
expert based 
Aid political deci-
sion making; 
closely linked to 
political process 
To identify the 
most cost-efficient 
option; expert and 
stakeholder 
based 
Compliance 
with formal 
guidance 
Good, but focus 
remains on eco-
nomic impacts 
Low: narrow fo-
cus on adminis-
trative and direct 
economic costs 
Compliance with 
informal ministe-
rial instructions 
rather than for-
mal rules 
Considerable, but 
with a narrow 
focus on econom-
ic costs and 
benefits 
Functions of 
assessment 
knowledge 
Some instrumen-
tal learning; lit-
tle/no conceptual 
learning; some 
political use 
Some instrumen-
tal learning; no 
conceptual learn-
ing; many political 
uses 
Significant in-
strumental learn-
ing; some con-
ceptual learning 
and political 
usage 
Some instrumen-
tal learning; lit-
tle/no conceptual 
learning; some 
political usage 
Factors limiting 
learning 
Political; issue 
complexities; 
organisational 
cultures; re-
sources con-
straints 
Political and ad-
ministrative (‘ex-
ecutive federal-
ism’) 
Fragmented 
institutional set-
up; lack of re-
sources and 
time; political 
pressure to de-
liver ministerial 
goals 
Political, legal, 
and administra-
tive 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
This can partly be explained by the fact that many assessments ignore unintended 
consequences and/or external costs. Particularly in Germany and the UK the anal-
ysis tended to focus on direct economic and administrative costs, leaving little 
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space for reflection to occur in relation to bigger issues such as problem framings, 
causal effects, alternative measures, and so on. That said, the assessments we 
examined took place over relatively short time scales, typically ranging from a few 
weeks to one or two years. As it is well established in the literature that conceptual 
policy learning processes occur over much longer time periods, our analyses may 
have underestimated their importance.  
Significantly, we found a variety of more political usages of knowledge. Most com-
mon in the analysed cases was a form of use that could be termed justificatory. 
Here, the lead ministry used the assessment report to justify a specific measure on 
the basis of its superiority over alternative courses of action. This type of 
knowledge use is often criticised, but it undoubtedly serves to make policy making 
more transparent and thus is often defended by policy officials as a legitimate and 
necessary way of going about their work. Similarly, other actors (such as sector 
ministries or interest groups) often use or produce assessment knowledge for their 
own political purposes – for example, by putting forward cost estimates, reinter-
preting data, or assessing certain types of impacts that were not covered by the 
assessment. This much more strategic type of knowledge use can legitimately 
broaden the knowledge base of policy making, but it can also involve the con-
scious manipulation of evidence (e.g. in the form of overstating the costs of regula-
tion). Strategic use tended to occur in relation to issues with high ‘decision stakes'. 
In some cases, assessment processes even became an additional venue for con-
flict. This was particularly the case if key actors had the expertise and information 
to engage in a factual discussion, and if knowledge claims could be used to sup-
port their position. In other cases, however, we observed that assessment pro-
cesses became largely irrelevant in the face of intense political controversy: “Once 
the debate has become heated, stakeholders – us included – don't actually look at 
the facts anymore, but they fall into an adversarial pattern'” (interview 2, Germany, 
Environment Ministry). 
 Finally, we also observed a few cases where the production and use of assess-
ment knowledge also served to signal a political response to a perceived problem 
in the absence of actual policy measures (for example, when these are considered 
politically, legally, financially, or technically unfeasible). As the behaviour has 
commonalities with the well-established phenomenon of symbolic legislation 
(Dwyer 1990), we refer to it as a type of symbolic knowledge use.  
It has been interesting to observe that the interpretation of assessment knowledge 
uses is far from clear-cut. Although it can be difficult to judge whether interviewees 
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gave an honest account of their role, there were strong divergences between the 
views offered by different actors. It seemed that both officials and stakeholders 
often genuinely considered themselves as one of the more fact oriented and ‘ra-
tional' actors (that is, engaging mostly in learning and justificatory knowledge use), 
while accusing other players of using research in a biased, strategic, or symbolic 
way. While this may (at least to some extent) be an unavoidable part of the political 
game, it also points towards the importance of competing rationalities and the 
blurred boundaries between science and policy, facts and norms. This view is at 
odds with models that assume that the relationship between science and politics 
can be clearly defined. Pielke (2007), for example, argues that knowledge produc-
ers have a choice in how they position themselves in relation to policy and politics, 
and that this decision corresponds to particular views of science and democracy. 
Instead, we would argue that these roles vary from one decision (or assessment) 
context to the next. It also seems to vary over time, with the political uses of 
knowledge being more dominant in the later stages of decision making when politi-
cal capital has already been invested in promoting a particular policy direction.  
Although we have, as Owens et al (2004) predicted, found it difficult to gather sys-
tematic evidence on the gap between the ‘rational' conceptualisation of assess-
ment and the ‘messy reality' of everyday policy making, it does appear to be a 
considerable barrier to learning. In fact, we would argue that, when learning oc-
curred in our cases, it was despite rather than because of the instrumental concep-
tion of the prevailing assessment procedure. We see at least three main manifes-
tations of this conflictual relationship. First, the rational-instrumental assessment 
model draws the attention of both policy officials and evaluators towards the more 
‘technical' elements of an assessment (for example, the number of options studied, 
the degree of quantification, and the availability of data sources). A conceptual 
learning approach, by contrast, would be expected to draw attention to the pro-
cess, framing, and scope of assessment. The lack of reflection about which actors 
should be involved, at what stage, and for what purpose meant that learning op-
portunities were often missed. Second, there was (as also noted by Turner (2007)) 
a notable reluctance to draw upon incomplete quantitative information or to use 
more structured qualitative methods such as decision trees or impact matrices to 
describe impacts. This attitude can at least partly be explained by the positivist 
framing of most policy assessment procedures, which put an onus on precision, 
neutrality, and comprehensiveness. In practice, however, it leads to a narrowing 
down in assessment practice towards things like administrative and economic 
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costs that can be fairly reliably assessed. Third, assessment procedures and guid-
ance documents do not really help policy officials to mediate the relationship be-
tween ‘rational' science and ‘messy' policy making. Many of the handbooks and 
guidance documents portray them as technicians whose task is to make ‘messy' 
policy decisions ‘more rational'. As a consequence, many of the officials we inter-
viewed felt uneasy about, and frustrated with, assessment procedures that – at 
least in their view – have little to do with the ‘way things work in practice'. This has 
led in some cases to the emergence of a de minimis or ‘tick box' attitude that views 
assessment not as a decision support instrument but a bureaucratic hurdle to be 
quickly overcome.  
While the overall setting and structure of ex ante policy assessment means that its 
potential to foster broader policy learning is likely to remain small, a design of pro-
cedures that is more conscious of process and of the barriers to knowledge use 
should enable ex ante policy assessment to play a more fruitful role in policy mak-
ing. In this paper we have provided a start; more longitudinal empirical studies are 
now required to better test for the presence of some of the more subtle long-term 
learning effects of assessment knowledge. While we may never be able to fully 
‘rationalise the policy mess', with time we should at least be able to establish the 
conditions under which assessment knowledge plays a more prominent and con-
structive role in political decision making. 
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5. The production and use of knowledge in Regulatory Impact 
Assessment: An empirical analysis 
Hertin, J., K. Jacob, U. Pesch and C. Pacchi (2009). The production and use of 
knowledge in Regulatory Impact Assessment: An empirical analysis. Forest Policy 
and Economics 11(5-6): 413-421. 
5.1 Introduction 
There are few institutional venues in which knowledge, politics, and policy-making 
are more closely interlinked than in Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA). RIA is 
commonly understood as the formal appraisal activities initiated or coordinated by 
government administrations during the process of developing specific policy in-
struments. RIA can take different forms and is frequently made up of several pro-
cedures (e.g. competitiveness, environmental, health and administrative burden 
assessments). What makes RIA a fascinating case for the analysis of the role of 
knowledge in policy-making is the fact that it has quasi-scientific ambitions, but 
also takes place at the heart of government where political decisions are trans-
formed into laws, regulations and other policy instruments. The paper analyses 
both the production and the use of knowledge in the context of RIA with the aim of 
shedding more light on the different functions knowledge can play in policy pro-
cesses. Using positivist and post-positivist conceptualisations of the role of 
knowledge in policy-making as the theoretical lens, it compares and contrasts how 
RIA is conceived in policy documents and how it functions in practice. The paper is 
based on an empirical research project analysing RIA procedures across the Eu-
ropean Union. The research draws on a desk-based review of relevant policy doc-
uments and evaluations as well as interviews with government officials and stake-
holders. The paper begins by giving a brief account of ways in which the role of 
knowledge in policy-making is theorised (section 5.2). It then provides an analysis 
of how RIA procedures are conceived and set up in EU Member States and in the 
European Commission (section 5.3). Section 5.4 contrasts this with the practice of 
RIA drawing on in-depth studies in five selected jurisdictions. The final section 
(5.5) explores whether and how RIA can serve as a procedure for more open, dis-
cursive and cooperative policy-making processes if procedures are informed not 
by naive rationalist ideas, but more nuanced and realistic concepts of the produc-
tion and use of knowledge in decision making. 
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5.2 Conceptualisations of the role of knowledge in policy-making 
RIA aims to enhance public policy-making by systematically integrating the stock 
of available knowledge into these processes. This goal brings into play the episte-
mological issue of the type of knowledge which is thought to enable the improve-
ment of policy-making. A distinction of different types of policy-relevant knowledge 
that is often put forward in literature is that between the technical-rationalist and 
the post-positivist orientation (Fay 1975, Radin 2000, Stone 2002, Owens et al. 
2004, Stirling 2005). This section gives a brief overview of the two orientations as 
both are important theoretical reference points for the analysis of the interface be-
tween knowledge and policy. The technical-rationalist orientation has been the 
dominant perspective upon policy-relevant knowledge and retains much influence 
today even though the post-positivist approach has formulated an influential cri-
tique of the foundations of the technical-rationalist epistemology.  
The technical-rational orientation has been dominant since the 1950s, and builds 
upon a positivist epistemology in which scientific knowledge is objectively validated 
by application of sound methodology. Scientific information is considered to be 
value-free and as such has no political content; the application of such knowledge 
enables the political debate to be 'liberated' from interest-based and value-led 
knowledge claims. A defining characteristic of the technical-rational model is its 
schematic representation of decision-making processes. Such a schematic ap-
proach is preferred over a messy and more naturalistic representation of the policy 
domain, because the assumption is that the 'rationality' of a process can be deter-
mined in relation to the way decisions would have been made in a 'perfect' world 
(Pesch 2007).  
Applied to the phenomenon of policy-making, the technical-rational model invokes 
decisions as the outcome of a process that can be analytically subdivided into logi-
cal steps. With that, a linear sequence of stages in the decision-making process 
emerges, each of those stages having its defining features. In its most condensed 
form, the sequence of policy steps is as follows: first, a policy goal has to be decid-
ed upon; second, a population of policy options with which this goal can be 
achieved has to be mapped out; third, out of this set of policy options, the most 
efficient measure is selected.  
One of the crucial elements of rationality is the intentionality with which decisions 
are made. Every step in the decision entails that choices are deliberately made. 
Logically, this intentionality implies that there is someone or something that actual-
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ly reasons. In other words, the technical-rational model invokes a unitary agent to 
whom decisions can be attributed.  
Even the most arduous technical-rationalist will admit that this scheme does not 
concur with empirical reality. There are necessary and contingent features that 
prevent the rational scheme from being effectuated into real life. Herbert Simon 
(1997) pointed to the fact that due to limitations in resources and human neurolog-
ical capacities it is impossible to take the whole population of possible policy tools 
into account – we have to be content with 'bounded rationality' in that respect. Sim-
ilar limitations to rationality also apply to collective actors which are often treated 
as individual agents (Pesch 2005). 
The aspiration of the technical-rational policy analyst is to enhance the 'rationality' 
of the policy process: the empirical reality is assessed against the ideal represent-
ed by the technical-rational template. Deviations from that template will be inter-
preted as less rational or even irrational. 
Advice can take place at several levels. A policy analyst can contrast empirical 
decision-making processes with the idealized representation and thus advise on 
how the process could be made 'more rational'. For instance, such an advice could 
concern claims about goals that have to be made explicit or more realistic, so that 
it becomes easier to identify means to achieve them. Policy analysts can also sup-
port decision-makers by giving advice on instruments that are available to achieve 
the given objectives. A further approach is to provide analytical methodologies that 
enable actors to apply rational criteria to the choice between different alternatives. 
One may think here of ways of quantifying the costs and benefits associated with 
certain policy instrument. Following this perspective, policy analysis increases the 
rationality of decisions by allowing agencies composed of several individuals to 
reach agreement about certain goals or certain policy tools. In other words, a plu-
rality of voices is harmonized into one singular voice. This harmonization process 
is first based upon the neutral and objective character of the knowledge produced 
by the policy analysis, and second upon the positivist assumption that reality can 
be described by a consistent and coherent knowledge basis. These two character-
istics help unite political agents, who are divided with respect to their interests or 
value systems, by turning to a unified body of knowledge that is neutral and value-
free. 
In contrast, the post-positivist orientation comprises a number of alternative ap-
proaches to the technical-rational model sketched above. Following Owens et al., 
(2004), we can distinguish three interrelated forms of challenges to the technical-
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rational model. A first form of critique argues that the technical-rational model is 
theoretically inadequate. This claim is predominantly based upon the way that a 
distinction between the realm of 'facts' and that of 'values'. The legitimacy of this 
distinction has not only been heavily disputed from a social-constructivist perspec-
tive, but even technical-rational policy analysts themselves do not live up to it: 
Their efforts to reframe political argument into technical terms in order to facilitate 
rational decision-making implies that value claims can indeed be translated into 
knowledge claims. 
A second form of critique holds that the technical-rational model is politically inad-
equate because it is seen to harbour the danger that prevailing structures of pow-
er, interest, and value are reinforced through the 'scientisation of politics' (Weingart 
1999, Hoppe 2005). In its inability to acknowledge the core of politics, the tech-
nical-rational model fails to produce legitimate decisions. Instead of opening up 
decision-making processes to all groups of society - particularly social minorities, 
the technical-rational model facilitates 'closure' by implicitly excluding those groups 
(Stirling 2005). 
The argument of political inadequacy can be extended to the claim that eventually 
the technical-rational model is practically inadequate. The exposure to shortcom-
ings that are suggested by the claims that the technical-rational model is both the-
oretically and politically inadequate will almost inevitably lead to the loss of credibil-
ity of such analysis techniques and of the policies that result from them. 
Conceptualising a policy analysis that overcomes these inadequacies, post-
positivists have stressed the relativity of policy-relevant knowledge. Knowledge 
that can be used in policy is often not the kind of knowledge that can be produced 
by science (Lindblom and Cohen 1979, Ravetz 1985). Therefore, the strict criteria 
that are applied to create legitimate scientific claims cannot be maintained, which 
implies that policy-relevant knowledge can typically only have provisional value. In 
many cases, policy can only be based on knowledge that is surrounded by uncer-
tainties and bounded by normative assumptions, which demands policy analysts to 
be very cautious in their advice. As the reliability of scientific information is ques-
tioned, other forms of knowledge gain status. In other words, the production of 
policy-relevant knowledge is pulled out of the confinement of the scientific domain, 
and now it is seen as an endeavour which is intrinsic to the policy domain itself, 
developed by a myriad of public actors (Scharpf 1997). 
In policy analysis, these insights have led to an emphasis on the contextualized 
and linguistic nature of policy-relevant knowledge claims in the policy realm. In 
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relation to the first aspect, following Rein and Schön (1991), policy problems are 
constructed through frames in which facts, values, theories and interests are inte-
grated. Hence, the frame of a policy analyst may be of a different nature than that 
of citizen or a stakeholder. Using the notion of 'frames', the struggle for policy be-
comes a fight over the power to frame a policy problem (and therefore also policy 
solutions) in a certain way (cf. Majone 1989). Experts are then not seen as 'guardi-
ans of the truth', but as political agents who try to enforce their discursive version 
of the truth upon the public sphere (cf. Foucault 1996). Hajer (1994) shows how 
different 'discourse coalitions' may emerge to articulate an issue so that it facili-
tates a certain scientific and political approach. These insights into the discursive 
nature of policy-formation suggest that the crucial task of policy analysts is to make 
these processes more democratic by developing participatory methods that facili-
tate the empowerment of groups and individuals who are usually excluded from 
participation (Dryzek 2000). 
The post-positivist critique has not only shown that the role of knowledge in policy 
rarely corresponds to this model, but has more fundamentally questioned the ap-
propriateness of this model to serve as an ideal type on both functional and norma-
tive grounds. However, some scholars argue that the differences between tech-
nical-rational and post-positivist models of policy appraisal should not be overstat-
ed (e.g. Owens et al. 2004). This is firstly because elements of both the models 
are typically combined in theory and practice. A second reason is that the role and 
function of policy analysis heavily depends on the context, particularly the nature of 
the policy issue at stake. By far not all policy issues involve matters that have high 
societal stakes and a large degree of scientific complexity. In those instances, a 
technical-rational approach is preferable, as post-positivist approaches generally 
require more resources and do not necessarily guarantee a satisfactory result 
(Ravetz 1985, Hisschemöller and Hoppe 2001). 
We would, however, maintain the distinction between the two models for analytical 
purposes, as it enables us to recognize tacit inclinations and implicit assumptions 
in certain practices in policy analysis, and determine possible shortcomings in the 
light of the theoretical arguments presented above. Analysing the theory and prac-
tice of RIA through the lens of these two theoretical perspectives, we will show that 
in general the concept of RIA is presented almost fully in line with the technical-
rational model of policy analysis. However, an analysis of concrete policy pro-
posals highlights that practice does not conform with the model, but that it confirms 
its empirical inadequacy. This leads us to consider ways in which RIA-procedures 
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could take more account of post-positivist, i.e. more realistic as well as normatively 
grounded ideas. 
 
5.3 The conceptualisation of RIA in policy documents  
RIA is commonly understood as a set of formal analytical activities initiated and 
coordinated by government administrations in the process of designing specific 
policies. The OECD defines Impact Assessment as “information-based analytical 
approach to assess probable costs, consequences, and side effects of planned 
policy instruments (laws, regulations, etc.).” (OECD 2001, p. 10). The large majori-
ty of OECD countries have one or several formal RIA procedures in place (Radaelli 
2005, Jacob and Volkery 2006), although they vary with regard to their institutional 
arrangements, specific orientations and implementation. The aims of RIA are de-
scribed in different terms, but a common objective is to improve decision making 
processes by systematically collecting information about the likely impacts of a 
planned policy and thereby providing the basis deciding on the ‘best’ policy. In 
many countries, RIA is strongly related to a 'better regulation' agenda that aims to 
improve the quality of regulation, reduce administrative burden and make a posi-
tive contribution to economic competitiveness. Recently, in many countries the 
scope has been broadened and requirements to assess different dimensions of 
sustainable development have been added as additional aspects.  
In this section, we analyse how RIA procedures are conceived and set up, particu-
larly with regard to how RIA knowledge is supposed to be produced and used in 
the policy process. It draws on an extensive review of RIA procedures across the 
European Union. Individual country studies were carried out for all 27 EU Member 
States11 and for the European Union. The presentation of the empirical material will 
be structured around the key formal elements of RIA procedures: the objectives, 
the design of the process, timing, the audience, involved actors and preferred 
methodologies. 
 
5.3.1 The stated objectives of RIA 
Surprisingly, the policy documents underlying RIA procedures in the different EU 
member states often do not state an explicit objective. It appears to be taken for 
granted that better information straightforwardly leads to 'better' decisions, while a 
                                               
11
  Austria, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia, Luxemburg, Malta do not have a RIA system in place 
and have therefore not been studied in detail. 
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normative dimension is not perceived. Such an assumed value free concept indi-
cates a prevalence of the rationalist concept. A lack of purpose and guidance is 
also apparent in those guidelines that require an assessment of 'all' impacts of a 
planned regulation without any further specification. Where an aim is stated, reduc-
ing costs imposed by regulation is the most frequently cited objective (e.g. Den-
mark, Belgium, France, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, Spain, UK). A smaller 
number of countries also mention the improvement of competitiveness as an im-
portant goal of RIA. The assumption typically made is that reducing regulatory and 
administrative burden can be achieved without compromising policy objectives. 
Fostering sustainable development is an explicitly mentioned goal only in the 
Netherlands and the European Commission. Broadly, the concept of RIA follows a 
rationalist idea: The assessment is perceived as a value-free effort, objectives are 
provided either by the policy itself or they are lying outside the scope of RIA. It is 
meant to inform decision makers (or even a unitary decision maker) who are sepa-
rate from those involved in the assessment process. With regard to the objectives 
we did not find much evidence of alternative epistemological approaches. For ex-
ample, RIA procedures tend not to place any emphasis on discursive objectives, 
for example developing shared interpretations of policy problems or building a 
broader consensus on an acceptable distribution of costs. 
 
5.3.2 The RIA process 
RIA procedures are typically set out as a linear process with sequence of analytical 
steps that mirror the phases of problem-solving. It normally begins with the identifi-
cation of a policy problem or objective by the rule making unit, runs through an 
analysis of options and respective impacts which leads to a weighing up of alterna-
tives with a final selection of the 'best' policy choice (see for example OECD 1997, 
and CEC 2005). This linear process which assumes a political will or objective that 
may be somewhat refined during the RIA, but which in general is exogenously giv-
en. It does not explicitly give room for or make reference to processes of negotiat-
ing and bargaining to identify compromises that are acceptable for a political ma-
jority. Instead, the assessment is designed on the basis of the assumption that 
there is one most efficient way of achieving the given objectives. This conception 
of RIA is based at least implicitly - on a number of assumptions: that policies are 
designed to address well-defined problems or objectives, that impacts of planned 
policies can be anticipated with a certain degree of accuracy, that different types of 
impacts can be weighed up against each other and that the a final choice (or at 
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least a clear recommendation) can be reached on the basis of the analysis. It is 
not uncommon that procedures use concepts and terminology stemming from an 
economic methodology - for example 'expected net benefit' or 'cost-benefit-ratio'. 
In many countries, the guidelines acknowledge that proposals change during poli-
cy formulation and that the RIA process should in principle be iterative. While the 
process is staged in some countries (e.g. in the form of a broad scoping phase and 
a fuller assessment stage), only a few systems systematically linked this to the 
political process. Only a few jurisdictions (e.g. UK) explicitly foresee an evaluation 
step, thereby conceiving it as a cyclical rather than a linear process. The RIA pro-
cess is typically designed to end with a policy recommendation or decision. In a 
number of jurisdictions, guidance documents that set out the RIA process in detail 
are missing altogether, suggesting either a lack of awareness of process issues or 
a generally low priority of the procedure. 
 
5.3.3 Timing and audience 
The foreseen timing of RIA varies considerably between jurisdictions. Several ju-
risdictions require that RIA should begin 'at an early stage', i.e. as soon as a policy 
measure is considered (Czech Republic, European Commission, Germany, Ire-
land, Italy, Poland, UK). Others foresee the assessment once a proposal has been 
drafted (Lithuania, Netherlands, Slovakia). In general, requirements regarding the 
timing are not very specific. The audience of the assessment is not always made 
explicit either, but can usually be derived from approach, the timing and the level of 
transparency. In jurisdictions where RIA reports either do not exist (i.e. the gath-
ered knowledge is not put together into a formal document) or are not systemati-
cally published, the main audience are government officials themselves and their 
hierarchy. In most countries, a summary of the results of the RIA is made public, 
often only as part of a short explanatory memorandum (e.g. Belgium, Denmark, 
France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia). In Portugal, a 
publication of the RIA requires a cabinet decision. Where RIA summaries are 
submitted to parliament in conjunction with the proposed policy, an important func-
tion of RIA is seen as providing parliamentarians with the information necessary to 
make a political decision on the proposed regulation. Stakeholders (and, to a less-
er extent, citizens) are seen as an important audience only in jurisdictions where 
RIA reports are systematically published (e.g. UK, Ireland, EU). Overall, the domi-
nant view appears to be that RIA is a purely analytical task that is (and should be) 
separated from the political sphere. It is part of the balanced decision making by 
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officers that are assumed to be neutral and to take into account all relevant as-
pects of which they are aware. There are few examples of guidelines that make 
explicit reference to the relationship between RIA and administrative and political 
hierarchy. Implicitly, the dominant assumption seems to be that RIA knowledge 
can play the role of 'enlightening' the political leadership. 
 
5.3.4 Involvement of political institutions 
RIA is in all jurisdictions mainly a duty of the administrative unit responsible for the 
drafting of the proposal. The lead policy unit is perceived as the actor with both the 
competence and responsibility required to conduct an assessment and to adjust 
the proposal accordingly. There is little involvement of other political institutions, for 
example the parliament or representations of regions or localities. The EU is the 
only jurisdiction which has adopted an inter-institutional regulation on RIA proce-
dures. On the other hand, it is notable that no RIA procedure makes provisions to 
systematically outsource the assessment to external consultants, researchers or 
dedicated agencies (with the exception of administrative burden assessments). 
This indicates that there is a certain acknowledgement that RIA is not a purely sci-
entific process. We did not find any examples of Member States that require RIA 
for proposals or significant amendments by parliament. The Swedish and Finnish 
Committee procedures12 can be seen as an interesting exception. These commit-
tees are made up of members of parliament, civil society and government. Howev-
er, setting up such committees is not obligatory but based on a political decision, 
while the routine RIA is left to the ministries or agencies. In some countries - for 
example the UK - where the parliament is charged with overseeing the process, 
RIA procedures have been reviewed by a parliamentary committee. A common 
model is that RIA results become part of an Explanatory Memorandum that ac-
companies that proposal when it is tabled in parliament. In general, there seems to 
be the prevailing view on RIA as a tool to inform officers that will be enabled to 
develop a balanced proposal based on rational arguing, while an involvement of 
other institutions is hardly foreseen at all. 
 
5.3.5 Involvement of external stakeholders  
In most of the studied jurisdictions, RIA procedures do not foresee an active in-
volvement of external stakeholders. The role of actors such as interest groups, 
                                               
12
  Finland has formally abandoned the Committee RIA procedure, but it is still practiced in 
some instances. 
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NGOs, and local authorities is to comment on the substance of the proposal 
through routine consultation procedures such as hearings and written consultation. 
Many jurisdictions see stakeholders are an audience of RIA to be informed about 
the outcome of the assessment (see 'timing and audience'). Exceptions are the 
EU, Ireland, the Czech Republic and the UK, where policy documents emphasise 
that stakeholders hold relevant knowledge (especially on unintended consequenc-
es), that involvement can increase public buy-in and that consultation on the pro-
posal should be an integral part of the process (see for example CEC 2005, and 
Cabinet Office 2007). Overall, this means that the foreseen external involvement 
varies considerably, but three main models of participation can be identified: 
stakeholders are given the role of providing or validating factual information, they 
should be informed ex post about the assessment through an RIA statement, or 
they do not have any involvement. There was no case where participation is fore-
seen in the phase of designing the assessment. 
 
5.3.6 Role of coordinating units 
In all jurisdictions, RIA processes are managed and performed decentrally by indi-
vidual departments. Central coordinating units are mostly either not mentioned at 
all or are foreseen in a role of support rather than enforcement. Notable exceptions 
are Poland and UK where Prime Minister's offices play the role of monitoring the 
quality of individual assessments, and the European Commission which has re-
cently introduced an influential Impact Assessment Board made up of high-level 
officials. Specialised departments that support or oversee the assessments of oth-
er ministries can be found in a number of countries, most often the ministry of jus-
tice (e.g. Estonia, Finland, Hungary), finance (e.g. Slovakia), the interior (e.g. 
Germany) or economic affairs (e.g. Poland). Few countries have set up interde-
partmental units that share the responsibility for the process, e.g. in the Nether-
lands, with the ministries of Justice, Environment and Economy responsible for the 
RIA. There were no cases where a ministry of the environment or social affairs is 
given the main responsibility. The rather weak degree of central steering is a sign 
that RIA is seen as a technical task rather than a political activity. It is interesting to 
note, however, that this has recently begun to change: During the reform proce-
dures in the last few years several countries have upgraded the responsibility for 
RIA in the hierarchy or shifted it to the heart of government (e.g. the prime minis-
ter's office). Others have strengthened central steering through the introduction of 
review bodies (e.g. Germany, Netherlands, EU). The role of these bodies often 
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includes both support and control functions, but their relation to the power structure 
in the political system remains ill-defined.  
 
5.3.7 Interdepartmental cooperation  
The majority of jurisdictions have not established any formal mechanisms for inter-
departmental cooperation in the process of RIA. Overall, there seems to be an 
assumption the that lead policy unit has access to all relevant expertise or that 
routine consultation and negotiation processes (in particular in the process of draft-
ing of new regulations) can fulfil the function of knowledge transfer between minis-
tries. For those countries that formally require the coordination between the minis-
tries, two models can be distinguished. A number of countries have formalised 
procedures for the circulation of RIA reports or summaries (e.g. Germany, Ireland, 
Poland, UK). In Germany, departments are entitled to insist on the assessment of 
a specific impact. The second model is the establishment of interdepartmental 
working groups which work together on framing and conducting the assessment. 
This is, however, only foreseen in few jurisdictions (Czech Republic, EU, and in the 
Swedish and Finnish Committee system), sometimes only under certain circum-
stances.  
 
5.3.8 Role of analytical methodologies  
There are only two types of methodologies that are commonly mentioned in RIA-
related policy documents: cost-benefit analysis (including variants such as cost-
effectiveness analysis) and administrative burdens assessment (mainly using the 
Standard Cost Model). A number of countries favour economic analysis as the 
main framework of analysis (France, the Czech Republic, Italy, UK, Germany and 
Finland). Only a few jurisdictions mention other quantitative and qualitative meth-
ods such as multi-criteria analysis and risk analysis (most notably the EU, but also 
Hungary, Poland and Ireland). Simple checklist tools are also recommended in the 
UK, Netherlands and Portugal. Overall, the proposed methods focus on specific 
issues rather than providing incentives to analyse and weigh-up a broad range of 
potential impacts including side effects. More open, exploratory methods (e.g. sce-
nario analysis) and those geared towards capturing uncertainties (e.g. sensitivity 
analysis) are also not covered. The selection of methodologies by jurisdictional 
guidelines confirms the focus of RIA on producing 'hard', decision-guiding infor-
mation in line with a positivist epistemology. The suggested methods are clearly 
not geared towards objectives that would be considered important from the per-
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spective of a post-positivist epistemology, for example clarifying or validating as-
sumptions, searching appropriate problem framings, and analysing dominant and 
alternative discourses.  
 
5.3.9 Conclusion: RIA as a neutral, expert-based 'fact-finding' 
To summarise, it can be concluded that policy documents conceive RIA mainly as 
an expert-based, neutral fact-finding process to inform officers to develop a bal-
anced proposal based on rational reasoning. It is performed by the administrative 
unit, in most countries without formal requirements to include other actors or politi-
cal institutions. In its ideal type it is meant to be free of normative choices, which 
are left to parliament and cabinet. It seems - at least implicitly - to be based on the 
idea that there is a unitary decision maker who should be informed through a qua-
si-scientific assessment. The missing attention to process issues may partly be 
attributed to a general lack of effort in designing effective assessment procedures, 
but also reflects that the relationship between knowledge and policy is seen as 
straightforward. With a few exceptions, the conception of RIA draws heavily on a 
positivist epistemology. RIA procedures still follow a model of 'speaking truth to 
power'. They are - at least in the way they are set out on paper - almost unaffected 
by the 'post-positivist turn in policy analysis' (Hoppe 1999). In the subsequent sec-
tion we will investigate to what extent RIA practice conforms to this view of the 
relationship between knowledge and policy. 
 
5.4 The practice of RIA at the interface between knowledge and politics 
Our analysis of RIA procedures in the previous section was based on a desk study 
of policy documents, RIA guidelines and evaluations in all 27 EU Member States. 
The study of RIA practice in this section also draws on this desk study, but com-
plements it with an in-depth analysis of 22 individual cases of RIA in five different 
jurisdictions (Denmark, EU, Netherlands, Poland and UK). The five RIA systems 
were selected because of their fairly extensive experience with policy assessment, 
while at the same time representing a variety of different approaches of RIA and 
representing different types of political and economic systems. In each of the juris-
dictions, a range of individual policy cases were selected. The cases were chosen 
to represent different policy areas and instruments, but include policy initiatives of 
a certain political and economic significance. A certain bias may arise from the 
selection of countries: We have selected those which have a number of years of 
experience with RIA and a certain level of practice to ensure the presence of as-
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sessment activities that can be usefully studied. This requirement already limited 
the number of countries as RIA requirements have often been only recently intro-
duced or implementation remains rudimentary. This bias towards well-performing 
countries is, however, less problematic as the barriers to RIA identified in these 
jurisdictions are likely to occur also in others. A second bias arises from the selec-
tion of individual policy cases: It can be assumed that the willingness of individual 
desk officers to be interviewed is usually higher in relation to RIA that were judged 
to be successful in terms of both quality of analysis and policy impact. Further-
more, the identification of cases started from lists of adopted policies and therefore 
we did not include initiatives that were abandoned during the policy formulation 
process (perhaps also as a result of an unconvincing RIA). As a result of these 
biases, the case studies may draw an overly positive picture of RIA. While not be-
ing fully representative of RIA practice across Europe, our analysis provides valu-
able insights into the functions of policy assessment in policy-making and into the 
factors influencing them. 
The most striking observation when analysing the practice of RIA is the large vari-
ability of process and outcome, not just between but also within jurisdictions. The 
variability concerns the process, the timing, the type and quality of knowledge pro-
duced, and the function of the knowledge in the policy process: We found superfi-
cial RIAs done after all major decisions were taken, with the only objective of com-
plying with an administrative procedure. On the other hand, we also found - some-
times in the same country - excellent pieces of analysis carried out in parallel with 
the policy development process, analysing rigorously the major intended and unin-
tended effects of different options, led to considerable instrumental learning on 
policy design. While a certain heterogeneity in terms of process, quality and impact 
may be expected, we surprisingly found that the relationship between those varia-
bles is also far from consistent: Some of the studied RIA reports were well-written 
and rigorously researched but interviews showed that they served the function of 
justifying a previously taken decision and have very little impact on the decision 
(except, perhaps, in the sense of creating political support for the preferred policy 
option). In another case we found that a fairly simple RIA that was narrowly fo-
cused on administrative costs turned out to be influential in changing the design of 
the policy.  
What is also clearly visible from the 22 case studies is that conformity of RIA prac-
tice with - or even resemblance to - the process described by jurisdictional guid-
ance documents is the exception rather than the norm. The divergence between 
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guidance and practice can be described and analysed in different ways. The main-
stream literature on RIA normally focuses on barriers to more effective assessment 
and provides advice on processes, institutions, incentives and resources that could 
improve compliance. In the context of this paper we want to take a different ap-
proach and describe RIA practice in relation to the key assumptions of the instru-
mental-rational RIA model analysed in the previous section. We summarise them 
in relation to five 'illusions of rational policy analysis'. 
 
5.4.1 The illusion of linearity 
While guidance documents tend to describe RIA in terms of a rational problem-
solving process, the reality observed in practice often corresponds to a process in 
which the objectives and problems are continuously reframed and re-interpreted. 
Policy development often takes place under constraints which leave little room for 
manoeuvre due to the need to find consensus and political support. Accordingly, 
policy change is largely path dependent and incremental. There were few cases 
where a more fundamental policy change was a realistic possibility and for which 
the lead ministry seriously considered fundamentally different policy options. In 
many of the studied cases, policy discussions and negotiations evolved around a 
solution (or policy measure) rather than a problem. Thereby, policy making resem-
bled more the ‘garbage can model’ of policy making (Cohen et al. 1972) or the 
multiple stream model (Kingdon 1984). In some cases, the policy process originat-
ed neither from a problem nor from a solution, but from a decision opportunity. This 
was, for example, the case when a newly appointed minister took the opportunity 
to raise her profile by announcing a new policy initiative. Even where one can 
speak of a policy problem that prompted a certain measure, those often took the 
form of administrative or legal requirements created by the politico-administrative 
system itself - often at a higher governance level. This concerns for example the 
need to implement European legislation or to operationalise overarching laws 
through more detailed regulations. Desk officers feel at times obliged to describe a 
fictitious process of problem definition and options appraisal which has not taken 
place and would not have been realistic to expect. The idea that better knowledge 
leads straightforwardly to better policy designs is also not usually borne out in 
practice. Although RIA produced in some cases robust and useful insights that 
were taken into account in policy formulation (especially in the EU), in other cases 
the analysis only played a marginal role due to conflicting political commitments. In 
some cases a very elaborated analysis turned out to be completely irrelevant for 
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practical decision making. And even if the knowledge gathered in the RIA process 
is taken up in the political decision making, its function is not obvious: As observed 
previously by many other authors (e.g. Weiss 1999, Hertin et al. 2007), learning is 
only one possible use of knowledge. Other functions include political or strategic 
use (i.e. to justify or undermine a particular policy), symbolic use (i.e. to delay de-
cisions) and non-use. 
 
5.4.2 The illusion of 'neutral' and 'objective' analysis  
The expectation RIA can provide a reliable, objective and comprehensive picture 
of potential impacts of a planned policy is clearly not realistic. The holistic ap-
proach - as formulated in many guidelines - to assess all intended and unintended 
effects and side effects is far beyond the possibilities of RIA in practice. Almost all 
cases showed that analysis of potential future impacts is necessarily uncertain, 
incomplete, simplified and potentially contested. The only exceptions were very 
small or procedural measures the implications of which can be determined with 
certain accuracy. The reasons for this related to many different factors at different 
levels. There are obvious methodological difficulties (e.g. in adequately describing 
temporally and spatially differentiated environmental impact) and data shortages 
(e.g. due to commercial confidentiality), more fundamental limitations of knowledge 
(e.g. about future socioeconomic conditions), problems of human agency and re-
flexivity (e.g. in the behaviour of public agencies or target groups) and irresolvable 
normative disputes about the valuation of different types of impacts (e.g. trade-offs 
between economic, social and environmental effects). Several interviewees - es-
pecially in the UK and the EU - also pointed out the tension between comprehen-
siveness and policy impact, emphasising that in their experience neither stake-
holders nor politicians have the time to engage with long, technical RIA reports. 
Particular difficulties were associated with the assessment of the benefits of poli-
cies. Even a brief reflection on studied policies makes it clear that it is difficult to 
accurately measure their benefits, for example through increased social and envi-
ronmental reporting by companies, extended parental leave, lower agricultural 
subsidies, better groundwater protection, an extension of organic farming or more 
transparent financial services. Benefits are often dispersed, long-term and difficult 
to measure. RIAs were not just uncertain and incomplete, but it was also apparent 
that they inevitably adopt a selective analytical framing. This partly appeared to be 
a strategy to reduce complexity: Given the wide range of different effects and the 
uncertainties associated with them, those in charge of the RIA tended to withdraw 
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into the corner of their own area of expertise (i.e. the intended policy objectives) 
and that of partial methods that produce unambiguous figures, (e.g. on costs). 
Short-term economic costs are better represented than benefits because they tend 
to be raised by well-organised and well-resourced stakeholder groups. Still, we 
found cases in which the assessment contributed to an increased transparency in 
weighting costs and benefits. It seems plausible that this made it more difficult to 
represent private or sectoral interests at the expense of public interests, although 
this is a claim that is difficult to confirm empirically. Overall, however, unintended 
effects and distributional implications were typically not given much attention. 
While the framing of the analysis was often coherent and thought through, it also 
seemed clear that alternative framings could be envisaged, for example with re-
gard to problem definition, policy options, types of impacts, methods and time-
scales. In some cases this was illustrated by competing approaches by stakehold-
ers and government departments opposing the measure. Given that RIA 
knowledge is often used strategically by different actors to promote a specific polit-
ical position, it does not surprise that political considerations also play a role in the 
set-up of the analysis. Several desk officers confirmed the impression one can 
have from reading RIA reports: that information is commonly filtered and presented 
in a way that it supports and justifies the preferred policy option. In a number of EU 
cases and to a lesser extent in the UK, the setup of RIA studies was subject to 
influence and lobbying. This was of course not an issue in jurisdictions where the 
framing of the RIA is an internal administrative process that is not made transpar-
ent to outsiders. 
 
5.4.3 The illusion of a unitary decision-maker 
The idea of a unitary decision-maker seems implicit in many RIA-related policy 
documents. Even though the lead policy unit has shown to be very influential in the 
studied policy processes, the model of a unitary decision-maker who chooses the 
most efficient policy option based on the RIA is unrealistic. While the RIA process 
was always largely steered by the lead department, other actors play important 
roles in the process of producing and using RIA knowledge: Inter-departmental 
cooperation tended to be central for larger and cross-cutting policies in the Euro-
pean Commission and the UK. External stakeholders typically functioned as pro-
viders of information (e.g. in assessments of administrative burden in Denmark 
and the Netherlands), in some instances they played a role in shaping the analy-
sis. In a small number of cases, NGOs and industry groups were involved in defin-
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ing the scope analysis, successfully insisted on additional research or brought their 
competing assessments into the policy arena. The use of the knowledge in deci-
sion-making processes is even more accessible to competing approaches. RIA 
knowledge is frequently used by government departments, opposition parties, tar-
get groups and other stakeholders to oppose a proposed measure (typically on 
grounds of administrative or economic cost) or to argue that it does not go far 
enough. In one UK case, the same cost data put forward by the economics de-
partment to justify the policy was used by the finance ministry to argue for the 
withdrawal of the policy. RIA has in some cases been a forum in which actors with 
conflicting interests can engage in a transparent, evidence based debate about the 
consequences of policies. In other instances, it has provided an arena for strategic 
use of information. While this can take the form of introducing illegitimate bias into 
the analysis, it can also contribute to a fuller consideration of impacts. For example 
in one case the long term benefits of a policy in terms of tax revenues were calcu-
lated to defend the proposal against the ministry of finance which opposed the 
policy on budgetary grounds. 
 
5.4.4 The illusion of analytical 'closure' 
While many guidance documents favour quantitative and economic approaches, 
desk officers were typically unable to provide any formal analysis except narrow 
assessments of administrative burdens on companies and simple cost calculations 
(with the exception of large EU policy reforms that drew on extensive studies). In 
theory, RIA is supposed to guide decisions by providing a reliable picture of posi-
tive and negative impacts of the policy, i.e. it aims to help 'close down' (Stirling 
2005) decision processes. In practice, however, this was only achieved in relation 
to the more 'technical' RIAs carried out on very specific policies (e.g. different im-
plementation options for an EU Directive). In more complex cases, RIAs tended to 
show that policies have a wide range of consequences - some desired, some un-
desired, some uncertain - which cannot easily be weighed up against each other, 
not least because of fundamental problems of incommensurability. While RIA has 
shown to produce relevant knowledge, it does not in itself lead to analytical closure 
in the sense of producing a 'best' policy option. Interviewees confirmed that this is 
often at odds with the expectations of policy-makers. Unless a minister or senior 
official happens to be very involved in a particular issue, he or she tends to expect 
clear and concise recommendations for a favoured course of action rather than 
qualified, complex information reflecting on different options and impacts. Officials 
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therefore tended to downplay potential risks and leave out alternative options - at 
least when the proposal is made public or enters political negotiations. This has in 
some cases lead to a form of 'artificial closure' based on the legitimacy of an as-
sessment rather than on the substance of the analysis which was framed in ways 
that were not shared by all stakeholders. While lack of closure or artificial closure 
were the most common scenarios, we also analysed one case where the specific 
circumstances allowed the RIA process to support a participatory search for con-
sensual, efficient measures to address a recognised problem. 
 
5.4.5 The illusion that relevant knowledge is exclusively held by experts 
In most jurisdictions, RIA is conceived as a largely internal process based on the 
expertise of public administration. Government officials, particularly the lead policy 
unit, are expected to have access to the knowledge required to assess the impacts 
of new policies, in some cases with the assistance of external studies or sectoral 
agencies. It is evident that specialised government officials normally have great - in 
some cases unrivalled - knowledge of a policy area. There can also be no doubt 
that ex ante policy appraisal requires specialised technical expertise. However, the 
experience in jurisdictions that give stakeholders a more prominent role in RIA 
(especially the EU, to some extent also the UK and Scandinavian countries) shows 
that the knowledge of practitioners is also very important. In case studies that drew 
extensively on knowledge (and judgement) by industry, NGOs and other stake-
holders and professionals, interviewees emphasised that their input was vital in 
becoming aware of unintended consequences, determining the magnitude of ef-
fects, reaching a balanced assessment, and developing norms and procedures 
that can be implemented in practice. 
 
5.5 Conclusion: Towards Regulatory Impact Assessment as a 
discursively rational process 
In the previous section we have shown that RIA as it operates in practice shows 
little resemblance to the linear and instrumentally-rational process of gathering 
neutral facts for better policies that it typically held up as the ideal-typical model in 
policy documents. What, however, are the implications of this finding? One might 
argue that this observation does not in itself discredit the instrumental-rational 
model as an aspiration, nor does it provide an alternative to it. Taking each of 
these arguments in turn, the first question is whether the positivist orientation of 
RIA procedures is a barrier to their functioning as an effective and democratic aid 
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to policy-making. The insights generated by the research suggests that the expec-
tations currently associated with RIA function indeed as a major constraint to the 
fruitful application of the procedure as a tool for evidence-based policy-making. 
Three main problem areas can be identified. First, we have observed a widespread 
lack of commitment and resources to RIA. While few actors have expressed the 
view that RIA is wholly unnecessary, it is often seen as a 'side event' of the political 
process. Actors involved in the production and use of RIA knowledge - desk offic-
ers, senior officials, politicians, stakeholders - have expressed different views on 
why the impact of RIA on decisions is limited, but overall the research suggests 
that the large gap between the prescribed linear RIA formats and the practice of 
political decision-making plays an important role. If assessment processes are 
seen rather separate from policy formulation, important actors will not devote sub-
stantial resources to carrying out a thorough analysis, discussing implications or 
drawing conclusions about desirable courses of action. This phenomenon was 
clearly apparent from many interviews with both government officials and non-state 
actors, and it appears to be self-reinforcing.0 
Second, we would argue that the instrumentally-rational approach leads to a prob-
lematic bias in the selection of analytical methods. The focus of RIA methodology 
on prediction and precision tends to narrow down the scope of the assessment as 
carries with it a dominance of economic valuation and other quantitative methods. 
While this often increases the depth of the assessments, the trade-offs in relation 
to the breadth of impact areas is not sufficiently acknowledged. Qualitative 
knowledge tends to be undervalued and few attempts are made to capture uncer-
tainties or explore sensitivities in relation to methods and assumptions. The case 
studies have illustrated a strong reluctance to apply structured ways of analysing 
qualitative information and to introduce methodological approaches that open up 
decision processes to public scrutiny. Finally, the presumed simple relationship 
between knowledge and policy appears to a lack of attention to process issues. 
This concerns, in particular, the widespread assumption that the lead policy unit 
has - or can easily acquire, the required knowledge. As RIA procedures tend to 
make little effort to involve different types of expertise, for example by other minis-
tries, target groups, other affected stakeholders, and implementing bodies, they 
miss the opportunity to gather knowledge for the robust design of workable and 
acceptable policies. The rational model also draws the attention of evaluators in-
side and outside government to the 'technical' elements of the assessment (for 
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example the number of options studied, the degree of quantification and so on) to 
the detriment of a more appropriate focus on learning processes. 
The question of an alternative orientation of RIA is more difficult to answer, as the 
post-positivist perspective is arguably better at pointing to the weaknesses of tradi-
tional assessment approaches than at providing operational alternatives. We 
would not argue that instrumental learning has no role to play in RIA and that con-
ventional methods of policy analysis should be completely replaced. Policy formu-
lation raises different types of questions and many of them can be adequately 
treated through traditional forms of rational analysis. Policy analysis may provide 
such approaches, even though they are reductionist and their relevance can only 
be provisional. The strong points of the post-positivist analysis lies in making us 
aware of even those provisional qualities and of the risks associated with the non-
reflective use of scientific knowledge in the policy domain. By identifying the limits 
of rationalist approaches, by reframing the expectations of the potentials of RIA 
from this perspective, assessments can be made more robust and more relevant 
to the policy process. The potentials of the discursive and political functions of RIA 
are currently underutilised. As developments in other fields of assessment - partic-
ularly risk assessment, technology assessment and environmental assessment - 
have shown how traditional methodologies and processes can be adjusted to in-
crease not only the legitimacy, but also the robustness of analysis. 
In the area of RIA, the example of the European Commission's Impact Assessment 
procedure has shown how the rational approach can be significantly qualified and 
attenuated without compromising the basic goal of improving the evidence base of 
policy-making (see also Hertin et al. 2007). Most importantly, RIA requirements, 
documents and institutions could more explicitly acknowledge the complex interre-
lationships and fuzzy boundaries between assessment activities and the political 
process. RIA practice is an activity where knowledge and politics are inextricably 
linked, one that combines evidence, logic, norms, judgement and rhetoric in a cer-
tain policy space. Therefore, neither policy documents nor those involved in the 
analysis should expect RIA to produce a single best choice. The aims of the as-
sessment have to be put modestly, as for example in the Commission's guidelines: 
"This may then allow the conclusion to be drawn that one option stands out above 
the others. However, it is important to reiterate that the final decision on whether, 
and how, to proceed is a political one" (CEC 2005, p. 39). On the other hand, if the 
primacy of the political decision is over-emphasised, RIA will be limited to a narrow 
adjustment of policy design or an exercise in ex post justification. It is hence nec-
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essary to reflect on a case-by-case basis about appropriate role of the assessment 
in the given political, legal and administrative context. RIA procedures should give 
lead ministries the flexibility to adapt the approach to the political and technical 
requirements of the specific case. In some cases, RIA can and should reflect on a 
broad set of potential measures, in others it can realistically do little more than fine-
tune a proposal on which there is political consensus. 
Recognising the political dimension of RIA also implies that it should not try to iso-
late itself from politics, but relate to the interplay between bargaining and arguing 
and to acknowledge the presence of preferences, conflict, and different values. 
This is partly a matter of framing the analysis appropriately, but can also be 
achieved through institutional changes. One way of improving the coupling be-
tween RIA and politics would be to ensure that RIA is not located at the lowest 
level of the administrative hierarchy, but receives attention from the political lead-
ership, for example through a ministerial signature for RIA reports or the involve-
ment of parliament. This would require in many jurisdictions that the RIA process 
has to become far more transparent to external stakeholders. This would be a 
challenge particularly for countries with a more corporatist or closed culture of de-
cision-making, but EU example shows that a public scrutiny can be achieved and 
does not necessarily turn RIA into an exercise that just serves political legitimisa-
tion purposes. The inter-ministerial steering groups and influential review bodies 
can provide a certain guard against the instrumentalisation of RIA for interest-
based bargaining.  
Acknowledging the limits of instrumental rationality also implies that officials, poli-
cy-makers and stakeholders do not see the use of sophisticated assessment tools 
as the key to clearer recommendations. Although further investment in methodolo-
gies and data can be useful, it should be seen as a step towards more transparen-
cy and a better understanding of the normative choices. Overall, more attention 
should be given to systematic ways of analysing different qualitative and distribu-
tional impacts. These should aim to broaden the analysis, to connect and compare 
different impacts without the over-ambitious objective to integrate all aspects into a 
single methodological framework. There is a wide range of multi-criteria assess-
ment approaches the application of which could be promoted through guidance 
documents, best practice sharing and training courses. If RIA is to be developed 
towards a more discursive practice, reflection on methodology has to be seen as 
an important step in the scoping of the assessment. It should not just be seen as a 
purely technical matter, but needs to be discussed with key actors (in particular 
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relevant ministries and stakeholders). In important and controversial policy cases, 
it might be necessary to involve interested parties in the detailed design of the ap-
proach to ensure that the results are widely accepted. Given the current difficulties 
of RIA procedures in many countries to achieve even a fairly basic level of imple-
mentation and policy impact, such a more discursive orientation could not only 
achieve a higher level of legitimacy and accountability, but it also seems a prereq-
uisite to improving their relevance and, ultimately, effectiveness. 
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6. Towards Regulatory Impact Assessment as a reflexive governance 
arrangement 
6.1 A critical reflection on environmental policy integration 
A strength of the environmental policy integration literature lies in its close coupling 
with real world political and administrative processes. It describes and analyses – 
often in great detail – the environmentally relevant decision-making processes, 
involved actors, inter- and intra-ministerial procedures as well as the conception 
and implementation of a wide range of integration mechanisms (see for example 
Jacob, Volkery, et al. 2008, Eckerberg and Nilsson 2013). It has also substantially 
contributed to understanding opportunities for and barriers to a reform of policy-
making processes oriented towards long-term ecological sustainability (e.g. 
Nilsson et al. 2008, Turnpenny et al. 2008). These have been translated into prac-
tical tools and policy recommendations aiming for an incremental integration of 
environmental concerns into sectoral policy-making (Jacob, Hertin, et al. 2008, 
Jacob, Volkery, et al. 2008, Nilsson et al. 2008). 
The weakness of the environmental policy integration perspective is that it funda-
mentally underestimates the breadth and depth of change processes required for a 
substantive change in the way environmental concerns are addressed in policy. A 
few contributions to the literature – not least the approach presented in chapter 2 –
highlight the conceptual learning required for environmental policy integration, but 
the bulk of proposals for reforming administrative structures display a rather mech-
anistic style. This particularly refers to the assumed role of knowledge and exper-
tise . The environmental policy integration literature is largely based on the implicit 
assumption that ‘better knowledge’ on environmental impacts leads to more sus-
tainable policies. This is somewhat curious because the protagonists of this strand 
of research – predominantly political scientists – are not generally naive in relation 
to the role of economic interests and power relations in policy-making. Nonethe-
less, there appears to be persistent optimism that transparency about the negative 
impacts of, for example, transport or agricultural policies would strengthen envi-
ronmental actors such as NGOs or environmental ministries. The reason behind 
this optimism is the essentially positivist stance that these detrimental environmen-
tal impacts are simply ‘out there’ and that policy appraisal is able to provide evi-
dence of incontestable facts.  
The research presented in chapters 4 and 5 has shown, in contrast, that gathering 
evidence on environmental impact is a complex as well as disputed task and that 
policy appraisal is far from providing closure to questions such as “what conse-
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quences will this policy have?” and “what is the best policy option to address a 
given problem?”. Especially with regard to politically contested policy issues and 
those relating to areas with high uncertainty (see also Funtowicz and Ravetz 
1993), policy appraisal can be based on very different rationalities, argue very dif-
ferent cases, raise fundamental normative questions and in the end tends to throw 
up more questions than it actually answers. Without a different understanding of 
policy-making and the relationship between knowledge and policy, efforts to pro-
mote integrated appraisal have limited effects. The recent literature on reflexive 
governance might provide useful perspective for this purpose.  
 
6.2 Conceptual foundations of reflexive governance  
The term reflexive governance is used differently in individual areas of research 
(see Feindt 2012). Here, we refer to the concept as used in the wider field of sus-
tainability governance (De Schutter and Deakin 2005, Grin 2006, Rip 2006, Voß 
and Kemp 2006, Hendriks and Grin 2007, Newig et al. 2008, Feindt 2012, Stirling 
2014). Reflexive governance has two main conceptual foundations which will be 
described in turn. 
First, it builds on the work around the concept of governance. The notion of gov-
ernance indicates a broad view of the process of policy-making which includes not 
just formal democratic institutions but a wide range of actors, processes and dis-
courses (Rhodes 1997, Pierre and Peters 2000, Kooiman 2003, Rhodes 2007). 
Decisions are not seen as the outcome of hierarchical, top-down steering of gov-
ernment but of many vertical and horizontal processes in policy networks made up 
of interdependent governmental and non-governmental actors structured around 
shared interests in public policy-making. In looking at these broader processes of 
decision-making, the governance perspective recognises the erosion of the state’s 
ability to authoritatively steer society and economy. Governance can then essen-
tially be understood as a self-steering of society in which policy pathways emerge 
as the result of heterogeneous, but interacting decisions at different levels. 
Second, reflexive governance builds on the theory of reflexive modernisation as 
developed by Beck, Giddens, Lash and others (Beck 1986, Beck 1993, Beck et al. 
1994). It starts from the observation that traditional modernisation processes and 
institutions – described as ‘simple modernity’ – have produced risks and unintend-
ed consequences which tend to undermine their own foundations. Dynamic pro-
cesses of modernisation with their optimism of control, exploitation of natural re-
sources, belief in technological progress and lack of concern about unintended 
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side effects have caused a self-endangerment of society in the shape of environ-
mental and social risks such as nuclear accidents, climate change, and mass un-
employment (Beck 1986). At the same time, associated processes of individualisa-
tion and globalisation lead to a disintegration and dissolution of established institu-
tions of first modernity such as social class, traditional gender roles, and family 
structure. In short, the paradigm of technical and economic rationality tends to un-
dermine itself. The modernisation process itself becomes the object of modernisa-
tion. This fundamentally affects the role of public policy. In a context of simple 
modernisation, the role of public policy was to guarantee the legal and economic 
order and to create and maintain the conditions for technological development, 
economic growth and welfare. With progressing modernisation and increasingly 
visible negative consequences, however, “the guardians become offenders of law, 
order, wealth and freedom” (Beck 1993, own translation). The role of public policy 
becomes increasingly one of containing these risks, thereby entering into an itera-
tive cycle of risk creation and risk management (cf. Voß, Kemp, et al. 2006). By 
confronting these self-generated risks and negative consequences of its technical 
and economic development, modernisation necessarily becomes reflexive. “While 
crises, transformation and radical social change have always been part of moder-
nity, the transition to a reflexive second modernity not only changes social struc-
tures but revolutionizes the very coordinates, categories and conceptions of 
change itself” (Beck et al. 2003). From this perspective, the concept of reflexive 
governance aims to use critical self-observation to explore ways of consciously 
moving policy making on from the increasingly self-defeating mechanisms and 
approaches of first modernity. 
 
6.3 Defining reflexive governance 
Reflexive governance is – similar to environmental policy integration – a concept 
that is normatively founded, but also to some extent empirically based. In its empir-
ical-analytical dimension, a change of political institutions is not a conscious 
choice, but results autonomously from inevitable processes of self-confrontation. 
Following Beck’s argument, the question is not whether society confronts the side 
effects of modernity, but in what way: through a counter-modernity which provides 
new certainties and rigidities or through a radicalised modernisation which refor-
mulates objectives and foundations of western society (Beck 1993). Therefore, 
reflexive governance can be used as an analytical concept for diagnosing ongoing 
processes of democratic and institutional change we currently witness. At the 
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same time, the concept has a strong normative impetus, being seen as a progres-
sive and emancipatory way of reshaping decision-making processes (Stirling 2008) 
or as an approach which confronts the challenges of sustainable development by 
reflecting on underlying problematic developments (Voß and Kemp 2006, p. 7). 
Normative expectations typically associated with reflexive governance are partici-
pation, transparency, deliberation, learning, inter- and transdisciplinarity, reflection, 
critique, flexibility, experimentation and consensus-building. This dual character of 
reflexive governance as empirical and normative concept has been, for example, 
expressed by Feindt: “Reflexive governance is needed to address the joint chal-
lenges of multi-level and multi-referential governance in providing global public 
goods; it emerges from ongoing parallel attempts to build multi-level policies and 
cope with the side effects from practices and institutions of the first modernity type“ 
(Feindt 2012, emphasis added). Both perspectives are equally valid, but should be 
clearly distinguished (cf. Beck 1993, p. 15).  
In the current literature on reflexive governance, empirical uses of the concept are 
clearly less widespread than normative ones, especially in relation to sustainable 
development. According to reflexive modernisation theory we are still at the early 
stages of a process of reinventing governance in the era of second modernity. 
While we observe in many places a crisis of traditional forms of government and 
governance, new approaches are only beginning to take shape. For example, it is 
obvious that many traditionally popular political parties across Europe are losing 
membership and reach lower levels of mobilisation. It is less clear, however, 
whether and how their role and function will be replaced in the longer term. In other 
words: Because the concept of reflexive governance emerges from a crisis of clas-
sical-modernist government, it is – empirically – easier to say what reflexive gov-
ernance is not than to say what it is. In its quest to find a sustainable pathway for 
economic and social development, reflexive governance has to abandon a number 
of key premises of first modernity: 
- Reflexive governance can rely to a lesser extent on the institutions of first mo-
dernity such as a sovereign nation state, popular and social embedded politi-
cal parties, the legal system, parliamentary democracy – all these institutions 
have been considerably weakened and undermined over the last decades. 
The institutions of governance, the political and democratic processes have to 
be reshaped and renegotiated (Voß and Kemp 2006). 
- Reflexive governance needs to question the concept of technical-scientific 
rationality with its associated principles of technological and economic pro-
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gress and functional differentiation and its optimism of human control over na-
ture and technology (Beck 1986, Beck et al. 1994). 
- Reflexive governance has to be based on a new concept of nature which can 
no longer be seen as an external resource to be exploited to the full in the 
quest to maximise economic gains. The clear separation between society and 
nature becomes blurred as we become more aware not only of our fundamen-
tal dependence on geological resources and ecosystem services but also of 
the ways in which humans shape ‘natural’ processes in the age of climate 
change (Beck 2010) and the Anthropocene (Latour 2013). Instead, a new, 
sustainable relationship between humans and nature is needed (Beck et al. 
2003). 
The more widespread efforts to define reflexive governance normatively tended to 
start from the perceived contemporary challenges, looking for ways to adequately 
address them through a new mode of governance. Recent normative definitions of 
reflexive governance typically start from the distinction between first order and 
second order reflexivity (e.g. Voß and Kemp 2006, p. 6, Hendriks and Grin 2007, 
p. 2, Gottschick 2013): 
- First order reflexivity is a process in which policy-making tries to remedy the 
problems of modernity (i.e. the side effects of earlier decisions such as nega-
tive effects on the environment) but in dealing with them creates new prob-
lems. 
- In contrast, second order reflexivity is thought to confront the structural causes 
for these negative side effects which create the perpetual cycle between prob-
lems, solutions and new problems. It thereby questions the basis of decision 
making, generates knowledge which may challenge existing policy objectives, 
analyses control problems, deals with uncertainty and is learning-oriented.  
This distinction puts the concept of reflexive governance in the context of moderni-
sation theory, but for two reasons it does little to advance our understanding of this 
new approach to collective decision-making. First, from a perspective of moderni-
sation theory, the mechanism described as first order reflexivity clearly has to be 
associated with (advanced) simple modernity. It is precisely the effort of address-
ing environmental and social problems through targeted instrumental measures 
that characterises this period. The phenomenon of being confronted with negative 
side effects of modernisation (i.e. “self-confrontation”) can contribute very little to a 
definition of reflexive governance because reflexive governance is supposed to be 
a new steering mode which helps overcome this dilemma of recurring crises. In 
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short: reflexive governance is an antipode to first-order reflexivity. Second, the self-
reflection of governance associated with “agency, intention and change” (Hendriks 
and Grin 2007, p. 334) described as “second order reflexivity” is not per se a new 
phenomenon or one which defines a new sociological age. As described in chapter 
2, both theorists and practitioners of environmental policy have long reflected on 
the structures, institutions and frames which contribute to persistent environmental 
problems. Instruments such as sustainable development strategies, interministerial 
working groups on the environment, sectoral integration strategies, Green Cabi-
nets, green budgeting, ecological finance reforms etc. were all developed to 
change the institutions and practices of governance in order to address the short-
comings of a functionally differentiated administrative systems with the ultimate 
goal of more integrated, forward-looking and sustainable policy decisions (Jordan 
and Lenschow 2008). The definition of reflexive governance should therefore not 
be restricted to a sheer reflection on the structural factors that contribute to the 
production of detrimental side effects. This would oversimplify the idea of reflexivity 
as it was the case in the debate on reflexive modernisation: Looking back on a 
decade of academic work on the concept, Beck and his colleagues note: “The ‘re-
flexivity’ in ‘reflexive modernization’ is often misunderstood. It is not simply a re-
dundant way of emphasizing the self-referential quality that is a constitutive part of 
modernity” (Beck et al. 2003, p. 1). 
A definition which brings out both the analytical depth as well as the innovative 
normative core of the concept of reflexive governance needs to be more substan-
tive and reflect deeper ontological and epistemological foundations of reflexivity. 
Heuristically helpful in this context is the typology by Stirling who distinguishes 
between ‘unreflectiveness’, ‘reflectiveness’ and ‘reflexivity’ (Stirling 2006, p. 226ff.): 
- Unreflectiveness is defined as a “governance situation in which representa-
tions, understandings and interventions are effectively restricted to whatever 
are held to be the most obvious, operational or instrumentally pertinent attrib-
utes of the object under intention” (ibid, p. 226). 
- Reflectiveness is a “mode of representation, understanding and intervention 
by governance systems in which attention extends to a ‘full range’ of whatever 
are held to be broadly salient attributes to the object in question” (ibid, p. 227). 
- Reflexivity involves the recognition that governance subject and object – the 
governance system and the area of intervention – are co-constituted through 
a “recursive mutual contingency of subjective representations and interven-
tions” (ibid, p. 229).  
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The value of this typology is that it highlights the distinction between broadening 
decision-criteria and participation (reflectiveness) and the more fundamental re-
thinking of the ontological and epistemological basis of governance (reflexivity). 
This distinction is particularly important because it refers to the key contribution of 
reflexive modernisation theory to the governance debate: “Without further 
measures, practices of network management, public participation, self-organisation 
and so on will reflect many of the assumptions of first modernity, and reproduce 
the patterns of action typical for it” (Grin 2006, p. 60). Just as the distinction be-
tween first order and second order reflexivity, the typology put forward by Stirling is 
also essentially normative. It can be interpreted as a stages model in which the 
aim is to move from a less reflexive to a more reflexive level. There is also, how-
ever, an implicit functional dimension because a higher degree of reflexivity is as-
sumed to be better equipped to deal with the social and environmental problems 
faced by late modernity. 
There have been few attempts to provide a general definition of reflexive govern-
ance. Starting ‘top down’ from a normative analysis of the basic problems of sus-
tainable development, Voß and Kemp propose five “strategy elements” of reflexive 
governance:  
- “integrated transdisciplinary knowledge production, 
- adaptivity of strategies and institutions, 
- anticipation of the long-term systemic effects of action strategies,  
- iterative participatory goal formulation, and 
- interactive strategy development” (Voß and Kemp 2006, p. 17ff.). 
Generally, the terminology used here – especially the reference to “strategies and 
institutions” – suggests that the authors have an overall governance system in 
mind which incorporates these elements. Moreover, the strategy elements are very 
general in nature and mostly process-oriented. Only one criterion (“anticipation of 
long-term systemic effects”) directly relates to the substance of decision outcomes. 
With its focus on how to take of a broad range of relevant aspects and actors into 
account in a dynamic and flexible way, the criteria are more concerned with reflec-
tiveness than with reflexivity. Somewhat curiously, the strategy elements seem to 
be loosely structured around the policy cycle which has attracted much criticism for 
its instrumental perspective on policy-making (see for example Jann and Wegrich 
2007): Goals are formulated (agenda setting), the effects of different strategies are 
anticipated (options appraisal), strategies are developed (policy formulation and 
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implementation), and knowledge is produced (policy evaluation). While indicating a 
general direction of thought, these criteria do not yet provide a substantive defini-
tion, typology or analytical framework of reflexive governance.  
An alternative, more operational definition is put forward by Feindt who suggests 
that “reflexive governance occurs 
- where institutional and procedural arrangements involve actors from various 
levels of governance and/or various epistemic backgrounds 
- in an effort to reflect on and possibly adapt their cognitive and normative be-
liefs 
- in ways that take into account and acknowledge alternative understandings of 
the problems 
- in an attempt to integrate multiple approaches to problem solution” (Feindt 
2012, p. 161). 
This definition has a similar focus and direction. It also mainly refers to procedural 
aspects and highlights the need for interaction between different stakeholders. On 
the other hand, there are significant differences between the two ways of opera-
tionalising the concept: While Voß and Kemp emphasise the need for adaptive 
strategies and institutions, this is not a key criterion for Feindt who, instead, high-
lights the adaptation of cognitive and normative beliefs and the acknowledgement 
of alternative understandings. This second definition is therefore more concerned 
with reflexivity than with reflectiveness. A second difference is that the strategy 
elements put forward by Voß and Kemp refer to the substance of evaluation crite-
ria (“anticipation of long-term systemic effects”, for example to avoid undesirable 
social and environmental impacts). Feindt, in contrast, abstains from formulating 
any ‘external’ normative objective or reference point. Instead, he defines reflexivity 
purely through procedural ‘ways of doing’ such as the integration of different per-
spectives and the adaptation of beliefs (ibid., p. 161). 
While it appears to be difficult to define and operationalise reflexive governance as 
such, it is possible to get a better understanding of its substance when turning to 
the specific area of reflexive policy appraisal which is recognised to be a key ele-
ment in reflexive governance (Stirling 2014, p. 20). Here, two concepts will be ex-
plored because they are useful for the further analysis: the idea of ’opening up‘ vs. 
‘closing down’ and the concept of congruency. 
Stirling emphasises the function of appraisal for ‘opening up’ analytical and deci-
sion-making processes (Stirling 2008). Contrary perhaps to an intuitive under-
standing of the term, opening up is not the same as broadening out the scope of 
assessment. The broadening of impacts and decision criteria considered in ap-
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praisal refers to the scope on the input side (i.e. reflectiveness). A narrow analysis, 
for example, would only consider direct economic effects while a broad analysis 
would include a range of different impacts such as indirect economic effects, envi-
ronmental outcomes and distributional aspects. The task of opening up, in con-
trast, refers to the way in which these inputs are processed in the context of the 
analysis and how results are presented. Here, closing down could, for example, 
mean that the appraisal proposes a ‘best’ policy option on the basis of a straight-
forward cost-benefit analysis. An appraisal which plays the role of opening up may 
instead be based on a number of different methodologies, carry out sensitivity 
analyses to test different plausible assumptions and present several policy options 
with their associated opportunities and risks. It would make underlying uncertain-
ties and potentially contested normative commitments visible and highlight choices 
in framing the policy issue as well as in addressing it. In analogy to how Stirling 
describes the role of social science more broadly, the function of policy appraisal 
from the perspective of reflexive governance can be described as “helping to in-
form – and catalyse, provoke and mobilise – more vibrant political debate over the 
particular questions, framings, values and knowledges under which alternative 
courses of action look most reasonable” (Stirling 2014, p. 6). 
The second concept which has been used to describe the function of reflexive pol-
icy appraisal is that of congruency (Grin and Van de Graaf 1996, Grin et al. 2004). 
Congruency describes a course of action that makes sense for each of the actors 
involved: “Stakeholders consider it an ‘unproblematic’ solution to ‘their’ problem, 
while co-producers are motivated for performing their envisaged part in realising 
the solution” (Grin et al. 2004, p. 128). It turns “a technically good idea into a ‘so-
cially robust’” (ibid.). Crucially, congruency is different from both consensus and 
compromise. Consensus typically implies a full alignment of the problem framing 
and solutions which is neither required for an effective solution nor easy to 
achieve. Compromise – typically based on bargaining – is a well established way 
of resolving political deadlock. While it can often be effective in the short term, it 
may be less robust over the longer term (ibid.). The option of exploring congruent 
courses of action through reflexive policy appraisal opens up the potential for find-
ing innovative ways of creating momentum for collective decision-making. 
Based on this review of relevant definitions and concepts, we can now adopt a 
tentative working definition of reflexive governance. In the context of this thesis, 
reflexive governance will be understood as practices aimed at collective decision-
making which  
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- involve a wide range of relevant actors, 
- include a broad range of (intended and unintended) impacts and decision cri-
teria, 
- open up analytical and decision-making processes as well as connecting em-
pirical and normative enquiry, 
- reflect critically on the way in which problems are framed and decision-
relevant knowledge is produced, 
- increase actors’ mutual understanding of frames, values and knowledges with 
a view to identify congruent solutions, and 
- recognise limitations to prognostic and managerial capacities and make provi-
sions for adaptation and learning. 
 
6.4 Comparing environmental policy integration and reflexive 
governance 
A structured comparison between the concept of reflexive governance and the 
concept of environmental policy integration shows commonalities as well as differ-
ences. Both approaches have in common the fundamental objectives of dealing 
with side effects of modernity and steering development processes towards sus-
tainable development. One important way to achieve this is the integration of 
knowledge, beliefs and perspectives across scales and policy areas. On the other 
hand, there are major differences. 
Summarising the more detailed analysis in table 6.1, it can be noted that the con-
cept of environmental policy integration is much narrower in its scope and has a 
focused reform agenda. Reflexive governance, in contrast, is an encompassing 
perspective which responds to a broad range of political, economic and environ-
mental crises. 
The second major difference is their very distinct ontological and epistemic orienta-
tion. Environmental policy integration is essentially based on realist ontology and a 
positivist epistemology.  Economic development is thought to have negative side 
effects which should be predicted and acknowledged in the policy formulation pro-
cess to find better, ‘win-win’ policy options. Environmental policy integration aims 
to promote ecological modernisation through the procedural advancement of envi-
ronmental information in policy and administration which is hoped to result in a 
promotion of environmental technology and green growth. 
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The concept of reflexive governance, in contrast, includes a fundamental critique 
of realist ontology and positivist epistemology. It is based on the assumption that 
social reality is multiple and relative and that the knowledge acquired about the 
world is socially constructed. The reflexive governance perspective therefore ex-
plicitly deals with the problems and phenomena which emerged in the empirical 
analysis of appraisal practice in chapters 4 and 5, for example the competition be-
tween different rationalities in the political process and the fundamental uncertain-
ties and incommensurabilities in environmental assessment and decision-making. 
From the perspective of the conception of policy appraisal, these are undesirable 
divergences from the rational-instrumental ideal (cf. chapters 4 and 5).  
While the theoretical perspective of environmental policy integration is not well 
equipped to conceptualise these problems, the reflexive perspective concept can 
help understand and respond to these phenomena. It allows to analyse how an 
alternative approach to rationality could be employed in practice, for example in 
scientific policy advice (Van Zwanenberg and Millstone 2000). It recognises and 
values normative and epistemic diversity, analyses the role of participation and 
deliberation under conditions of uncertainty and reflects on the iterative relation-
ship between knowledge and power (Stirling 2014). While the environmental policy 
integration literature has extensively studied existing policy-making institutions and 
processes, the literature which uses reflexive governance explicitly as a theoretical 
lens has engaged rather little with the institutions of representative democracy but 
has, instead, focused on new and experimental decision and planning processes. 
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Table 5: Comparison between environmental policy integration and reflexive gov-
ernance 
 Environmental Policy Integration Reflexive Governance 
Commonalities 
Overall objec-
tives 
Steering the development process of society towards sustainability 
Dealing with unexpected and undesirable consequences of development 
Integration of knowledge, perspectives and beliefs across scales and sectors 
Differences 
Theoretical 
basis 
Ecological modernisation theory Reflexive modernisation theory 
Direction of 
critique  
Critique of functional differentiation 
of environmental policy-making and 
administration 
Broader critique of policy-making institu-
tions of modernity 
Reform agenda Reform agenda to solve one particu-
lar problem 
Continuous self-observation of society 
Focus Focus on environmental problems Relevant to all side effects of modernity 
Role of 
knowledge 
Positivist view that knowledge in-
forms policy. Knowledge on envi-
ronmental impacts is ‘out there’, but 
has to be integrated into sectoral 
decision-making. 
Post-positivist view of co-evolution of 
knowledge and power. Different 
knowledge claims compete, their legiti-
macy and validity needs to be negotiat-
ed in the policy formulation process. 
View of tech-
nology 
Social change leading to technical 
change 
Socio-technical change as joint process 
Role of ap-
praisal 
Integrating environmental concerns 
into decision-making to make better 
and more balanced decisions 
Opening up decision processes, high-
lighting choices, increasing accountabil-
ity and legitimacy, reflecting uncertainty 
and including marginalised positions 
Policy process-
es in focus 
Focus on reform of existing policy-
making processes (e.g. regulatory 
impact assessment, sustainable 
development strategies, administra-
tive reforms) 
Focus on new processes typically de-
tached from established democratic 
processes (constructive technology 
assessment, adaptive management, 
participatory scenario planning, transi-
tion management etc.) 
Policy advice Policy advice with strong instrumen-
tal dimension, typically concrete 
recommendations with incremental 
ambition 
Policy advice with strong post-positivist 
dimension, typically abstract recom-
mendations with radical ambition 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
6.5 Regulatory Impact Assessment as a reflexive governance 
arrangement? 
6.5.1 The analytical framework 
The key questions of the subsequent analysis are, then, to what extent and under 
which conditions RIA can serve as a reflexive governance arrangement. In at-
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tempting to answer this question, it seems useful to come back to the distinction 
between reflectiveness and reflexivity introduced in section 6.3.2.2, because it cap-
tures two important, but quite distinct elements of reflexive governance. In addition, 
we will distinguish between two other perspectives, namely the institutional setting 
and the outcome. The institutional setting describes the formal rules of the ap-
praisal procedures, for example the prescribed process, actors to be involved, tim-
ing, and reporting obligations. As appraisal outcome we understand the learning 
that actually takes place during RIA. Here, we ask whether the appraisal has actu-
ally lead to a change of the beliefs and positions of different actors and ultimately 
been reflected in the policy design. This distinction between setting and actual out-
put seems crucial given that our previous analysis has shown a huge gap between 
the theory and practice of appraisal: The institutional framework provided by the 
procedure is an important determinant of the kind of learning that can occur, but 
the link between the institutional setting and the outcome of an appraisal is far from 
straightforward.  
Bringing the dimensions together – reflectiveness and reflexivity on the one hand 
and institutional set-up und and learning outcome on the other – we arrive at four 
criteria for the analysis: 
- Reflectiveness of the governance setting: This criterion describes the degree 
to which the governance arrangements make provisions to ensure that not 
just direct effects but also less obvious impacts play a role in decision-making, 
including unintended consequences, distributional impacts and external-
effects (cf. Stirling 2006). This aspect is equally covered by the principle of 
environmental policy integration. The reflexive governance perspective, how-
ever, emphasises the crucial role of participation in order to achieve reflec-
tiveness (Feindt 2012). A governance setting which enables or even encour-
ages the participation of actors with different kinds of expertise and different 
interests is more likely to consider a broader range of aspects. 
- Degree of reflective learning: Here, we observe the extent to which policy de-
cisions are actually based on a broader range of impacts, evaluation criteria 
and options. This includes knowledge which is put to use for concrete deci-
sions in the sense of specific information to improve the design of policies (cf. 
Dedeurwaerdere 2009, see also chapter 4). In short, the question is whether 
the cognitive basis for policy decisions has been widened to take account of 
all relevant aspects. Reflective learning is also aimed for by environmental 
policy integration. 
 112 
 
- Reflexivity of the governance setting: A reflexive governance setting is one 
that provides the conditions to systematically acknowledge and analyse multi-
ple perspectives, including those typically excluded from decision-making. It 
provides a process which does not aim to immediately close in on one particu-
lar way of judging or acting. It uses methodologies which connect facts and 
values, empirical and normative enquiry (cf. Stirling 2006, Fischer et al. 2007, 
Stirling 2008). A reflexive governance setting also aims to reflect on limits of 
knowledge and control, thereby developing alternative models of rationality, 
modes of justification and approaches to steering societal development (which 
may be latent already but not fully recognised as legitimate in public, cf. Beck 
et al. 2003).  
- Degree of reflexive learning: This criterion refers to the extent to which actors 
have actually developed an understanding of the way in which normative 
standpoints, framing assumptions and the structure of knowledge impact on 
their respective positions with regard to the policy in question. Reflexive learn-
ing opens up opportunities for policy change through a challenge of existing 
beliefs (Hendriks and Grin 2007, see also chapter 4). Reflexive learning has 
occurred if the appraisal has helped to overcome political deadlocks, to ad-
dress persistent environmental and social problems or to find congruent 
courses of action through a fundamental reflection on ways of thinking and 
acting. It has also occurred if those courses of action are based on a modest 
expectation towards the ability of state actors to anticipate and steer societal 
developments. 
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Table 6: Framework for assessing the reflexivity of governance arrangements 
1. Reflectiveness of the governance setting 
- setting encourages participation of diverse 
actors 
- setting enables inclusion of full range of 
intended and unintended impacts, including 
long-term effects 
2. Degree of reflective learning 
- wide range of impacts and evaluation 
criteria are considered 
- policy design improves, negative unin-
tended impacts are reduced, long-term 
effects are considered 
3. Reflexivity of the governance setting 
-  setting allows connecting and opening up 
analytical and decision-making processes 
- setting encourages congruent solutions, 
early and deep involvement 
- setting enables development of alternative 
modes of rationality, justification, and steer-
ing 
4. Degree of reflexive learning 
- actors improve understanding of each 
other’s frames, values, and knowledges 
- deadlocks are overcome, congruent 
courses of action are identified 
- measures are based on modest expec-
tations of steering capacity 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
In applying this framework, the aim is not to evaluate RIA on the basis of a simple 
blueprint. Developing a general model of reflexive RIA would be inappropriate, not 
least because of the heterogeneous conditions for each appraisal. As shown by 
Spruijt et al. (2014), there is a broad consensus in the relevant literatures that ex-
pertise plays a different role in policy-making depending on the decision context, 
for example the type of issue and the type of knowledge. In relation to RIA, we 
have observed strong differences in the institutional contexts and administrative 
cultures which vary not only between, but also within jurisdictions (see chapter 3 
and 4). RIA also covers very different kinds of policy issues. These include issues 
with minor political, economic and ethical importance as well as major reform pro-
jects. They include simple problems that can be easily solved through technical or 
legal measures as well as ‘wicked’ problems or complex systems that are difficult 
to steer. Therefore, the aim of the subsequent analysis is not to prescribe any par-
ticular model of RIA but to get a better understanding of the extent to which RIA 
can and does increase the reflexivity of policy-making. 
 
6.5.2 Regulatory Impact Assessment as reflective setting 
In principle, RIA has a considerable potential to function as a reflective governance 
setting. Broadening the set of evaluation criteria and taking unintended conse-
quences into account are key objectives of this form of policy appraisal. Involving a 
wider range of actors in the assessment process (e.g. through public hearings) can 
also be part of RIA.  
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In practice, however, the jurisdictions and procedures studied here are using this 
potential to a varying, but overall limited degree. A significant number of proce-
dures aim to make policy appraisal more comprehensive. The most common in-
strument to achieve this is to prescribe an extended list of themes and indicators to 
be considered. In some procedures, these explicitly included sustainable develop-
ment indicators, other common topics are climate change, health, gender, and 
small business. This objective of broadening the analysis is, however, counteract-
ed by methodological choices. As described in the empirical chapters, RIA is in 
many countries conceived as a narrow cost-benefit or administrative burden as-
sessment. Impacts that are difficult or impossible to include in those methodologies 
tend to be sidelined in these procedures. 
Generally, the majority of guidance documents studied focus on questions of con-
tent (methodology, options, criteria etc.) and do not make detailed provisions for 
the process of appraisal. Many RIA procedures are conceived as internal adminis-
trative processes. While some require that the results of the appraisal become 
publicly accessible, only a few explicitly foresee stakeholder involvement. Any pro-
cedure which contributes to transparency is likely to increase reflectiveness be-
cause it enables societal actors to challenge the analysis and to voice concerns if 
certain impacts are excluded. Procedures which combine a narrow methodology 
with a purely internal focus have to be judged as unreflective. 
 
6.5.3 Reflective learning in Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Here, the question is whether RIA procedures have actually led to a broadening of 
criteria, impact areas and policy options considered in the policy formulation pro-
cess. As this question corresponds with the idea of environmental policy integra-
tion and has been covered in detail in the previous chapters, the results will only 
be recapitulated briefly. Overall, we found that reflective learning occurs only to a 
limited extent. The main factor which restricted any kind of learning is that a con-
siderable share of desk officers did not carry out an actual assessment, but only 
complied formalistically with the requirements (see section 4.2.2). Many of them 
saw the RIA procedure as an unnecessary obligation, mostly because the pre-
scribed process of open options appraisal contrasts with a much more constrained 
reality of policy formulation. 
Even in cases where some kind of appraisal was eventually carried out, the expec-
tation that RIA standards translate directly into a broadening of appraisals and 
therefore fundamentally change policy decisions has proven to be naive. Desk 
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officers in charge of developing a policy were rarely ‘enlightened’ through the anal-
ysis in the sense that it made them consider a policy option, an evaluation criterion 
or an impact they had previously neglected (see section 4.2.3). The dominance of 
a particular perspective of the policy unit in the lead ministry is a matter of beliefs, 
political commitments and interests rather than a matter of lacking factual infor-
mation. In our case studies, desk officers were typically well-informed about major 
side effects of particular decisions. Government administrations also normally have 
routine cooperation mechanisms that ensure that civil servants from other affected 
policy areas have opportunities to voice concerns on particular issues.  
The question then is what priority is given to, in particular, environmental side ef-
fects. Here, RIA does very little to change the dominant routines of decision-
making because it is not systematically linked with the political process. Most pro-
cedures do not foresee the involvement of external stakeholders, with the effect 
that any broader impacts eventually included remain without political support. 
Moreover, RIA does not offer methodologies that go beyond an analysis of mostly 
short-term costs and benefits. Confronted with complex causal links, uncertainties, 
shortage of data and a lack of well-established assessment methods, desk officers 
tend to exclude indirect and long-term effects. RIA also usually sets in too late in 
the policy process for an open reflection on fundamentally different approaches. 
Especially in the case of major political initiatives, political parties, ministers or 
government coalitions usually already have a firm political commitment to imple-
ment a particular instrument. 
Where reflective learning occurred, it tended to do so at the margins of a policy 
decision (see section 4.2.4). Where side effects could be addressed without com-
promising the core of the policy initiative, policy assessment have in some instanc-
es helped to identify possible improvements in the design of policies. While RIA did 
not change the basic balance of power between different actors representing dif-
ferent concerns and evaluation criteria, it appeared to have allowed in some cases 
a fuller consideration of potential problems and side effects. This is particularly true 
for the small number of jurisdictions in which stakeholders can contribute to RIA 
and – to a lesser extent – for those where results of the appraisal are published 
(see section 4.2.4). Other factors enabling (both reflective and reflexive) learning in 
RIA which can be derived from the analysis in section 4.2.4 are the absence of 
strong previous political commitments to a particular instrument and the formal 
recognition of a political dimension of the decision. 
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6.5.4 Regulatory Impact Assessment as reflexive setting 
The potential for RIA to work as a reflexive setting is ambiguous. RIA is situated 
right at the core of democratic decision making: Unlike many other forms of ap-
praisal, RIA is directly integrated into the process of rule-making. This offers both 
opportunities for and barriers to reflexivity. On the one hand, its position at the in-
terface between the administrative and the political sphere means that RIA is, in 
principle, well placed to encourage a reflection on the direction, scope and justifi-
cation of collective action. As observed in section 5.1, there are few institutional 
venues in which knowledge, politics and policy-making are more closely interlinked 
than in RIA. It is exactly in this arena that a reflexive process is needed to disen-
tangle the different justifications and knowledge claims, thereby leading to a fuller, 
more informed and critical public debate. 
On the other hand, the proximity to the political process can also be a barrier to 
reflexive appraisal as it raises the stakes and puts the procedure under time pres-
sure. RIA is expected to come to a conclusion within a relatively short timeframe. 
RIA could still endeavour to combine opening up the decision process criteria be-
fore closing down towards a particular course of action, but there is likely to be a 
structural pressure to narrow down the options. Finally, the possibility of RIA to 
achieve the more ambitious expectations of reflexive governance is heavily re-
strained by the fact that it is a highly regulated procedure governed from within a 
functionally differentiated and hierarchically structured bureaucracy. Desk officers 
in charge of framing and carrying out RIA are unlikely to have much incentive or 
leeway to engage in a more fundamental reflection about alternative modes of ra-
tionality, unorthodox forms of justification and new ways of steering.  
In practice, RIA procedures are typically not designed in a way that supports re-
flexivity (see section 5.3). The way in which RIA is dominantly conceived – not only 
by guidance documents, but also by the majority of actors supposed to contribute 
to and learn from this form of appraisal – is not in line with the basic assumptions 
of reflexivity: RIA is widely expected to provide an objective and neutral way of 
predicting consequences of a policy (see section 5.3). It is thought to convey a 
rationale for action seen as superior to that produced by the political process from 
which it therefore needs to be detached. The possibility of previous political com-
mitments is rarely acknowledged, the analysis assumed to start with a blank sheet. 
The narrow instrumental model on which these procedures usually build means 
that they do not explore the wider decision context, for example alternative prob-
lem framings, different evaluation criteria, and diverging normative standpoints. As 
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long as this model is maintained, RIA is unable to systematically connect and open 
up both analytical and decision-making processes. 
The stated aim of RIA procedures to open up the decision-process does not usual-
ly go beyond reflectiveness (see section 5.3.1). The methodologies typically used 
in RIA – especially cost-benefit analysis and regulatory burden assessment, cf. 
section 5.3.8 – systematically closes down the analysis, because it hides uncer-
tainties and disguises value conflicts. RIA also tends to be conceived as an inter-
nal administrative process. The lack of stakeholder participation, the limited atten-
tion to the wider decision context and the neglect of distributional effects across 
society are barriers to exploring the potential for congruent solutions. It should be 
noted, however, that there are a number of procedures in different jurisdictions 
which have a more discursive character and see stakeholder consultation or other 
forms of dialogue as part of the appraisal process (see section 5.3.5). In these 
cases, especially the EU Impact Assessment system and the Swedish ‘committees 
of inquiry’ (see section 4.2), the procedure offers opportunities to address the wid-
er decision context as well as to connect participatory and analytical aspects of 
appraisal. 
 
6.5.5 Reflexive learning in Regulatory Impact Assessment 
Here, the question is whether RIA has actually helped political and societal actors 
to improve the understanding of each other’s knowledges, frames and values and 
to identify congruent courses of action. The analysis in the previous section has 
made clear that RIA as such has characteristics which structurally limit its reflexivi-
ty. In addition, the set-up of these procedures in practice often undermines their 
ability to function as reflexive arrangements. It is therefore hardly surprising that 
the case studies provided little evidence for reflexive learning through RIA. Instead, 
the most common form of knowledge use was strategic: Lead policy units – if they 
substantively engaged with RIA at all – tended to do so in a defensive mindset 
(see sections 4.2.3 and 5.4.2). They framed the appraisal in a way that it support-
ed the policy options they had previously decided to pursue (because it was con-
sidered to be either politically or technically the right course of action). The aim 
was to close down the decision-making process in order to steer ‘their’ regulatory 
project through the democratic process as quickly and effectively as possible. 
Nonetheless, procedures with a high degree of transparency have in a number of 
cases helped to clarify the analytical (and sometimes normative) decision-making 
basis of the lead ministry. This made it easier for outside actors to challenge the 
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chosen course of action on the basis of the decision-making basis and to put for-
ward alternative framings, values and knowledges. This can be interpreted as a 
partial ‘one-way reflexive learning’. Measured against a counterfactual situation 
without any RIA, this is doubtless a first step towards reflexivity which transcends 
pure reflectiveness. Measured against the ambitions of reflexivity set out above, 
however, this effect is very limited. 
 
6.5.6 Results 
The analysis of RIA from the perspective of environmental policy integration in 
chapters 3, 4 and 5 has been disappointing: Procedures were often not properly 
implemented. Where RIA was actually carried out in a more than formalistic fash-
ion, it did not always promote the consideration of environmental impacts of a poli-
cy in the decision process. Assessments tended to focus on direct economic and 
administrative costs and to use methods which give more weight to easily quantifi-
able market effects vis-à-vis uncertain and indirect environmental consequences. 
Cases where RIA promoted environmental policy integration were the exception 
rather than the rule. 
Section 6.3 has reflected on the empirical material from the more recent theoretical 
perspective of reflexive governance. A key difference compared to the environ-
mental policy integration approach is that the reflexive governance concept aims to 
address not just a given and known set of environmental problems, but a broader 
set of political, economic and ecological crises emerging from processes of self-
endangerment of modernity. Moreover, the very notion of reflexive governance is 
based on a post-positivist ontology and epistemology which imply a fundamentally 
different set of ambitions with regard to policy appraisal. Section 6.3.5 has spelled 
out the diverging expectations with regard to both the setting and the outcome of 
RIA. This has allowed exploring in more detail the potentials and limitations of RIA 
to promote reflexive learning, as well as to evaluate the achievements and failures 
of the concrete policy cases studied in this thesis. 
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Table 7: Results of the analysis 
1. Reflectiveness of the governance setting 
- regulatory impact assessment has consid-
erable potential for reflectiveness 
- procedures realise this potential only to a 
limited degree because of lacking provi-
sions for participation and a bias towards 
unreflective methodologies (e.g. cost-
benefit analysis) 
2. Degree of reflective learning 
- in many cases reflective learning did 
not occur because breadth of analysis 
related to existing beliefs and previous 
commitments, not lacking knowledge 
- in some cases reflective learning oc-
curred, especially in jurisdictions with 
transparent and participatory proce-
dures 
3. Reflexivity of the governance setting 
-  ambiguous potential: well-placed at the 
interface between policy and politics to en-
courage reflection, but integration in law-
making process creates pressure to quickly 
close down decision 
- instrumental settings do not support explor-
ing the wider decision context 
- recommended methodologies tend to dis-
guise uncertainties and value conflicts 
4. Degree of reflexive learning 
- typically no reflexive learning, but stra-
tegic use of regulatory impact as-
sessment to close down decision-
process towards the preferred course 
of action  
- in some cases partial ‘one-way’ reflex-
ive learning observed in jurisdictions 
with transparent and participatory pro-
cedures 
 
Source: Own compilation 
 
Summarising the results of the analysis (see Table 7), we find that RIA provides, in 
principle, a considerable opportunity to increase the reflectiveness of policy-
making, but the actual setting created by procedures across the EU, realises this 
potential only partially. In practice, reflective learning occurred only in few cases, 
while in most cases the appraisal has not affected or even reduced the scope of 
the appraisal. The analysis also shows that the potential of RIA to function as a 
reflexive setting is ambivalent. On the one hand, the venue is ideally situated for 
different stakeholders to explore and negotiate the normative and analytical basis 
of concrete policy decisions. On the other hand, the integration into the law-making 
process provides a narrow frame and creates considerable time pressure. This 
already restrained context combined with the technical-instrumental set-up in the 
large majority of jurisdictions makes truly reflexive learning very difficult. As a re-
sult, we only have observed partial ‘one-way’ reflexive learning processes in a few 
cases.  
In sum, the shift towards the theoretical perspective of reflexive governance has 
allowed to clarify in which sense regulatory impact assessment can contribute to-
wards the opening-up of policy processes, and which types of learning processes 
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(reflective vs. reflexive) can reasonably be expected under currently dominant and 
under more conducive circumstances.  
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7. Conclusion 
7.1 Synthesis of results 
The overall question addressed by this thesis is whether and how regulatory im-
pact assessment promotes the consideration of environmental and sustainability 
concerns in policy-making. This issue is approached through a number of specific 
research questions. This synthesis summarises key results from the previous sec-
tions in relation to these research questions. 
 
1. What kinds of processes are conceptually required to improve the considera-
tion of environmental concerns in collective decision-making and to reorient 
such decision-making towards sustainable development? 
This question was addressed through two different theoretical lenses: first through 
the perspective of environmental policy integration (with ecological modernisation 
theory as its basis), and then through the concept of reflexive governance (with 
reflexive modernisation theory as its basis, cf. section 6.2). 
The review of the environmental policy integration literature has shown that the 
question of what is being integrated how and by whom is under-conceptualised. In 
order to address this conceptual gap, chapter 2 drew out the key rationale for envi-
ronmental policy integration from the ecological modernisation literature: Existing 
patterns of departmentalised administrative structures combined with antagonistic 
relationships between environmental and sectoral departments are taken to lead to 
ineffective and expensive policy strategies and to hinder the development of inte-
grated and innovative solutions. If, in contrast, sectoral and environmental depart-
ments worked together to develop integrated approaches focused on avoiding det-
rimental environmental effects through innovation and technical change, then the 
economy could be ecologically modernised. Based on this rationale, the chapter 
derives four generic processes that are expected to promote a shift between a 
segregated and an integrated mode of environmental policy:  
- environmental agenda setting within sectoral departments (e.g. high-level po-
litical commitment and systematic assessment of environmental impacts dur-
ing policy formulation), 
- horizontal communication between environmental and sectoral administra-
tions (e.g. early consultation of the environmental department in sectoral poli-
cy initiatives), 
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- environmental capacity building within sectoral departments (e.g. well-
resourced units responsible for environmental issues with a mission to identify 
win-win options), and 
- policy learning (e.g. positive eco-modernist framing of the link between sec-
toral interests and environmental objectives). 
The analysis supports the view that environmental policy integration is not just the 
political will to prioritize environmental issues, but a multi-dimensional process with 
a strong cognitive dimension. Efforts that address only one dimension (e.g. just 
putting resources into environmental units of sectoral ministries) are unlikely to be 
successful. The analysis highlights the need to recognise the fundamental role of 
learning in environmental policy integration, both at an instrumental level (about 
means to achieve given ends) and at a conceptual levels (reflecting about ends 
themselves). The fundamental optimism of this perspective does not only stem 
from empirical research showing large potentials for technological solutions with 
positive economic and environmental effects, but also from the assumption that 
‘better knowledge’ on environmental impacts leads to more sustainable policies. It 
emerged during the research, however, that this optimistic outlook underestimates 
the breadth and depth of change processes required for a substantive change in 
the way environmental concerns are addressed in policy. In particular, the instru-
mental view of the role of knowledge in policy-making has proven to be unrealistic 
(cf. research question 4). These insights motivated a conceptual shift to the per-
spective of reflexive governance (chapter 6). Here, the question of reorienting the 
decision-making towards sustainable development is framed differently. The focus 
is not just on environmental issues but on all negative effects of modernisation, 
including social ones. The key reform agenda derived from the reflexive govern-
ance literature is to develop governance institutions which involve a wide range of 
relevant actors, open up of the process of knowledge production and decision-
making, reflect critically on the way in which problems are framed, increase actors’ 
mutual understanding of relevant issues, and make provisions for adaptation and 
learning. 
On the basis of this literature, chapter 6 has defined a framework for assessing the 
reflexivity of governance arrangements. It draws on the distinction between reflec-
tiveness (i.e. a broadening of representations, modes of understanding and inter-
ventions) and reflexivity (i.e. the recognition that governance subject and object 
are co-constituted). Distinguishing on the other hand between institutional set-up 
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and learning outcome, chapter 6 derived four criteria for evaluating the reflexivity of 
governance arrangements: 
- reflectiveness of governance setting (the degree to which setting encourages 
participation of diverse actors and enables inclusion of full range of intended 
and unintended impacts, including long-term effects) 
- reflective learning (the degree to which wide range of impacts and evaluation 
criteria are considered, policy design improves, negative unintended impacts 
are reduced, long-term effects are considered) 
- reflexivity of the governance setting (the degree to which setting allows con-
necting and opening up analytical and decision-making processes, encour-
ages congruent solutions through involvement of societal actors at early deci-
sion stages, enables development of alternative modes of rationality, justifica-
tion, and steering) 
- reflexive learning (the degree to which actors improve understanding of each 
other’s frames, values, and knowledges, deadlocks are overcome, congruent 
courses of action are identified, measures are based on modest expectations 
of steering capacity). 
The framework developed from the perspective of reflexive governance overlaps 
with that derived from environmental policy integration with regard to the broaden-
ing of the analysis and the need for policy learning. The reflexive governance ap-
proach goes further, however, in three important ways: First, it widens the scope 
from only addressing environmental issues to all undesirable side-effects of devel-
opment. Second, it recognises the fundamental plurality of values, knowledges and 
rationalities and therefore puts much more emphasis on early, wide and deep in-
volvement of societal actors. Third, it is more sceptical with regard to technocratic 
models of steering and promotes flexible, learning-oriented courses of action. 
 
2.  How is Regulatory Impact Assessment framed and institutionalised across 
the EU?  
The research shows that current procedures for RIA are rooted in two distinct 
agendas: better regulation and environmental policy integration. The constituen-
cies associated with these agendas have conflicting expectations about the func-
tions of these appraisal procedures. Typically, however, these different expecta-
tions remain implicit. The policy documents underlying RIA procedures in the dif-
ferent EU Member States often do not state any normative objective such as pro-
moting sustainable development. Instead, aims which can be derived from policy 
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documents are more generic and procedural: to improve the evidence base of pol-
icy decisions, to enhance regulatory quality, to reduce unnecessary bureaucracy 
and to improve the coherence of policy-making decisions in different areas. 
While the research has demonstrated strong similarities in the basic orientation of 
RIA procedures across the EU, there is one key aspect in which variation was 
found: The majority of the studied jurisdictions conceive RIA as a purely internal 
administrative exercise. A number of jurisdictions, however, use RIA also as a way 
of increasing transparency, accountability, and participation. These jurisdictions 
provide different degrees of access to information (e.g. publication of final assess-
ment reports) or stakeholder involvement (e.g. consultations). The institutional set-
up of procedures also varies significantly, for example the way in which policy pro-
posals are selected for appraisal, the extent of central coordination, and the meth-
odological approach favoured. These variations can to some extent be explained 
by different politico-administrative systems and cultures. 
Policy appraisal procedures are based on a number of assumptions closely asso-
ciated with the model of instrumental rationality. The analysis in chapter 4 has 
highlighted three assumptions: First, policy appraisal is based on the idea that pol-
icy-making is a problem-solving process. It is supposed to support the policy cycle 
in the early stages of problem definition, identification of options and policy formu-
lation. Second, policy appraisal is conceptualised as informing one single decision-
maker with a unified and coherent set of evaluation criteria. Third, policy appraisal 
is supposed to make policy-making more rational and evidence-based by providing 
unbiased factual information. 
Chapter 5 has shown in detail that policy appraisal procedures across Europe are 
conceived as neutral fact-finding exercises free from political pressure. This per-
spective is reflected in different characteristics of the procedures including the 
stated objectives, the process design, timing and audience, and the role of analyti-
cal methodologies. Policy documents typically conceive RIA as an expert-based, 
objective process that helps officers develop a balanced proposal based on ration-
al reasoning. Guidance documents foresee that assessments should be performed 
by the relevant administrative units, in most countries without requirements to in-
clude external stakeholders or political institutions (such as parliament). In its ideal 
type, RIA is meant to be free of normative choices, which are assumed to be made 
by politicians at later stages of the decision-making process. Procedures are – at 
least implicitly – based on the idea that there is a unitary decision maker who 
should be informed through a quasi-scientific assessment. 
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The lack of attention to process issues also reflects the perception that the rela-
tionship between knowledge and policy is linear and instrumental. With a few ex-
ceptions, the conception of RIA draws heavily on a positivist epistemology. The 
only two types of methodologies commonly mentioned in policy documents are 
cost-benefit analysis (including variants such as cost-effectiveness analysis) and 
administrative burdens assessment. A notable exception to this model is the EU’s 
Impact Assessment procedure which is relatively transparent, involves stakeholder 
consultation, has a wider scope in terms of impacts and foresees a range of ap-
praisal methods. 
 
3. What kind of knowledge is generated in Regulatory Impact Assessment? 
While the thesis found a relatively strong homogeneity in the conception and basic 
orientation of procedures for RIA, the actual assessment practice varies widely 
between and within jurisdictions (chapter 4 and 5). Most RIA systems are charac-
terised by a considerable implementation deficit, some procedures appear to only 
exist on paper. In many cases, we found that either the impacts of a planned policy 
have not been formally appraised at all or in a very superficial and formalistic way. 
In these cases, RIA has not generated any relevant new knowledge. 
The expectation that RIA guides decisions was only met in a few, more technical 
assessments carried out on very specific policy options (e.g. different implementa-
tion options for an EU Directive). In more complex cases, appraisals tended to 
identify a wide range of consequences – some desired, some undesired, some 
uncertain – which could not easily be weighed up against each other. While RIA 
has in many cases produced relevant knowledge, it has not in itself led to analyti-
cal closure in the sense of clearly identifying a 'best' policy option. Interviewees 
pointed out that this lack of closure is often at odds with the expectations of policy-
makers who tend look for unequivocal and concise recommendations rather than 
qualified, complex information reflecting on different options and impacts. Officials 
admitted that this gap between external expectations and actual outcomes of the 
analysis made it in some cases more difficult to constructively engage with RIA. 
Where RIAs have been carried out, they typically adopted a very selective analyti-
cal framing. While the chosen frame of analysis was often coherent and plausible, 
alternative framings could easily be envisaged, for example with regard to problem 
definition, policy options, types of impacts, methods and timescales. 
Although many guidance documents recommend the use of quantitative appraisal 
methods, assessments were rarely based on any formal quantitative or qualitative 
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analysis. Where methodologies were used, there was a strong bias towards partial 
economic analytical methods (such as assessments of administrative burdens on 
companies and cost-benefit analysis with focus on short term cost to business). 
Unintended effects and distributional implications were typically not given much 
attention. Exceptions were large policy reforms which were in some cases based 
on extensive external studies.  
The selective framing and biased use of methods can be explained by four main 
factors: First, the tendency to narrow the analysis down to specific issues ap-
peared to be a strategy adopted by desk officers to reduce the effort of appraisal 
and avoid areas in which they had less experience and information. Confronted 
with a wide range of different direct and indirect effects, those in charge of the ap-
praisal tended to focus on questions close to their own area of expertise. Second, 
several desk officers confirmed that information was commonly selected and pre-
sented in a way that supported the preferred policy option. Potential negative ef-
fects were often not explored in depth or even excluded from the analysis. Third, 
using methodologies that produce unambiguous results and sparing out impacts 
which are hard to predict was seen as a way to generate supposedly robust analy-
sis and avoid methodological criticism. Fourth, another reason for the focus on 
short-term economic costs was that these tended to be a matter of concern raised 
by well-organised and well-resourced stakeholder groups.  
In many cases, therefore, the RIA has tended to produce knowledge which 
strengthens the legitimacy of courses of actions chosen by powerful incumbent 
actors rather than bringing critical knowledge to the decision-process. In some 
cases, however, the question what kind of knowledge should be generated and 
used in RIA became itself the object of political controversy, for example between 
the lead ministry and other departments affected by the policy. In jurisdictions 
where the process of RIA is transparent, external actors have attempted to influ-
ence the setup of RIA or bring different knowledge claims into the discussion. 
 
4. How is knowledge from Regulatory Impact Assessment used in decision-
making?  
Chapter 4 draws on the literature on policy learning to identify three different types 
of using knowledge in policy-making:  
- instrumental learning about means to attain a given end, 
- conceptual learning which challenges existing beliefs, and  
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- political use of knowledge which includes different forms of symbolic and stra-
tegic use. 
As with regard to the previous research question, the research presented in chap-
ter 4 and 5 has again shown considerable differences between the studied RIAs. 
In the majority of cases, the overall influence of the appraisal on the policy output 
was small. Assessments were typically unable to influence the policy-formulation 
process in the way set out in the appraisal guidance documents, decisions tended 
to be shaped much more by political dynamics and power relations. 
The dominant type of knowledge use found in the case studies was political. In 
many cases, the predominant function of the assessment was the justification of a 
specific measure by the lead ministry vis-à-vis other departments (and, where as-
sessment reports were published, also with regard to external stakeholders). This 
strategic use of knowledge can have positive effects when it makes the rationale of 
a policy intervention more transparent. It can, on the other hand, also be illegiti-
mate, if the analysis is biased or based on contested assumptions. In some cases, 
strategic use of knowledge has led to what can be termed 'artificial closure': Lead 
ministries have successfully used RIA to legitimise a political intervention on the 
basis of ‘scientific evidence’ even though the appraisal was framed in a way which 
was not acceptable to relevant societal groups. In these cases, the political func-
tion of RIA was to silence conflict and avoid critical debate, thus ultimately helping 
to support and reproduce existing power structures. 
A different dynamic tended to emerge when assessment knowledge was made 
public. In cases of transparent RIA procedures, the knowledge produced was then 
frequently challenged, for example by NGOs demanding the inclusion of (further) 
environmental impacts or by industry associations proposing higher cost esti-
mates. In other cases, elements of the assessment were used politically by stake-
holders to require changes in the planned policy. It needs to be noted, however, 
that less well-resourced stakeholder groups did not always have the means to crit-
ically analyse and challenge the frames used in the RIA, especially if they were not 
given access to all relevant information, for example underlying external modelling 
studies.  
Although political use tended to be dominant, instrumental learning with regard to 
the specific policy design also occurred in many cases. It tended to be selective in 
its focus on achieving political objectives at the lowest economic and administra-
tive costs. Evidence of conceptual learning (in the sense that an assessment con-
tributed to a shift of fundamental views about a policy by either the lead ministry or 
 128 
 
external actors) was found only in very few cases. This suggests that RIA proce-
dures typically helped to refine predetermined policy conceptions, again reinforcing 
existing power relationships.  
The way in which the appraisal knowledge was used was influenced by a broad 
range of factors, some relating to the administrative culture of the lead ministry, 
others to the characteristics of the procedures and some to the specific policy case 
(chapters 4 and 5). The most important factors were the extent to which there were 
pre-existing political commitments, the positions of powerful stakeholders and pub-
lic opinion, the inherent complexity of the issue, the organisational culture of the 
administration responsible for the appraisal, the attitude of the policy officer in 
charge, the level of transparency provided by the procedure and the degree of 
political controversy associated with the impacts of the proposed measure. The 
impact of these factors is, however, somewhat contingent and difficult to general-
ise. For example, where highly politicised policies were in question, assessment 
processes could actually become an additional venue for conflict with stakeholders 
even commissioning alternative studies. In other cases, however, RIA became 
largely irrelevant in the face of intense political controversy. 
Interestingly, the research presented in chapters 3, 4 and 5 found that actors inter-
preted patterns of knowledge use in very different ways. Government officials and 
different stakeholder groups often appear to genuinely consider themselves as the 
more fact oriented and ‘rational' actors, while accusing other players of using re-
search in a biased, strategic, or symbolic way. While this may in part be itself a 
strategic behaviour, it also points towards the influence of competing rationalities 
and the blurred boundaries between science and policy, facts and norms.  
 
5. Can Regulatory Impact Assessment promote the consideration of sustaina-
ble development in policy-making and how are the conception and design of 
assessment procedures influencing this ability?  
The hope and expectation of the literature on environmental policy integration was 
that RIA would strengthen the knowledge base about negative ecological impacts 
in the policy formulation process and help identify integrated and synergistic sec-
toral policies (chapter 2). While this has happened in some cases and to a limited 
extent, practice showed that there is also a considerable risk that RIA can work 
against sustainable development (chapters 3, 4 and 5). This can particularly be the 
case if it requires administrations to demonstrate – for example through a formal 
cost-benefit analysis – that the benefit of a proposed intervention is greater than its 
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cost. This openness of RIA towards different political agendas is in line with the 
observation that this instrument was supported from the beginning by two very 
different constituencies, namely from the field of environmental policy integration 
and from proponents of better regulation (chapter 2). It means that the substantive 
outcome of policy appraisal strongly depends not only on the political context and 
the political agenda of the lead ministry, but also on the conception and design of 
RIA procedures. 
The lack of normative orientation observed in RIA across the EU (cf. research 
question 2) is an expression of the assumption that providing evidence is ‘value-
free’. The research presented in this thesis has made clear, however, that the idea 
of ‘neutral’ policy appraisal is a misconception. The findings show that – while 
some learning takes place in RIA – this occurs despite rather than because of the 
rational-instrumental set-up of the procedures (chapter 4 and 5). Three main barri-
ers to learning were identified: 
- The lack of attention to issues such as stakeholder involvement, issue framing 
and consensual definition of the scope of assessment was a strong barrier to 
learning and consensus building. 
- The bias towards “hard” quantitative data and a reluctance to include qualita-
tive, uncertain or incomplete information inhibit a broader reflection about the 
policy and therefore tend to undermine the broader social legitimacy of the 
appraisal.  
- The gap between the conception of RIA and the actual political-administrative 
decision-making processes has led many policy officers to treat it as a bu-
reaucratic hurdle rather than a learning opportunity. 
For RIA to promote the consideration of sustainability, it is therefore necessary to 
develop a fundamentally different conception of the role of appraisal at the inter-
face between knowledge and policy. Drawing on the reflexive governance litera-
ture, chapter 6 has explored potentials for and limitations of a reflexive kind of RIA. 
It found that RIA provides, in principle, a considerable opportunity to increase the 
reflectiveness of policy-making. As several cases of good practice have demon-
strated, it can help broaden the set of evaluation criteria and take account of unin-
tended consequences. This requires, however, that the design of RIA procedures 
encourages participation of diverse actors, both from within and outside govern-
ment. 
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The potential of RIA to promote reflexivity is, in contrast, more limited. On the one 
hand, the venue, if properly designed, is ideally situated for different stakeholders 
to explore and negotiate the normative and analytical basis of policy decisions. On 
the other hand, the integration into the law-making process provides a relatively 
narrow frame and considerable time pressures. A RIA procedure which achieves 
at least a certain degree of reflexivity would also require the development of new 
approaches to appraisal. These would need to connect and open up analytical and 
decision-making processes, to find ways of exploring congruent solutions as well 
as to enable the development of alternative modes of rationality, justification, and 
steering (cf. section 7.4). 
The concept of reflexive governance allows to envision such an alternative design 
and use of RIA. As a contrasting ideal, it helps to arrive at a clearer view how pre-
vailing practices of RIA tend to reproduce closures in the policy process rather 
than providing opportunities for opening up. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Overall, the research presented in chapters 2-6 highlights the risks and opportuni-
ties policy appraisals pose to the agenda of environmental policy integration. It 
demonstrates the varied uses of knowledge in policy appraisal. While it reveals 
that RIA tends to become closely entangled with the political contest for particular 
decisions, it can also inform decisions in more traditional ways and occasionally 
reshape positions and interests of different actors. In the cases where appraisal 
processes played a significant role in decision-making, policy officers in lead minis-
tries tended to be simultaneously engaged in processes of learning, convincing, 
steering, and manipulating at the boundaries between knowledge, policy, and poli-
tics. Drawing on these insights, the research provides an empirically-based critique 
of a positivist orientation of policy appraisal procedures, draws out the barriers and 
predicaments caused by ‘apolitical’ process design and shows ways of making 
these processes more discursive. Appraisal procedures and those involved in 
practice should explicitly acknowledge the complex links and fuzzy boundaries 
between appraisal, policy-making and politics. The function of appraisal should be 
reframed with lower expectations towards analytical closure through more sophis-
ticated analysis, but a stronger focus on the discursive and political functions. This 
would require more careful individual framing of the analyses and – in most juris-
dictions – a more transparent and participatory appraisal process. Such a reflexive 
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redesign would, however, challenge the often affirmative function of RIA in repro-
ducing and legitimising pre-existing closures of the policy process. 
 
7.2 Impact of the research: Reception in the academic literature 
Since their publication in academic journals, chapters 2 to 5 of this thesis have 
received considerable attention in the academic literature. In this section, I review 
the reception in the literature and relate this to the key results presented in the 
previous section. For this purpose, a review has been carried out of major refer-
ences to the four research chapters by academic articles, books, and book chap-
ters. By May 2015, Google Scholar found 271 citations for all four research papers. 
Chapter 4 has been most frequently cited (134 references), followed by chapter 2 
(85), chapter 5 (36) and chapter 3 (27).13 All publications referenced below cite one 
or several of the published research chapters presented in this thesis. 
A review of the reception of chapter 2 shows that it has helped clarify the meaning 
of environmental policy integration (see for example Coffey and Major 2005, 
Mickwitz and Kivimaa 2007, Persson 2007, Adelle and Russel 2013, Massey and 
Huitema 2013). Making the link between ecological modernisation theory and envi-
ronmental policy integration was seen as a conceptually innovative way of high-
lighting the importance of technological innovation in environmental policy as well 
as the depth of changes associated with environmental policy integration (Jay and 
Morad 2007, Persson 2007). As Persson points out:  
“Hertin and Berkhout […] focus on the organisational environment and power structure 
within which it takes place. What is perhaps most interesting about their contribution, 
however, is that they put EPI [environmental policy integration] in a larger context of 
ecological modernisation and look beyond the short- and medium-term. In their view, 
EPI is a transitory means for achieving a new type of policy-making. In reality, their vi-
sion of such policymaking may not differ much from other authors, but the issue of what 
comes after integration is raised, in terms of a new policy-making culture” (Persson 
2007, p. 17).  
Another argument taken up in the literature is the emphasis on learning processes 
(as recognised, for example, by Oberthür 2009, Jordan and Lenschow 2010, 
Adelle and Russel 2013). In arguing that environmental policy integration has the 
potential to lead to a redefinition of sectoral interests – from perceiving calls for 
stricter environmental protection as threat to seeing them as an opportunity for 
innovation and competitive advantage – chapter 2 was seen as bringing a cogni-
tive perspective into the literature which has previously been undervalued. 
                                               
13
 Accessed on 19.05.2015. 
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Chapter 3 has been mostly cited for its empirical content. It is cited for 
- providing evidence on the growing number of policy assessments carried out 
in Western democracies (see Schout et al. 2010), 
- drawing attention to the ambiguous nature of some procedures due to their 
roots in both better regulation and environmental policy integration 
(Meadowcroft and Steurer 2013), 
- showing the trend towards the increasingly integrated nature of assessments 
as opposed to previous single-issue assessment procedures (Huge et al. 
2011), and 
- highlighting the fact that the scope of assessments in practice tends to be 
narrow with a focus on economic costs and short-term effects (Volkery and 
Ribeiro 2009, Meadowcroft and Steurer 2013). 
The article contained in chapter 4 was cited particularly often, especially in the 
political science literature. Conceptually, the paper is seen to contribute to a more 
differentiated and realistic representation of the policy process and to highlight the 
challenges this poses to appraisal processes (see Huge et al. 2011, Adelle et al. 
2012, Adelle and Weiland 2012, Weiland et al. 2013). It is therefore cited in argu-
ments critical of the rational-analytical account of appraisal use that dominates the 
literature and which tends to prescribe more and better analytical tools as the pan-
acea for evidence-based policy-making:  
“A key strand of consensus that has developed is that the gap between the rational-
analytic promise of policy appraisal and reality of the ‘policy mess’ results in significant 
barriers to decision-makers’ learning (Hertin et al, 2009)” (Dunlop 2010). 
Empirically, the chapter has addressed the knowledge gap in relation to the actual 
impacts of policy assessments on policy processes and policy outputs. It has been 
referenced for example in relation to  
- the different contexts appraisal is used in (Cashmore et al. 2010), 
- the bias of appraisal practice towards short-term economic and administrative 
costs (De Smedt 2010),  
- the finding that the strategic use of knowledge is dominant (Dunlop 2010, 
Amblard and Mann 2011, Weiland et al. 2013), 
- evidence for the perfunctory use of assessments (Galvin 2011), and  
- the finding that appraisal typically only use simple analytical tools (Hirschi et 
al. 2013). 
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The analysis contained in chapter 5 is cited as a contribution to a new type of criti-
cal literature on policy appraisal (see Adelle et al. 2012, Adelle and Weiland 2012, 
Weiland et al. 2013). Turnpenny et al have distinguished four types of research 
(Turnpenny et al. 2009): Type 1 research which mainly addresses the design of 
tools and methods for policy appraisal, Type 2 research which aims to explain and 
improve the performance of policy appraisal, Type 3 research which explores ap-
praisal from the perspective of learning and knowledge utilisation and Type 4 re-
search which investigates the politics of assessment. Adelle and Weiland draw on 
this typology and note that “a small number of Type 2 researchers appear to have 
evolved into Type 3 researchers (e.g. Hertin et al 2009a;b; Turnpenny et al 2009)” 
(Adelle and Weiland 2012). Adelle et al also observe that there is still an insuffi-
cient amount of – particularly empirical - research of this type (Adelle et al. 2012). 
They conclude that: 
“Hertin et al (2009b) have helped to raise further questions prompted by the post-
positivist critique which remain almost entirely unanswered at present. Questions such 
as: how can the design of policy appraisal better adjust to the messier reality of policy 
making?” (Adelle et al. 2012, p. 12). 
Overall, this review of citations shows that other authors have drawn on insights 
relating to all five research questions. Conceptually, the question relating to pro-
cesses of change in environmental policy integration has been of interest to other 
researchers (research question 1). Frequently cited were also the empirical in-
sights into how RIA procedures have diffused across Europe and how they are 
designed (research question 2). In relation to the production of knowledge (re-
search question 3), a number of authors have referred to the more instrumental 
results regarding patterns of implementation, methodologies and tool use. Others 
have taken note of the more critical observation that RIA tends to generate selec-
tive and biased knowledge about policy options and impacts. The insights on how 
knowledge from RIA is actually used in policy-making (research question 4) have 
also been taken up in the literature – both in relation to empirical results and in 
relation to developing a new understanding of the science policy interface. One 
key finding which has not been followed up in the literature is the observation that 
the rational-instrumental character of RIA procedures acts as a barrier towards 
learning (research question 5). While some authors have taken note of the gap 
between the theory and practice of RIA, the question how a different conception of 
RIA may contribute to a more democratic and more effective policy appraisal re-
mains to be addressed by research in this area. 
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7.3 Future practice: Making Regulatory Impact Assessment more 
reflexive 
How can the insights of this analysis be translated into practical ways of making 
RIA more reflexive? The first and most critical question is under what circumstanc-
es key actors – particularly the lead ministries, but also governmental and non-
governmental stakeholders – have an interest in using the potentials for reflexive 
RIA identified in the previous section. The current rationalist conception of RIA 
creates a bias towards artificial analytical closure, towards narrow expert 
knowledge and towards the framing assumptions of those in charge of the ap-
praisal. Powerful incumbents – for example government officials who successfully 
steer policy processes and important interest groups which currently benefit from 
privileged access to policy-makers – may therefore have little interest in increasing 
the reflexivity of policy appraisal processes. 
While this argument seems valid to some degree, I would argue that there are two 
factors which attenuate this interest and improve the outlook for reflexive RIA. 
First, policy-making is increasingly confronted with a public which expects a high 
degree of transparency. The spread of RIA procedures in EU Member states ob-
served in chapter 3 is a symptom and result of this expectation. Electronic media 
and – more recently – the emergence of digital social networks put additional pres-
sure on political protagonists to communicate more quickly and consistently about 
why and how political decisions are taken. Although networked digital communica-
tion may also provide new avenues for disinformation and propaganda, it generally 
poses a challenge to the closed, neo-corporatist style of policy-making which has 
been common in many EU Member States and in many policy areas. Transparen-
cy, therefore, is not just a normative element of reflexive governance, but it is also 
becoming a social reality and – we would argue – a potential pro-active strategy of 
administrations seeking a policy decision. 
Second, many problems today require more complex solutions and, ultimately, the 
cooperation of a broader range of actors from different areas of expertise and dif-
ferent governance levels. This applies particularly to governance for sustainability 
which is the focus of this research. These factors make it more likely that incum-
bent actors will in the future more actively explore the political opportunities of re-
flexivity, which lie predominantly in the identification of congruent solutions. None-
theless, a tension remains between the aspirations of RIA as a reflexive activity 
which challenges current ways of thinking and acting and the need to engage 
powerful actors which will often represent precisely this dominant frame.  
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Bringing together our empirical insights and the theoretical considerations associ-
ated with the reflexive governance literature, we can formulate a number of direc-
tions for developing a practice of RIA which is more in line with the aspirations of 
reflexive governance: 
- Focusing on the function of opening up decision-making: RIA needs to be 
developed from a tool of closure to a two-phase process of opening up and 
closing down. In this way, the reflexive governance perspective fundamentally 
changes the logic of appraisal. From the perspective of environmental policy 
integration it seemed possible to arrive at a ‘best’ decision (ideally a ‘win-win’ 
constellation between environmental protection and economic gains through 
ecological modernisation, cf. chapter 2). The role of appraisal in this context is 
to strengthen the role of objective environmental evidence vis-à-vis politically 
powerful incumbents. This implies that RIA should be isolated from politics. In 
contrast, from a reflexive governance point of view, the main task of RIA is to 
open up the decision-making process as well as to acknowledge and negoti-
ate the different worldviews, diverging evaluation criteria and alternative ways 
of appraising amongst all relevant actors. Only once this crucial stage has 
been accomplished, the process of closing down towards a congruent course 
of action can begin. This means that the appraisal needs to systematically en-
gage with politics in a constructive way. 
- Increasing participation in RIA: RIA should be developed from being (in most 
jurisdictions) an internal administrative procedure to becoming a discursive 
and participatory exercise. Both reflectiveness and reflexivity in RIA can only 
be achieved through a direct and meaningful involvement of a broad range of 
stakeholders. That participatory RIAs had more impact on decision-making 
than purely internal ones has been an empirical observation (see chapter 4 
and 5) for which the reflexive governance literature provides a theoretically 
based explanation: From the perspective of environmental policy integration it 
seemed possible to anticipate, consider and ultimately mitigate the objective 
negative environmental consequences through a detached rational analysis. 
The understanding of environmental policy integration developed in chapter 2 
has somewhat enriched this perspective to include policy learning in the 
sense of a change of framing problems and solutions. Nonetheless, there is 
an implicit expectation that a desk officer who has to carry out an encompass-
ing RIA would see for himself what the environmental impacts are and adjust 
his or her policy preference accordingly. The analysis in chapters 3 and 4 
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showed that this expectation is unrealistic. Reflective learning mostly occurred 
at the margins of the policy and when consulted actors (including other minis-
tries) insisted on a broadening of evaluation criteria. The concept of environ-
mental policy integration, however, failed to provide a theoretical explanation 
for this finding. Reflexive governance, in contrast, emphasises that knowledge 
is embedded in social practices. Different actors may have fundamentally dif-
ferent cognitive and normative beliefs which have to be uncovered through 
discursive processes rather than just scientific methodology. Therefore, the 
appraisal cannot just rely on a wider analysis carried out by the same actors, 
but it has to invite actors representing these different worldviews and knowl-
edges to take part. The objective is to move from reflective learning and par-
tial ‘one-way reflexive learning’ to a broader process of reflexive learning 
where all relevant actors improve their understanding of each other’s posi-
tions, interests, problem framings, beliefs and knowledge claims in order to 
search for congruent solutions. Direct and systematic stakeholder involvement 
is a necessary (but not sufficient) condition for this form of reflexive learning. 
In practice, this means that RIA has to be understood as a transparently doc-
umented process, that stakeholders should be asked to critically review not 
just factual data, but the problem definition and the overall regulatory ap-
proach. 
- Defining standards of process rather than material standards: Reflexive RIA 
requires a flexibility to adjust to different circumstances: The empirical study 
has shown that RIA is often not a relevant and meaningful activity for desk of-
ficers in charge of actual policy processes. One important reason for this is 
over-standardisation through guidance documents which prescribe a uniform 
approach (options, methods, indicators etc.). Currently, many procedures at-
tempt to ensure implementation through a strict set of formal obligations. The 
experience suggests, however, that this approach largely fails because it is 
impossible to coerce desk officers into engaging constructively in a process 
which is not seen to support their work. Relevance in practice can only be 
achieved if there is a considerable amount of flexibility and responsiveness in 
the way in which it is applied. Procedures have to accommodate a wide range 
of decision contexts (see chapters 3 and 4). Therefore, key decisions (e.g. on 
the scope of the analysis, on alternative policy pathways to be compared, on 
the kind of expertise to be used and on the methods which should be applied) 
have to be taken individually for each assessment. The quality of these deci-
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sions can much better be improved through standards of process (require-
ments for the involvement of external and internal stakeholders) than material 
standards. 
- RIA should provide frame reflexivity: The RIA process has to be extended to 
cover both the framing of the policy problem and the framing of the appraisal 
(frame reflexivity). I have argued that RIA has in many jurisdictions contributed 
to increasing the transparency of policy-making because it has clarified the 
decision-making basis of the lead ministry. This transparency, however, most-
ly applied to the ‘factual’ basis of the decision, e.g. the costs and benefits of 
different options. The ways in which the policy problem is defined and the ap-
praisal is framed were typically not reflected in the process. Moreover, the ap-
praisal process is supposed to be separate from normative and political ques-
tions, conceived as unconstrained appraisal of all available options. In most 
observed cases, only ‘hard’ factual restrictions on policy decisions were 
acknowledged, for example budgetary constraints or compatibility with Euro-
pean law. Supposedly ‘softer’ constraints such as political pledges or lack of 
societal support tend not to be mentioned because they are seen as illegiti-
mate within RIA. A reflexive RIA needs to avoid this positivist reduction of the 
idea of rationality and acknowledge the political dimension of decisions. Re-
flexivity – a self-critical opening up of decision-making processes – requires 
that each appraisal is as transparent as possible about ‘policy commitments’ 
because they can only become the subject of political debate if they are open-
ly acknowledged. In analogy to the term ‘technological commitment’ as intro-
duced by Stirling (2008), ‘policy commitment’ can be defined as an attachment 
(political, institutional, economic or discursive etc.) to particular policy path-
ways. Political commitments can be deliberate and explicit (e.g. included in 
programmes of the political parties in government, previous statements by 
leading politicians or coalition agreements). They can also be emergent, dif-
fuse and tacit. Policy commitments can refer to a particular policy instrument 
or to specific regulatory impacts (or their avoidance). They are informed by 
knowledge, but also relate to values and interests. Overall, commitment and 
appraisal co-evolve as political commitments provide the political possibility 
space in which appraisal explores different options, while at the same time 
appraisal informs political commitments (cf. Stirling 2008). In practice, policy 
commitments should be described and justified in the RIA report. 
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- RIA should be understood as boundary work: Moreover, RIA could then be 
understood as a conscious reflection of the interface between science and 
policy. So far, it has often served as ‘boundary work’ in the sense of maintain-
ing a clear demarcation between scientific expertise and the subsequent nor-
mative policy decision (cf. Gieryn 1983). Reflexive RIA, in contrast, should 
recognise that there is a broad zone at the interface between science and pol-
icy where cognitive and normative beliefs are closely intertwined. In this zone, 
the function of the assessment in general as well as the scope and contribu-
tion of specific assessment methodologies are likely to be contested between 
different stakeholders. Managing this interface is a “fundamental element in 
effectively linking knowledge to action” (Cash et al. 2002, p. 1). This means in 
practice that actors involved in reflexive RIA need to put effort into determining 
exactly which questions can be answered by what kind of expertise. Specific 
methodologies of the assessments should not be considered as taken-for-
granted factual input, but as ‘boundary objects’. Originally coined in the con-
text of studying the collaboration of scientists from different disciplines and 
backgrounds, the term denotes ‘work arrangements’ (such as maps or mod-
els) which facilitate the cooperation of different groups without consensus 
(Star and Griesemer 1989, Star 2010). In the context of RIA, this may imply 
that elements of the appraisal such as evaluation criteria, indicators, forecasts 
or cost calculations are explicitly integrated into stakeholder dialogue to facili-
tate communication about underlying controversies about assumptions, val-
ues and perspectives. This task is (as we have seen in chapters 4 and 5) un-
derappreciated in the theory and practice of policy appraisal. 
 
7.4 Future research: Reflexive governance and the classical-modernist 
institutions of representative democracy 
So far, the reflexive governance literature has not been concerned in much detail 
with the functioning of classical-modernist policy-making institutions. This can be 
largely explained by a general scepticism towards the ability of established policy-
making structures to address the fundamental economic, social and technological 
crises diagnosed by reflexive modernisation theory (cf. section 6.3.2). Reflexive 
modernisation theory has also observed that the classical-modernist institutions of 
the nation state have been weakened, especially through the parallel processes of 
globalisation and individualisation. This discrepancy between the scope of the 
challenge and the perceived lack of steering capacity has led to a view that “these 
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[classical-modernist] institutions might simply lack the authority or focus needed for 
problem-solving that is widely perceived to be both effective and legitimate” (Hajer 
2003, p. 177, see also Ott 2014). 
Because of this scepticism, many reflexive governance scholars are exploring the 
potential role of new governance arrangements typically adjacent to existing dem-
ocratic venues, for example transition management, constructive technology as-
sessment, adaptive management, participatory scenario planning, local networks 
and so on (e.g. Kemp and Loorbach 2006, Sendzimir et al. 2006, Weber 2006, 
Gottschick 2013). In addition, it is sometimes suggested that reflexive governance 
complements the (essentially unchanged) modernist forms of government. For 
example, Voß and Kemp argue for “an additional level of integrative, unrestrained 
and open-ended ‘second order’ reflexivity governance that reflects, orients and 
supervises diverse specialised problem-solving processes [i.e. first order govern-
ance]. In this way, the powers of specialisation and integration can check and bal-
ance each other” (2006, p. 7). 
Developing and studying new, experimental governance arrangements has a 
number of obvious benefits: new constellations of actors may be less ‘tainted’ by 
entrenched conflicts between political parties and factions, the issue at question 
can be framed more freely, the process design is open for experiments and learn-
ing, and engaging in innovative processes tends to motivate both researchers and 
participants. While recognising the value of new governance arrangements, we 
would argue that sparing out the classical-modernist democratic institutions in the 
reflection on governance is misguided. 
The first reason is empirical. States still matter because they “structure political, 
economic and social interactions, maintain legal frameworks [...] backed by coer-
cive power, and deploy significant economic and administrative resources” (Duit et 
al. forthcoming). I also follow Ott (2014, p. 304ff.) that a radical pessimism regard-
ing the ability of the democratic state to respond to the ecological crisis is not justi-
fied when we look at the evidence over a long-term perspective. There are many 
indications that the modernist institutions of democracy in Europe (and beyond) 
are changing in the light of ecological and social crises. We can observe that criti-
cal ecological thinking is becoming more mainstream and that many governmental 
and non-governmental actors are searching for more sustainable development 
pathways. Examples include the recent expansion of renewable energy, the in-
creasing emphasis on relating public spending to societal needs, a renewed critical 
thinking on economic growth not only amongst radical NGOs but in mainstream 
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public discourse, as well as an increasingly networked civil society with a strong 
interest in environmental issues. Given that there are also counter-examples of 
political stalemate and backlog of reform (or indeed counter-modernity), the aim is 
not to claim that a state-led ecological transformation can be taken for granted. 
Rather, we would argue that it would be wrong to underestimate the dynamic and 
impacts of the response of existing state institutions to the ongoing ecological cri-
sis. 
The second reason is normative: Reflectiveness and reflexivity are principles 
which should apply not just to overarching societal discourses which frame specific 
decision situations, but to every political decision and every collective action. The 
analysis in chapters 4 and 5 has shown that policy-making institutions are not only 
concerned with specialist issues for which a technical-rational paradigm is appro-
priate. Much of the day-to-day decision-making by governments and parliaments 
relates to conflictual political issues. Moreover, uncertainty and value conflicts also 
arise in decision processes which may seem rather technical on the surface. 
Therefore, reflexivity not only requires new governance arrangements but at the 
same time a fundamental reform of classical-modernist institutions: “Reflexivity in 
governance for sustainable development should be understood primarily as a 
property of the governance system as a whole” (Meadowcroft 2009, p. 340). 
The suggestion of a division of labour between classical-modernist government 
continuing its traditional role of specialist problem-solving and new governance 
arrangements providing a broader frame for reflection seems unrealistic: It is hard 
to conceive how new reflexive governance arrangements “reflect”, “orient” and 
“supervise” specialised problem-solving processes (Voß and Kemp 2006, see 
above) if there is an increasing discrepancy in the ways issues are framed, alterna-
tives assessed and solutions conceived in these two distinct arenas. Moreover, 
this argument ignores the fact that there are classical-modernist institutions (such 
as parliament and political parties) which are deeply involved in broader societal 
discourse beyond technical problem-solving. 
The argument for a need to reshape core institutions of representative democracy 
also holds true if there is not an assumption of a division of labour but the alterna-
tive view that new governance arrangements take over certain functions from tradi-
tional institutions which are increasingly strained and are losing some of their rele-
vance. This idea resonates with the concept of sub-politics (Subpolitik, cf. Beck 
1993) which assumes that politics is increasingly made outside traditional political 
arenas, for example if civil society action (such as consumer boycotts or NGO 
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campaigns) leads companies to take environmental action beyond their legal obli-
gations. The replacement of ‘old’ with ‘new’ governance also seems to underlie the 
idea of an “institutional void” put forward by Hajer (2003). Political action, Hajer 
argues, now frequently takes place next to or across traditional venues and “there 
are no generally accepted rules and norms according to which politics is to be 
conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon” (Hajer 2003, p. 175). Ac-
tors thereby simultaneously engage in negotiations about new institutional rules, 
i.e. in both politics and meta-politics. While it is a valid observation that established 
institutions such as governments, parliaments and political parties have lost some 
of their power and appeal, they remain central institutions of democracy. It is hard 
to see how they could be fundamentally replaced. 
Therefore, a third reason why the reflexive governance literature should occupy 
itself with classical-modernist institutions is that new governance arrangements 
have to connect to the institutions of representative democracy. Generally, the 
literature does not sufficiently acknowledge the socio-political context in which re-
flexive governance takes place (Hendriks and Grin 2007, p. 336). It has tended to 
neglect politics, which is seen as “bother to steering, rather than as something that 
governance needs to accommodate and build upon” (ibid.). The question how ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ governance arrangements interact remains largely unanswered. Stand-
alone reflexive governance experiments are likely to suffer from a lack of struc-
tures and commitments that could take the outcomes of specific processes for-
ward, a lack of democratic legitimacy and an increased risk of duplicating process-
es for democratic opinion formation on particular societal problems. The critical 
questions Meadowcroft (2009, p. 335) poses with regard to transition management 
equally apply to other new reflexive governance arrangements (in a similar vein: 
Hendriks and Grin 2007, p. 336f): How well-equipped are these processes to ne-
gotiate the political dimensions of the issue in question? How do they relate to tra-
ditional policy tools which remain key instruments of governance for sustainable 
development? Are they suited to make decisions which require a formal framework 
of democratic legitimacy, for example because they have distributive consequenc-
es? The key research agenda for the reflexive governance literature, thus, has 
three elements.  
- First, future work should analyse and support efforts to increase the reflexivity 
of classical-modernist institutions. An important undertaking would be to ana-
lyse the barriers to and opportunities for increased reflexivity in institutions 
such as expert bodies, political parties, parliaments, the administration, and 
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the judiciary: What are the potentials of these different institutions to increase 
the reflexivity of policy-making? What conceptions of the science policy inter-
face underlie these institutions? Have these changed over time? Where can 
we already find elements of reflexivity such as efforts to open up decision-
making? What are key entry points for more reflexive practices?  
- Second, research is required to identify ways to systematically connect ‘old’ 
and ‘new’ governance arrangements: How do innovative, participatory pro-
cesses such as transition management, constructive technology assessment 
or participatory dialogues produce both relevant and legitimate knowledge? 
How have these processes to be set up in order to ensure that they can feed 
into decision-making processes associated with democratically legitimised in-
stitutions? 
- Third, this more empirical analysis should be accompanied by a further theo-
retical development of the concept of reflexive governance. If reflexive gov-
ernance is to become a guiding principle for collective decision-making, it has 
to be further developed from a normative and relatively fuzzy notion to a well-
defined concept with a normative, empirical and functional grounding. The 
definition developed in section 6.3.3 as well as the analytical framework de-
veloped and applied in section 6.3.5 have provided a starting point for this. 
Further work could develop and clarify key concepts underlying reflexive gov-
ernance such as frame reflexivity and boundary work (cf. section 7.3). 
In pursuing this line of research, the reflexive governance debate can and should 
build on the environmental policy integration literature, which  – as observed in 
section 6.3.1 – has largely failed to change the practice of policy making for sus-
tainable development. Nonetheless, it has generated important insights. Its 
strength lies in its detailed analysis of real world political and administrative pro-
cesses and its differentiated description of barriers to policy change. Informed by 
theoretical perspectives such as the comparative political systems analysis, policy 
analysis and institutional analysis, the literature on environmental policy integratoin 
has generated a solid and insightful analysis of functionally differentiated decision-
making structures and their effects on sustainability. Future research should take 
note of these findings when exploring potentials to make these institutions and 
processes more reflexive. 
This thesis has made a first step in this direction. It has shown that it is possible for 
RIA to create “moments of reflexivity amid the sea of everyday politics” (Hendriks 
and Grin 2007, p. 334), thereby providing an important entry point for making the 
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workings of our democracy more reflexive. It has also shown, however, that there 
will be circumstances under which key actors have little interest and incentive to 
engage in any effort to increase the reflexivity of decision-making. The extent to 
which the potential reforms of the classical-modernist institutions of democracy will 
be realised in the future will to a large extent depend on how vigorously actors out-
side the inner circle of policy-making push for change. 
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